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[561] 
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, PRIVATE WATER 
ALLOCATION, AND MONO LAKE: THE HISTORIC SAGA OF 
NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY V. SUPERIOR COURT  
BY 
ERIN RYAN* 
This Article tells the epic tale of the fall and rise of Mono Lake—
the strange and beautiful Dead Sea of California—which fostered some 
of the most important environmental law developments of the last 
century, and which has become a platform for some of the most 
potentially important developments in the new century. It shares the 
backstory and legacy of the California Supreme Court’s famous 
decision in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 
(Cal. 1983), known more widely as “the Mono Lake case.” Inspired by 
innovative legal scholarship and advocacy, the decision spawned a 
quiet legal revolution in public trust ideals, which has redounded to 
other states and even nations as far distant as India. 
The Mono Lake dispute pitted advocates for the local ecosystem 
and community against proponents of the continued export of Mono 
Basin water to millions of thirsty Californians hundreds of miles to the 
south. The controversy itself spanned decades, but the story leading up 
to the litigation stretches back more than a hundred years, adding 
depth and dimension to the tale that is easily missed on a casual 
reading of the Mono Lake decision itself. It is a case study on the 
challenges and possibilities for balancing legitimate needs for public 
infrastructure and economic development with competing 
environmental values, all within systems of law that are still evolving to 
manage these conflicts. And at this particular moment in time, 
commemorating the hundredth anniversary of the Los Angeles 
Aqueduct that would threaten the lake and the twentieth anniversary of 
 
* Professor Erin Ryan, Lewis & Clark Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School; M.A., Wesleyan 
University. I am deeply indebted to Mike Blumm, Hap Dunning, Carol Rose, Robin Craig, and 
Rick Frank for their generous and insightful comments, to Gabe Hinman and Ashley Garcia for 
their outstanding research assistance, and to the editors of Environmental Law for their 
exhaustive efforts in helping to prepare this piece for publication. I will always be grateful to 
the Mono Lake District of the Inyo National Forest, the Mono Lake Committee, and the 
community of Lee Vining, CA for welcoming me home so many years ago, and for inspiring the 
professional journey that began with this story. Finally, I dedicate this piece to the memory of 
Joseph Sax, whose work changed my life, as it has so many others. 
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the State Water Board’s ultimate decision to save it, the Mono Lake 
story is especially worth revisiting. 
Part II introduces the main cast of characters in the Mono Lake 
story, starting with the public trust and prior appropriations doctrines 
around which the legal controversy unfolds. Part III introduces the 
three places at the center of the drama—Los Angeles, the Owens 
Valley, and the Mono Lake Basin—in recounting the history of the 
Californian water struggles leading up to the Mono Lake case. Part IV 
discusses the Mono Lake litigation itself and its aftermath, reviewing 
the court’s conclusion and the subsequent decision by the California 
Water Resources Control Board implementing the judicial directive. 
After analyzing the most important doctrinal innovations in the opinion, 
Part IV discusses subsequent critiques and new developments in public 
trust law. 
Part V concludes with parting reflections about some important 
questions that the Mono Lake story leaves us to ponder, including 
whose interests count when we talk about the “public” trust, how they 
differ from aggregated private interests, and which to account for when 
balancing the economic, cultural, and environmental considerations in 
public trust conflicts. It considers the extent to which the doctrine 
creates substantive or procedural obligations, and the responsibilities 
of different legal actors and institutions in implementing them. The 
contested answers to these questions are what make the public trust 
doctrine so fascinating, so powerful, and so critical as we continue to 
confront the inevitable crises between competing natural resource 
values. 
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The visitors collect at the parking lot, breathlessly absorbing the 
magnificent escarpment of the Yosemite–Inyo Sierra before them, admiring the 
defiant cones of the Mono Crater volcanoes behind them, and settling their 
gazes over the crystalline edges of the body of water between, a vast inland sea 
twice the size of San Francisco—the mythical Mono Lake of newspaper 
headline and bumper-sticker fame. As they gradually descend the volcanic ash 
trail a few hundred yards out to shore, the ranger explains that the parking lot 
had been submerged twice their standing height in lakewater only a few 
decades ago, before the lake’s tributaries were first diverted into the Los 
Angeles Aqueduct for the 350-mile journey south to the City. . . . 
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And then, just a few yards from the foaming water’s edge, the ranger stops 
them and explains that thanks to important legal decisions between 1983 and 
1994, the water level is now rising again—the salinity falling, the birds 
returning, the shrimp safe from extinction, and the people breathing clean air 
again—all because of an ancient article of common law, the public trust 
doctrine, according to which the California Supreme Court finally decided that 
to allow the death of Mono Lake for the benefit of one city [c]ould violate the 
State’s duty to protect it as an ecological resource belonging to all. Parents’ 
eyes grow as wide as their children’s in sudden wonder of the power of ideas, 
and in awe of the devastation of near loss and the grace of last-minute 
salvation. And as they stand in the midst of such unparalleled natural splendor, 
rejoicing in a happy ending so rare in like stories of environmental crisis, the 
visitors experience . . . genuine gratitude for [law].1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this Article, based on an interactive lecture I have given countless 
times,2 I have the great pleasure of sharing the epic tale of the fall and rise of 
Mono Lake—the strange and beautiful Dead Sea of California—which 
fostered some of the most important environmental law developments of the 
last century,3 and which has become a platform for some of the most 
potentially important developments in the new century.4 The Mono Lake 
saga is one of my very favorite stories in the world, and one that I have 
enjoyed sharing all over the world in the years since I left the Mono Basin for 
academia. It includes the backstory and the legacy of the California Supreme 
Court’s famous decision in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court 
 
 1  Erin Ryan, Public Trust & Distrust: Theoretical Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine 
for Natural Resource Management, 31 ENVTL. L. 477, 493–94 (2001) (describing the standard 
United States Forest Service ranger-led tour of the South Tufa trail on the southwest shore of 
Mono Lake). 
 2  This Article is based on an extended lecture about the Mono Lake story, drawing on my 
own expertise as both a property and environmental law professor and as a former U.S. Forest 
Service ranger at the Mono Basin National Forest Scenic Area, just east of Yosemite National 
Park, in northeastern California. 
 3  See, e.g., Michael Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in 
Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701 (1995) (analyzing impacts of the Mono Lake case on 
subsequent cases and the evolving public trust doctrine nationwide); Craig Anthony (Tony) 
Arnold, Working out an Environmental Ethic: Anniversary Lessons from Mono Lake, 4 WYO. L. 
REV. 1 (2004) (using the Mono Lake case study to suggest that politics and public participation 
are as critical as formal law to environmental successes); Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold & Leigh 
A. Jewel, Litigation’s Bounded Effectiveness and the Real Public Trust Doctrine: The Aftermath 
of the Mono Lake Case, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1177, 1181 (2008) (arguing that 
the Mono Lake case laid the foundation for a conception of the public trust that transcends the 
courtroom); Sherry A. Enzler, How Law Mattered to the Mono Lake Ecosystem, 35 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 413 (2011) (reviewing the significance of the Mono Lake case for public 
trust and environmental law at a systemic level). 
 4  See, e.g., infra Parts II.A.2, IV.A.4, and IV.C.3 (discussing Robinson Township, the Scott 
River case, and atmospheric trust cases).  
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(Mono Lake),5 which began a quiet legal revolution in public trust ideals that 
has redounded to other states and even nations as far distant as India.6 
The Mono Lake dispute pitted advocates for the Mono Basin ecosystem 
and its local community against proponents of the continued export of Mono 
Basin water to millions of thirsty Californians hundreds of miles to the 
south.7 The controversy itself spanned decades, but the story leading up to 
the litigation stretches back more than a hundred years, adding depth and 
dimension to the tale that is easily missed on a casual reading of the 
Audubon Society decision itself. It is a case study on the challenges of, and 
possibilities for, balancing legitimate needs for public infrastructure and 
economic development with competing environmental values, all within 
systems of law that are still evolving to manage these conflicts. And at this 
particular moment in time—commemorating the hundredth anniversary of 
the Los Angeles Aqueduct that would threaten the lake, and the twentieth 
anniversary of the State Water Board’s ultimate decision to save it—the 
Mono Lake story is especially worth revisiting.8 
It is also a story that is very dear to me personally, because I came to it 
mostly through my own experiences living and working at Mono Lake as a 
grunt-level ranger with the U.S. Forest Service. Before later becoming a 
lawyer and then law professor, I spent a few years working on the Mono 
Lake District of the Inyo National Forest, just east of Yosemite National 
Park.9 Indeed, my decision to leave the Mono Basin for law, though 
 
 5  Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine County (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 
1983). 
 6  M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 S.C.C. 388 (1996) (India), in I UNITED NATIONS 
ENVIRONMENT PROJECT COMPENDIUM OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN MATTERS RELATED TO THE 
ENVIRONMENT, NATIONAL DECISIONS 259 (1998), available at http://www.asianjudges.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/Compendium_Judicial_Decisions_Nat_v1.pdf (discussing the role of 
the public trust doctrine in Indian law and quoting the California Supreme Court’s description 
of the doctrine in Mono Lake). 
 7  Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 715. 
 8  The Los Angeles Aqueduct formally opened in 1913. Id. at 713. The California Water 
Resources Control Board issued its decision implementing the state supreme court’s decision in 
1994. Mono Lake Basin Water Right Decision 1631, at 1, 6 (State of Calif. Water Res. Control Bd. 
Sep. 28, 1994) [hereinafter Decision 1631], available at http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/ 
publications_forms/publications/general/docs/monolake_wr_dec1631_a.pdf; see also infra Part 
III.B and IV.C (reviewing this history).  
 9  I normally give this lecture as an illustrated photo essay, drawing on my experiences 
during the years that I worked at Mono Lake. I lived with U.S. Forest Service rangers, Mono 
Lake Committee staff, and other local residents in the tiny mountain hamlet of Lee Vining, 
California, nestled at 7,000 feet of elevation between the western edge of the Lake and the 
eastern slope of the Yosemite–Inyo Sierra crest, with a population of 315 at the time. Lee Vining 
is surrounded by 10,000- to 14,000-foot mountains on three out of four sides, snowed-in beyond 
automobile passage for more than half the year. When I lived there in the mid-1990s, before 
home satellites were available, there was no television and only one radio station broadcasting 
intermittently from Mammoth Lakes, a small ski town 30 miles to the south.  
  To pass the time, local residents regularly went climbing, hiking, or birding—but my 
friends and I invented a wholly new Mono Basin sport: aqueducting. We made it our project to 
find all the interesting points along the 400-mile-long Los Angeles Aqueduct, all the way from 
the northernmost intake in the Mono Basin down to its symbolic end at Department of Water 
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wrenching, was the direct result of my experiences there bearing witness to 
the ability of ordinary people to wield the power of ideas to resolve critical 
social and environmental crises through legal process. Especially in the 
aftermath and implementation of the Mono Lake decision, I was inspired by 
efforts of citizens, lawyers, scientists, and governments working together to 
make progress in the best possible way, even when no perfect way was 
available.10 
For that reason, this is an Article that I have been wanting to write for 
the better part of the last twenty years. It takes a somewhat unconventional 
voice at times, alternating between the academic analysis of a law professor 
and the personal narrative of a local storyteller. But throughout, my 
objective is to share a classic story of American environmental law that 
continues to awe and inspire advocates worldwide. In the telling, I’ll explore 
the public trust doctrine, its relationship with competing areas of law, 
especially the law of private water allocation, and its potential scope and 
limits in application to other public commons that are also subject to private 
appropriation. 
Part II begins by introducing the main cast of characters in the Mono 
Lake story, starting with the public trust and prior appropriations doctrines 
around which the legal controversy unfolds. Part III introduces the three 
places at the center of the drama—Los Angeles, the Owens Valley, and the 
Mono Lake Basin—in recounting the history of the Californian water 
struggles leading up to the Mono Lake case. Part IV discusses the Mono Lake 
litigation itself and its aftermath, reviewing the arguments that made it to the 
California Supreme Court, the court’s disposition of them, and the 
subsequent decision by the California Water Resources Control Board 
implementing the court’s directive.11 After analyzing the most important 
doctrinal developments in the judicial opinion, it reviews the scholarly 
criticisms that have followed alongside the praise, as well as important new 
developments in public trust law. 
I’ll conclude in Part V with parting reflections about some of the open 
questions that the Mono Lake story leaves us to ponder. Like all public trust 
tales, it prompts us to consider exactly whose interests count when we talk 
about the public interest protected by the doctrine, and in what resources. 
How does the “public interest” differ from aggregated private interests? 
Which interests should we take into account when balancing the economic, 
cultural, and environmental considerations in public trust conflicts, and how 
should they be balanced? Indeed, we might ask what the Mono Lake story 
tells us about the ultimate content of the public trust doctrine itself. Which 
resources are subject to its protection? Does it create substantive 
 
and Power’s reflecting pool in Los Angeles. The full lecture makes use of stories and 
photographs from these personal journeys, to understand this history up close and personally. 
 10  Still, I’ll never forget that when I volunteered thoughts about leaving my work as a forest 
ranger to become a lawyer, most of the lawyers I spoke with cried aloud that this was crazy—
that they dreamed of leaving their jobs in law to become forest rangers! (Health insurance 
aside, there is a lot of wisdom in that reaction.) 
 11  See Decision 1631, supra note 8. 
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obligations to protect trust values, or mere procedural obligations to 
consider them? Finally, what are the responsibilities of the operative legal 
institutions—including the legislature, the courts, administrative agencies, 
and individual citizens—in making these difficult calls? I’ll suggest that the 
answers to these questions are what make the public trust doctrine so 
fascinating, so powerful, and so critical as we continue to confront the 
inevitable crises between competing natural resource values. 
II. THE LEGAL BACKDROP: THE PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIOR APPROPRIATIONS 
Before delving into the full narrative, we should introduce the cast of 
characters. And one unusual aspect of this story is that two of the most 
important characters in that cast are legal doctrines: the common law public 
trust doctrine, and the prior appropriations doctrine of private water 
allocation. This Part introduces the public trust doctrine as a feature of state 
common law and constitutional law, and perhaps as an underlying feature of 
sovereign authority more generally. It then reviews the broad mechanics of 
private water law, focusing on the western doctrines of prior appropriations 
and beneficial use. 
A. The Public Trust Doctrine 
The public trust doctrine is among the oldest doctrines of the common 
law, with roots in the Justinian Code of ancient Rome, where it was called 
the jus publicum.12 As the Byzantine Emperor Justinian described it: “By the 
law of nature, these things are common to mankind—the air, running water, 
the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea.”13 Even then, it was 
recognized that some resources are so critical that they cannot be owned by 
anyone in particular; instead, they must belong to everyone. To prevent 
private monopolization of these critical commons resources,14 the 
government must manage them on behalf of the public.15 
American law received the public trust doctrine through British 
common law, where it was applied mostly to the sea and the shores of the 
sea.16 Here in the United States, where the shores of the sea are matched by 
countless thousands of miles of navigable rivers and lakes, the concept of 
 
 12  See, e.g., Ewa M. Davison, Enjoys Long Walks on the Beach: Washington’s Public Trust 
Doctrine and the Right of Pedestrian Passage over Private Tidelands, 81 WASH. L. REV 813, 830–
31 (2006); Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) (laying the seminal academic foundations for the 
public trust doctrine as a modern legal tool to aid in the protection of natural resources). 
 13  J. INST. PROEMIUM, 2.1.1. (T. Sandars trans., 4th ed. 1867). 
 14  Davison, supra note 12, at 830–31. 
 15  See Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law: 
A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573, 580 (1989) (discussing the public 
trust doctrine as “a democratizing force by (1) preventing monopolization of trust resources and 
(2) promoting natural resource decision making that involves and is accountable to the public”). 
 16  See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently 
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 727–30 (1986).  
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the trust was expanded to protect the resources associated with navigable 
waterways more generally.17 Early American references to the doctrine 
include the 1821 New Jersey case of Arnold v. Mundy18 and the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 1842 decision in Martin v. Waddell,19 both affirming state sovereign 
ownership of navigable waters and submerged lands.20 The doctrine was 
formally ratified by the U.S. Supreme Court in Shively v. Bowlby,21 but the 
most classic American statement of the trust comes from the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois (Illinois Central): 
“[T]he State holds the title to the lands under the navigable waters . . . in 
trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the 
waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein 
freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties.”22 
Critically, the doctrine isn’t just about protecting the public nature of 
these common resources—it’s also about assigning responsibility for their 
protection. Analogous to the private property law construct of the “trust,” 
the government (acting as trustee) is responsible for protecting the resource 
(or trust res) for the public benefit.23 This means that the government doesn’t 
 
 17  See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois (Illinois Central), 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). The public 
trust doctrine has also been held to protect wildlife, groundwater resources, atmospheric 
resources, and potentially groundwater tributaries of navigable waters. See, e.g., Betchart v. 
Dep’t of Fish & Game, 158 Cal. App. 3d 1104, 1106 (1984) (“California wildlife is publicly owned 
and is not held by owners of private land where wildlife is present.”); Owsichek v. State, Guide 
and Control Licensing Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 495 (Alaska 1988) (“[C]ommon law principles 
incorporated in the common use clause impose upon the state a trust duty to manage the fish, 
wildlife and water resources of the state for the benefit of all the people. We have twice 
recognized this duty in our prior decisions.” (footnote omitted)); Environmental Protection Act 
of 1970, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1202(1) (West 1989) (extending the public trust, via 
statute, to authorize legal actions “for the protection of the air” in addition to water and other 
natural resources); First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., No. 
34-2010-80000583 (Cal. Sup. Ct. July 15, 2014) (seeking to extend the public trust doctrine to 
protect groundwater resources in California); Natural Resources and Environmental Protection 
Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.1701(1) (1994), available at http://legislature.mi.gov/doc.aspx?mcl-
324-1701 (extending the public trust to statutorily authorize legal actions “for the protection of 
the air” in addition to water and other natural resources). 
 18  6 N.J.L. 1, 10 (1821) (using the public trust doctrine to prevent individuals from claiming 
a property interest in oyster beds in a navigable river).  
 19  41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842) (“[W]hen the Revolution took place, the people of each state 
became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable 
waters, and the soils under them, for their own common use, subject only to the rights since 
surrendered by the Constitution to the general government.”).  
 20  For a more thorough history of the early American doctrine, see generally Harrison C. 
Dunning, The Public Right to Use Water in Place, in WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 28-1 to 33-22 
(Amy C. Kelley ed., 2009).  
 21  152 U.S. 1, 49 (1894) (affirming the substance of the common law doctrine and holding 
that, with regard to the territories acquired by Congress, “the title and dominion of the tide 
waters and the lands under them are held by the United States for the benefit of the whole 
people, and, as this court has often said, in cases above cited, ‘in trust for the future States.’”). 
 22  Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452. 
 23  See, e.g., Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past and 
Charting Its Future, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 667 (2012) (“Simply stated, however, the doctrine 
provides that certain natural resources are held by the government in a special status—in 
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own trust resources in the same way that it owns more ordinary public lands 
under its jurisdiction. Instead, it holds the resource “in trust” for the real 
owner—the public. Some scholars have described the difference as one 
between state “sovereign” and “proprietary” ownership, in which resources 
held as sovereign property are subject to the trust, while those subject to 
proprietary ownership may be alienated by the state on terms more like 
ordinary private property.24 
The public is the ultimate beneficiary of the trust, and as in 
conventional trust relationships, the public can hold the government 
accountable for failure to manage trust resources in accordance with its 
responsibility as trustee.25 If they feel the government is failing its obligations 
as trustee, citizens can usually seek to enforce their rights in court.26 In this 
way, the public trust doctrine acts as a limit on sovereign authority with 
regard to trust resources, constraining what the government can and cannot 
do to ensure against private expropriation and monopolization.27 
1. The Common Law Public Trust: Illinois Central 
Demonstrating the force of the doctrine are the facts at the center of 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s leading public trust decision, the 1892 case of 
Illinois Central.28 
This colorful nineteenth century lawsuit followed a fraught moment in 
Illinois history, when the state legislature granted ownership of the better 
part of Chicago Harbor on Lake Michigan to a private railroad company.29 
After a series of complicated transactions in which Illinois Central Railroad 
Company was granted rights to construct infrastructure along the dry and 
wet sides of the lakeshore,30 the legislature overrode a gubernatorial veto to 
enact the Lake Front Act of 1869,31 which conveyed ownership rights in 
 
‘trust’—for current and future generations. Government officials may neither alienate those 
resources into private ownership nor permit their injury or destruction.”).  
 24  See DAVID C. SLADE ET AL., PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 6–8 (1997) 
(describing the distinction between jus privatum, which the state may convey, and jus 
publicum, which it may not). 
 25  See Sax, supra note 12, at 473 (describing how citizens have brought lawsuits to enforce 
the trust obligations of the state). 
 26  Id.  
 27  See Amicus Curiae Brief of Law Professors in Support of Granting Writ of Certiorari at 1–
2, 7, Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 14-405), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 774 (2014) [hereinafter Professor Amicus Brief] (discussing the public trust doctrine 
as an attribute of sovereignty). 
 28  146 U.S. 387 (1892).  
 29  Id. at 438–39 (making “a grant by the State, in 1869, of its right and title to the submerged 
lands, constituting the bed of Lake Michigan”). 
 30  Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust 
Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 818–23 (2004) 
(discussing the railroad’s improvements to the lakeshore); see also Crystal Chase, The Illinois 
Central Public Trust Decision and Federal Common Law: An Unconventional View, 16 HASTINGS 
W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 113, 126 (2010) (same). 
 31 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 30, at 860–77 (discussing the enactment of the Lake Front 
Act of 1869); see also 2 Journal of the Senate of the Twenty Sixth General Assembly of the State 
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perpetuity to the railroad.32 Whether the legislative grant was a well-intended 
plan to spur economic development or the most flagrant variety of political 
cronyism,33 the people of Chicago were incensed, and they made their 
displeasure known to their leaders in government.34 
In 1873, responding to significant public pressure, the Illinois legislature 
sought to reestablish public control over the full harbor by repealing the 
original conveyance.35 Ten years later, when the railroad continued to 
assume a proprietary posture toward the harbor, the state sued for 
declaratory relief establishing public ownership of the lakebed.36 But Illinois 
Central argued that these submerged lands were now its private property, 
conveyed by the Lake Front Act of 1869.37 The railroad maintained that the 
state lacked authority to reclaim property that had already passed in a fully 
executed conveyance.38 As the railroad argued, the state could not formally 
convey property and then just take it back, as if the conveyance had never 
happened!39 
Of course, even if the legislative grant were sound, the state actually 
could have just taken it back—though not as if the conveyance had never 
happened. The state’s power of eminent domain would have allowed it to 
reclaim the property for public use, so long as it paid just compensation to 
the railroad.40 Indeed, other scholars have written about Illinois Central as 
though the most important issue in the litigation was the state’s liability for 
an uncompensated taking41—a legal issue in which the public trust doctrine 
might also play a role42—but that claim was not a subject of the actual 
litigation.43 Instead, Illinois Central staked its most important claim on the 
power of the original legislative grant and the lack of state authority to undo 
 
of Illinois 922 (1869) (noting the Senate’s passage of the House’s version of the bill, enacting the 
Act). 
 32  See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 30, at 875. 
 33  Compare Sax, supra note 12, at 490 (arguing that the conveyance could not be justified 
by any public benefit), with Kearney & Merrill, supra note 30, at 893 (“[A]lthough the 
documentary record from 1869 cannot be said definitely to establish . . . corrupt means . . . it 
probably leans in that direction.”). 
 34  See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 30, at 805–06, 875. 
 35  Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 449 (1892) (“On the 15th of April, 1873, the legislature of 
Illinois repealed the act.”). 
 36  Id. at 433, 439. 
 37  Id. at 438–39. 
 38  Id. at 450–51. 
 39  Boiling down the legal jargon, the railroad’s claim would have been well understood—by 
any five-year-old—under the hallowed doctrine of “No Backsies.” 
 40  See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 41  See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 422–26 (1987); 
Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 239, 
246 (1992). 
 42  See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Palazzolo, The Public Trust, and the Property Owner’s Reasonable 
Expectations: Takings and the South Carolina Marsh Island Bridge Debate, 15 SOUTHEASTERN 
ENVTL. L.J. 121, 137–40 (2006) (discussing use of the public trust doctrine to defend takings 
claims by defusing the reasonableness of claimants’ expectations). 
 43  See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 30, at 811 n.54 (explaining this popular 
misconception). 
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it (together with subsidiary claims for rights incident to its ownership of 
riparian lands and a later claim that the repeal interfered with rights under 
its original charter).44 
Nevertheless, the state had a formidable response, and one that hinged 
on the subject of our inquiry here. Illinois argued that its power to undo a 
fully executed conveyance was immaterial, because—thanks to the public 
trust doctrine—there was no actual conveyance to undo.45 It may have 
looked like a conveyance in the moment, but in fact, no exchange took place 
as a legal matter, because the state never had the power to convey these 
submerged lands to begin with.46 The trust obligation prevented the 
government from conveying the trust resource away from public ownership, 
making the conveyance essentially ultra vires—beyond the power of the 
state—and thus of no legal consequence. 
Accepting this argument, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
operation of the public trust doctrine had prevented the legislature from 
ever alienating the harbor in the first place.47 The railroad had never been the 
actual owner of the submerged lands, then, and so its legal claims ended 
there. In this way, Illinois was able to successfully reestablish public 
ownership of Chicago Harbor on the grounds that the public trust doctrine 
acted as a limit on the state’s legal ability to casually convey trust lands.48 
The premise affirmed in Illinois Central provided critical impetus for 
the development of the common law public trust in nearly all of the United 
States.49 Today, the common law public trust doctrine offers meaningful 
protection of navigable waterways as public commons in nearly every state.50 
 
 44  Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 438–39 (1892) (stating the railroad’s claims); Ill. Cent, R.R. 
Co. v. Chicago, 176 U.S. 646, 657–67 (1900) (dismissing the railroad’s contract rights claim after 
determining that its charter did not convey the disputed lands). 
 45  Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 439. 
 46  Id. 
 47  Id. at 453 (“The trust devolving upon the State for the public, and which can only be 
discharged by the management and control of property in which the public has an interest, 
cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property.”). Of note, Justice Field explained that the 
trust extended to Chicago Harbor because it was “a subject of public concern to the whole 
people,” leaving open the possibility, embraced by later scholars and litigants, that the same 
rationale should apply to other commons resources also vulnerable to monopolization. Id. at 
455; see also MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 72 (2013) (discussing Illinois Central and various 
scholars’ interpretations of the case); infra Part IV.C (discussing the Atmospheric Trust 
Project). 
 48  See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453 (“The control of the State for the purposes of the 
trust can never be lost . . . .”). 
 49  See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 30, at 799 (outlining the history of the case in light of 
its importance in modern public trust theory). 
 50  See generally Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust 
Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 1 (2007) (comparing eastern states’ public trust doctrines); Robin Kundis Craig, A 
Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, 
and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010) (comparing 
western states’ public trust doctrines); ALEXANDRA B. KLASS & LING-YEE HUANG, RESTORING THE 
TRUST: WATER RESOURCES AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, A MANUAL FOR ADVOCATES 21–24 
(2009), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/CPR_Public_Trust_Doctrine 
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Following the Mono Lake decision, it has become increasingly associated 
not only with the protection of such traditional uses as boating, commerce, 
fishing, and swimming, but with environmental protection as well.51 
2. Constitutionalization of the Public Trust: Robinson Township 
The common law public trust doctrine continues to play an important 
role in the regulation of public waterways, but the trust concept has also 
developed independently as a matter of state constitutional law. 
Many states have constitutionalized versions of the doctrine; some are 
similar to the most traditional common law statements, and others are more 
encompassing.52 For example, the Florida Constitution includes a version of 
the trust that confers very traditional protection for submerged lands 
beneath navigable waters: “The title to lands under navigable waters, within 
the boundaries of the state . . . is held by the state, by virtue of its 
sovereignty, in trust for all the people.”53 This statement recognizes public 
ownership of the critical water commons, very much as Illinois Central did. 
Constitutionalization in other states has broadened the scope and effect 
of the trust, sometimes far beyond the Illinois Central version. For example, 
Article XI of the Hawaiian Constitution declares that: 
For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political 
subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii’s natural beauty and all natural 
resources, including land, water, air, minerals and energy sources, and shall 
promote the development and utilization of these resources in a manner 
consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of 
the State. All public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the 
benefit of the people.54 
Echoing the California doctrine that emerged from the Mono Lake litigation, 
the Hawaii Supreme Court has concluded that the law of private water 
 
_Manual.pdf (comparing the sources of various states’ public trust doctrines); MICHAEL C. 
BLUMM ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN FORTY-FIVE STATES (2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2235329 (analyzing the public trust 
doctrines of 45 states); CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, RESTORING THE TRUST: AN INDEX OF 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND CASES ON WATER RESOURCES AND THE 
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE (2009), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Pub 
Trust_State_table_2009.pdf. 
 51  See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney (Marks), 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (finding increasing 
recognition that one of the most important uses of tidelands protected by the doctrine is “the 
preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for 
scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds 
and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area”). 
 52  See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and State Constitutions: The 
Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 866 (1996) (“[T]he ‘public trust’ 
doctrine . . . plays a constitutional role in most states even though less than a handful of states 
refer to the trust in the constitution itself.”). 
 53  FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11. 
 54  HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1.  
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allocation does not displace the public trust doctrine.55 However, it has gone 
even further than California in holding that all water, and not just navigable 
water, is subject to the trust.56 
Like Hawaii’s expanded doctrine, the Environmental Rights 
Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution reveals an expansive modern 
conception of the trust: 
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the 
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s 
public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including 
generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth 
shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.57 
In contrast to the simpler Justinian affirmation of public ownership of 
natural resources, the Pennsylvania doctrine explicitly establishes a 
substantive commitment to protecting the environmental values associated 
with public resources. 
Demonstrating the power of this commitment, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court recently invoked the Environmental Rights Amendment to 
overturn a state law limiting municipal authority to regulate harms 
associated with horizontal shale drilling and hydraulic fracturing 
(“fracking”). In the 2014 decision of Robinson Township v. Commonwealth 
(Robinson Township),58 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the state 
could not preempt local regulation of fracking operations threatening local 
water resources, because this conflicted with the state’s obligation to 
protect present and future generations’ interests in public natural 
resources.59 Notably, the court invoked the doctrine sua sponte to resolve 
the case, even though the parties did not argue it.60 The move has drawn 
renewed attention to the possibilities for intersections between the public 
trust and other forms of state action that threaten public natural resources.61 
3. Federalization of the Public Trust? 
American case law generally presumes that the public trust doctrine is a 
feature of state law—either received as common law or adopted 
 
 55  In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Haw. 2000) 
(holding that the state water code “does not supplant the protections of the public trust 
doctrine”). 
 56  Id. (“[T]he public trust doctrine applies to all water resources without exception or 
distinction.”). 
 57  PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
 58  Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 919–20 (Pa. 2013). 
 59  Id. (noting that “a political subdivision has a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in 
protecting the environment and the quality of life within its borders” and that “[t]he protection 
of environmental and esthetic interests is an essential aspect of Pennsylvanians’ quality of life 
and a key part of local government’s role”). 
 60  See John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public Trust, 45 
ENVTL. L. 257, 464–65 (2015). 
 61  Id.  
15_TOJCI.RYAN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2015 2:53 PM 
574 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 45:561 
constitutionally (or both)62—a view that was recently affirmed by the D.C. 
Circuit.63 However, scholars have long argued that the doctrine is better 
understood as an inherent limit on sovereign authority in general.64 Pursuing 
this intuition, some suggest that relevant federal sovereign authority should 
also be subject to public trust limits.65 New litigation follows this line of 
argument to assert that as an inherent limit on sovereign authority, the 
public trust doctrine may also be an implied feature of federal constitutional 
law.66 If so, then it may have application to waters under federal jurisdiction, 
and possibly to other natural resources that can be protected only by federal 
authority.67 
These scholars and litigants argue that there are neither historical nor 
logical reasons to differentiate between the state or federal nature of the 
sovereign power that the public trust doctrine constrains when the 
sovereign acts in a manner contrary to a definable trust obligation.68 
Received as part of the English common law that forms the bedrock of all 
American legal institutions, the doctrine is neither a creature of state nor 
federal law, but a constraint on the sovereign authority delegated to each 
level of government within our federal system.69 
 
 62  See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Silvyn, Protecting Public Trust Values in California’s Waters: The 
Constitutional Alternative, 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 355 (1992) (comparing California’s 
common law and constitutional public trust rights, and concluding that the latter is more 
expansive). 
 63  Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2014). But see Michael 
Blumm & Lynn Schaffer, The Federal Public Trust Doctrine: Misinterpreting Justice Kennedy 
and Illinois Central Railroad, 45 ENVTL. L. 257, 400–01 (2015) (arguing that the D.C. Circuit is 
incorrect on this point). 
 64  See, e.g., Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust and In-Stream Uses, 19 ENVTL. L. 605, 609 
(1989) (arguing that the public trust is an inalienable attribute of state sovereignty). 
 65  See, e.g., MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW 
ECOLOGICAL AGE 133–36 (2014) [hereinafter NATURE’S TRUST]; Mary Christina Wood, Advancing 
the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future 
Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 74 
(2009) [hereinafter Wood, Part I]; Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of 
Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part II): 
Instilling a Fiduciary Obligation in Governance, 39 ENVTL. L. 91, 135–36 (2009) [hereinafter 
Wood, Part II] (suggesting avenues for Congress to meet its public trust responsibilities); 
Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 63, at 399 (arguing that “there is considerable precedent applying 
the public trust doctrine to the federal government”); Blumm et al., Renouncing the Public Trust 
Doctrine: An Assessment of the Validity of Idaho House Bill 794, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 461, 494 
(“[T]he public trust is grounded in the federal constitutional equal footing doctrine . . . .”); 
Epstein, supra note 41, at 426 (asserting that the constitutional nature of the trust limits 
sovereign authority over public property in the same way the takings clause limits sovereign 
authority over private property). 
 66  See, e.g., Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 63, at 405; see also infra Part IV.C.3 (discussing 
possibility of an atmospheric trust theory).  
 67  See NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 65, at 136 (arguing that federal trust obligations should 
apply to protect the atmosphere against private appropriation as a disposal site for greenhouse 
gas pollution). 
 68  Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 63, at 399 (“The trust doctrine, properly understood, is an 
inherent limit on all sovereigns, not merely state sovereigns.”); NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 65, 
at 133–36. 
 69  See NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 65, at 133–36. 
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The historical argument roughly asserts that the public trust doctrine 
must constrain federal authority, because the implicit trust obligations of 
most states arose by delegation of federal authority over lands previously 
held in federal ownership. Today, the doctrine most often constrains state 
authority, because under the equal footing doctrine of the U.S. 
Constitution,70 states own the submerged lands beneath navigable 
waterways,71 and under the Submerged Lands Act,72 they are the primary 
regulators of tidelands within three miles of shore.73 But other than the 
original thirteen colonies, all states inherited their trust obligations through 
the medium of federal sovereignty that applied before their lands were 
carved out of federal holdings.74 The states must have inherited a pre-
existing trust obligation, goes this reasoning, because there is no clear legal 
moment when new trust obligations were expressly conferred. Therefore, 
the doctrine must have implicitly inhered at the federal level before it was 
delegated to the states, and by this theory, it remains there in application to 
all trust resources that were not delegated to the states.75 
The analytical argument asserts that, by the logic underlying the 
doctrine, there is no persuasive reason to distinguish between state or 
federal sovereignty when they govern resources that are appropriately 
subject to the public trust.76 The trust simply establishes a constraint on 
sovereign authority at whatever is the relevant level to protect public trust 
resources from private expropriation or monopolization. For submerged 
lands that remain under federal jurisdiction, or for other obligations the 
doctrine may be held to create, these scholars and litigants argue that the 
federal government should be equally bound as trustee.77  
Nevertheless, the argument that the public trust doctrine is an inherent 
limit on federal authority must overcome formidable hurdles in previous 
Supreme Court dicta stating that the doctrine is a matter of state law, and 
not an implied feature of federal constitutional law.78 It remains to be seen 
whether this dicta will hold firm over time, or whether it will be dislodged by 
more directed Supreme Court litigation in the future. 
 
 70  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. 
 71  See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 566 (1911) (interpreting the equal footing clause). 
 72  43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1315 (2012). 
 73  Id. §§ 1311–1312 (discussing state authority over submerged lands and seaward 
boundaries). 
 74  One way of viewing this is that in the equal footing conveyances, the federal government 
itself imposed the trust on the states. See Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 63 (discussing Justice 
Kennedy’s reference to the equal footing doctrine in Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe and what it 
means for the public trust doctrine’s origins). 
 75  See Blumm et al., supra note 65.  
 76  Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 63; NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 65, at 133–36. 
 77  Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 63; NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 65, at 133–36. 
 78  PPL, Montana, L.L.C. v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 (“[T]he public trust doctrine 
remains a matter of state law.”); cf. Alec L. v. McCarthy, 135 S. Ct. 774 (2014) (denying certiorari 
to address whether there is a federal public trust doctrine). See infra Part IV.C.3, further 
discussing these arguments. 
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B. The Prior Appropriations Doctrine 
The other leading legal doctrine in the Mono Lake story is equally 
important to the maintenance of public environmental values, but more 
directly associated with private rights and economic development: the prior 
appropriations doctrine of private water allocation. Water allocation 
doctrines regulate the private benefits that individuals and others can 
receive from public waterways. While the public trust regulates the 
management of rivers, lakes, and oceans, private water allocation doctrines 
regulate the use of the actual water in these waterways (excluding the 
nonpotable waters of the ocean). The United States follows two principal 
approaches to allocating surface water: the riparian rights doctrine of the 
eastern states, in which all users must share, and the prior appropriations 
doctrine of the west, in which the first to claim has the superior right.79 
Eastern riparianism is essentially a doctrine of correlative rights, in 
which users are entitled to appropriate water only to the extent that it does 
not compromise the legitimate needs of other qualified users.80 
Conceptualizing water as a resource that everyone shares equally, the 
doctrine requires a balancing of equities under conditions of shortage.81 
Instream uses are protected on par with other uses of a waterway, affording 
more historic protection for the environmental values associated with 
preserving instream flows.82 Because riparian rights are premised on a theory 
of waterways as commons resources, conflicts with the public trust 
doctrine—which also presumes that waterways are a public commons—are 
relatively modest. 
The doctrine of prior appropriations, adopted in arid western states 
where water scarcity is the defining feature, works very differently.83 
Following the old mining rule of “first-come-first-claimed,” it establishes 
first-in-time rights to appropriate water for exclusive private use, 
enforceable against later comers.84 Under the traditional common law of 
prior appropriations, whenever a user first takes water out of a watercourse 
and puts it to “beneficial” (or economically productive) use, that user is 
granted a perpetual right to continue taking the same amount for the same 
 
 79  See Christine Klein et al., Modernizing Water Law: The Example of Florida, 61 FLA. L. 
REV. 403, 406 (2009) (“The wetter eastern states . . . view the right to use water as an attribute of 
the ownership of riparian land. This is primarily a torts regime, prohibiting one riparian 
landowner from inflicting unreasonable harm upon another. In contrast, the arid western states 
historically have followed the prior appropriation doctrine, protecting the right to use water 
according to temporal priority of use.”). 
 80  Id. at 407. 
 81  In the traditional common law doctrine, water was shared equally by all riparian 
landowners. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 cmt. a., illus. 1 (1979). In states that 
adopt regulated riparianism statutes, most privileges associated with riparian ownership are 
eliminated. See Klein et al., supra note 79, at 411–12. 
 82  See Klein et al., supra note 79, at 410. 
 83  Id. at 408. 
 84  Id. 
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use, notwithstanding conflicting needs by those who come later—including 
the general public.85 
The prior appropriations doctrine creates elaborate webs of rights 
along a watercourse, in which long-established uses get priority over newer 
uses—even upstream or higher value uses.86 Return flows are assiduously 
calculated and jealously guarded, and changes in use may require 
repermitting to ensure against harm to the rights of other appropriators.87 
Traditionally, instream flows and uses receive no protection under the 
appropriative rights system, because rights are associated only with 
withdrawals.88 Beginning in the 1970s, most western states imposed various 
forms of instream protections by statute—but later protections can be of 
limited value in a system that continues to be defined by temporal priority.89 
To make matters even more complicated, a few states, including California, 
incorporate elements of both doctrines in their water laws.90 
Unlike the correlative, indeterminate rights associated with riparianism, 
the rights associated with the prior appropriations system are theoretically 
absolute—allowing senior rights holders to exclude others from the 
resource entirely during times of shortage, and in perpetuity. For this 
reason, and in contrast to riparianism, the private property orientation of the 
prior appropriations doctrine conflicts much more directly with the public 
commons theory underlying the public trust doctrine. And indeed, that 
conflict erupted most famously in eastern California, at Mono Lake. Both of 
the operative legal doctrines have deep roots in state common and statutory 
law, and the different values they protect are each legitimate and 
independently important. But reconciling them is difficult; they are 
theoretically orthogonal, each operating from a premise that excludes the 
 
 85  Id. at 408–09.  
 86  See, e.g., Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 147 (1855) (involving the overlapping nature of 
appropriative rights).  
 87  See Steven E. Clyde, Marketplace Reallocation in the Colorado River Basin: Better 
Utilization of the West’s Scarce Water Resources, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 49, 57 
(2008) (explaining the importance of the historic right to return flows); BARTON H. THOMPSON, 
JR. ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS 224–27 (5th ed. 2013) 
(discussing the requirements for maintaining a permit). 
 88  Id. at 215–18. 
 89  Id. at 215–16. 
 90  In California, the owners of land abutting watercourses hold some traditional riparian 
rights, which coexist with the more abundant appropriative rights that are unconnected to 
riparian land ownership but subject to similar requirements of reasonable and beneficial use. 
See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 87, at 200 (discussing California’s hybrid system of water law); 
see also CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (confirming the protection of riparian rights and discussing the 
requirement of beneficial use). However, in California, conflicts between riparian and 
appropriative rights are still governed by priority in time (in that riparian rights can be trumped 
by appropriations that came first), and prior appropriations remains the defining doctrinal 
approach in the state. See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 87, at 208 (explaining how the doctrines 
interact with one another in California); see also John Franklin Smith, The Public Trust 
Doctrine and National Audubon Society v. Superior Court: A Hard Case Makes Bad Law or the 
Consistent Evolution of California Water Rights, 6 GLENDALE L. REV. 201, 207–09 (1984) 
(outlining the history of California’s dual water rights system).  
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other’s central premise. How do these independent systems of legal rules fit 
together in actual environmental governance?91 
What follows is the story of that conflict—between the public trust 
doctrine’s affirmation of public rights in waterways and the prior 
appropriations doctrine’s affirmation of private rights to use of the water in 
those waterways.92 Writ large, it is also a conflict between environmental 
protection and economic development.93 And perhaps also a conflict 
between in-basin values and utilitarian allocation for use by the more 
numerous public in more distant urban centers—and doubtlessly others.94 
The Mono Lake story shows that the two doctrines create legal friction in 
California, and in other western states with similar laws, although perhaps 
necessary friction. With all that in mind, we now turn to what actually 
happened there, starting at the beginning. 
III. THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LOS ANGELES AQUEDUCT 
This Part explores the California water struggles that led to the 
construction of the Los Angeles Aqueduct and ultimately to the Mono Lake 
litigation. It reviews the history of water exports from the Owens Valley in 
the early 1900s, and the resulting effects on the local community and 
ecology. It recounts the story of the St. Francis Dam disaster of 1928, the 
extension of the aqueduct to the Mono Basin in 1940, and the acceleration of 
exports from the Mono Basin after the Second Barrel in 1970. After 
introducing the unique features of the Mono Lake ecosystem and 
surrounding community, it explores the human and environmental 
consequences of water diversions to the aqueduct, setting the stage for the 
legal controversy that would follow. 
A. Water as Wet Gold in Los Angeles 
The Mono Lake story begins in the early city of Los Angeles, where 
water has long been more valuable than gold. Why? A good aerial map of 
California makes that immediately clear. Los Angeles is located near the 
 
 91  See, e.g., Norman K. Johnson & Charles T. DuMars, A Survey of the Evolution of Western 
Water Law in Response to Changing Economic and Public Interest Demands, 29 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 347, 367–71 (1989) (considering ramifications of the public trust doctrine for the 
future of western, prior appropriations-based water law). 
 92  See Jan S. Stevens, supra note 64, at 612–14 (discussing the relationship between the 
public trust and prior appropriations doctrines); Timothy J. Conway, National Audubon Society 
v. Superior Court: The Expanding Public Trust Doctrine, 14 ENVTL. L. 617, 630–33 (1984) 
(analyzing the state court’s reconciliation of the public trust and prior appropriations doctrines 
in Mono Lake); Arnold & Jewel, supra note 3, at 1181 (same). 
 93  See Brian E. Gray, Ensuring the Public Trust, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 973, 974 (2012) 
(discussing Mono Lake’s establishment of an environmental baseline in the management of 
public resources, and how economic pressures limit further expansion). 
 94  Cynthia L. Koehler, Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Resolution of the Mono 
Lake Controversy, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 541, 577–82 (1995) (discussing competing interests in the 
Water Board’s reallocation decision-making process).  
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southwest corner of the state, where the climate is arid and surface water is 
scarce.95 Today, some ten million people live in Los Angeles County.96 But the 
Los Angeles River—the major local water source, which today is almost 
entirely channelized underground—has, at best, enough water annually to 
support a population of only a few hundred thousand.97 
Los Angeles is California’s largest metropolis, attracting its vast 
population with the promise of oil and agricultural resources, mild weather, 
and a deep water harbor enabling ready commercial access to other Pacific 
ports.98 At first, the growing city was able to slake its thirst by pumping 
available groundwater resources.99 By the end of the nineteenth century, 
however, when both surface and groundwater reserves had been exhausted, 
state and city leaders realized that they were going to have to find water 
elsewhere to sustain the growing metropolis.100 Moving water to the city of 
Los Angeles became one of California’s highest priorities, but the geography 
of the state made this no small task. 
The map of California readily shows where the water is available, and 
where it isn’t.101 Vibrant blue rivers crisscrossing the north reveal where the 
naturally occurring streams are, mostly draining snowmelt and runoff from 
the Cascades and Sierra Nevada mountain ranges.102 Further south, toward 
Los Angeles, these large, natural drainages mostly disappear.103 That said, 
you will find three snaking blue lines converging at Los Angeles—three 
enormous aqueducts all designed over the last century to import water to 
 
 95  HILDA BLANCO ET AL., U.S.C. CENTER FOR SUSTAINABLE CITIES, WATER SUPPLY SCARCITY IN 
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: ASSESSING WATER DISTRICT LEVEL STRATEGIES vii, xiv (2012), available at 
http://sustainablecities.usc.edu/quicklinks/H%20Blanco%20WSSC%20Exec%20Summary%2012%2
02012.pdf. 
 96  U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts: Los Angeles County, California, http:// 
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06037.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 97  See Kai Ryssdal, The Aqueduct That Gave Rise to Los Angeles, MARKETPLACE (AMERICAN 
PUBLIC MEDIA), Mar. 31, 3015, http://www.marketplace.org/topics/sustainability/big-book/ 
aqueduct-gave-rise-los-angeles (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (“As early as 1894, the city faced 
severe water shortages. Engineers estimated that natural sources serving the Los Angeles basin 
could support a population of 200,000 or so, in typical years.”); MARC REISNER, CADILLAC 
DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 53, 61–62 (1993) (describing the Los 
Angeles River as the first local source of water and how reliance on it became untenable as the 
population grew). 
 98  See DAVID KIPEN, CALIFORNIA IN THE 1930S: THE WPA GUIDE TO THE GOLDEN STATE 59 
(2013) (describing successful efforts to increase immigration to the City of Los Angeles in the 
late 19th century). 
 99  See REISNER, supra note 97, at 53, 60 (describing Los Angeles’s water sources in the late 
19th century). 
 100  Id. at 62 (“By 1900, Los Angeles’ population had gone over 100,000; it doubled again 
within four years. During the same period, the city experienced its first severe drought. . . . In 
late 1904, the newly created Los Angeles Department of Water and Power issued its first public 
report. ‘The time has come,’ it said, ‘when we shall have to supplement the supply from some 
other source.’”). 
 101  See California: Physical Features, http://www.csun.edu/~cfe/maps/CA_Physical.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 102  Id. 
 103  See Cal. Nev. River Forecast Ctr., CNRFC Interactive Map Interface: Rivers, http://www. 
cnrfc.noaa.gov (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
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the city from very distant lands.104 It is an especially impressive feat, given 
that the Los Angeles Basin is surrounded by the ocean on one side and 
mountains on all others.105 
Water now arrives in Los Angeles from the Rocky Mountains to the east 
via the Colorado River Aqueduct.106 It arrives from the western Sierra and 
Central Valley to the north—the agricultural heart of the state where water 
is more plentiful—via the California Aqueduct.107 Yet the aqueduct that came 
before all others is the Los Angeles aqueduct, which delivers water 
improbably from the far eastern midsection of the state, almost to the bend 
at the Nevada state line.108 Today, it extends all the way up to the Mono 
Basin, which is located about 400 miles northeast of Los Angeles and 250 
miles due east of San Francisco, along the Eastern Sierra Nevada range, just 
east of Yosemite National Park.109 Still, it started out a little more locally. 
B. The Early 1900s: Tapping the Owens River Valley 
When consumption began to exceed the locally available water sources 
in Los Angeles, state and city leaders struggled with the challenge of finding 
water elsewhere. Three in particular—former Mayor Fred Eaton, William 
Mulholland, of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (DWP), and 
Joseph Lippincott, a regional engineer of the federal Reclamation Service—
helped execute an unlikely plan to import water from another part of the 
state that was, ironically, itself a desert.110 Their target was the distant and 
sparsely populated Owens Valley, some 200 miles to the northeast.111 
The arid but enchanting Owens Valley is a large, long, and narrow 
canyon in eastern California that lies between two mountain ranges—the 
Sierra Nevada to the west and the White Mountains to the east, extending 
north and south of Bishop, California.112 Although the climate is very arid, the 
 
 104  See Sierra Club, Los Angeles Depends on Imported Water, https://angeles2.sierra 
club.org/los_angeles_depends_imported_water (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (explaining that 
aqueduct construction continued through the twentieth century and currently sources from the 
Colorado River and two Northern California locations). 
 105  Univ. of Houston: Earth and Atmospheric Sciences, Current Research Projects: Neogene 
Tectonics of Southern California, fig. 1, http://www.geosc.uh.edu/people/faculty/tom-bjorklund 
/current-research/index.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (showing the Los Angeles Basin 
bordered by the Santa Monica Mountains, San Gabriel Mountains, Santa Ana Mountains, and the 
Pacific Ocean). 
 106  See Sierra Club, supra note 104 (noting that the Colorado River Aqueduct supplies water 
to L.A.). 
 107  See Ctr. for Land Use Interpretation, California Aqueduct East Branch, http://clui.org/ 
ludb/site/california-aqueduct-east-branch (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (explaining that the 
California Aqueduct brings water south to the agricultural industry of the Central Valley and Los 
Angeles). 
 108  Sierra Club, supra note 104.  
 109  See Louis Sahagun, “There It Is—Take It”: A Story of Marvel and Controversy, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 28, 2013, http://graphics.latimes.com/me-aqueduct/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (describing 
the path and history of the Los Angeles Aqueduct). 
 110  REISNER, supra note 97, at 62–63, 91. 
 111  Id. at 61–63. 
 112  Id. at 59. 
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valley is a catchment for snowmelt from the high mountain ranges on either 
side.113 Rain and snow intercepted at elevations between 10,000 and 14,000 
feet drain into the improbably robust Owens River that runs the length 
between them.114 At least, it was robust at the beginning of the story—an 
extraordinarily life-productive river running through the desert, supporting 
the wildlife that thronged to its waters and a thriving agricultural community 
in an otherwise punishing environment.115 (The Owens remains a robust river 
above the diversion dam.116) 
The Owens River drains into a large salt lake at its terminus—the lake 
formerly known as Owens. Owens Lake was a terminal lake, meaning that 
water flowed into it from the river but nowhere flowed out, collecting at the 
base of an upslope in the land to the south.117 In a terminal lake, water 
departs the system only through surface evaporation, but that process leaves 
behind the trace minerals dissolved in the incoming river water, leached out 
of the surrounding rocks and soils.118 Over thousands of years, the 
accumulated minerals left behind as water evaporated from the lake’s 
surface made Owens Lake a saltwater body, by essentially the same process 
that made the oceans saline.119 
The Owens River and its delta at Owens Lake were a critical part of the 
regional ecosystem, because they combined fresh and saltwater resources in 
a high desert environment where water was otherwise scarce.120 Countless 
birds journeying along the Pacific Flyway would congregate at Owens Lake 
to feed and water themselves at this oasis, after traversing countless miles of 
barren land.121 Residents recalling Owens Valley life before the aqueduct said 
 
 113  See id. at 58–59 (explaining that the few rivers draining from the arid East Slope of the 
Sierra Nevada range are generally small; however, the Owens River, flanked by two mountain 
ranges, is the exception). 
 114  See Cal. Water Sci. Ctr., Evaluation of the Hydrologic System and Selected Water-
Management Alternatives in the Owens Valley, California, http://ca.water.usgs.gov/owens/ 
report/hydro_system_2surface.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (explaining that precipitation 
runoff from the Sierra Nevada feeds into the Owens River). 
 115  REISNER, supra note 97, at 59. 
 116  And one where I still fondly remember getting hypothermia while attempting to inner 
tube it one sunny day in July! Some years later, beginning in the 2000s, restoration efforts have 
apparently resurrected some of the Owens River below the dam. See Louis Sahagun, Tule 
Vegetation Infests Lower Owens River, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 2006, http://articles.latimes.com 
/2011/jul/25/local/la-me-tules-20110725 (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (reporting that restoration 
efforts, which began in 2006, have brought water and wildlife back to the Owens River). 
 117  REISNER, supra note 97, at 61. 
 118  CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RESOURCES, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SALTON SEA AND OTHER 
TERMINAL LAKES IN SUPPORTING BIRDS OF THE PACIFIC FLYWAY 1, available at http://www.water. 
ca.gov/saltonsea/historicalcalendar/docs/TerminalLakes.pdf (describing the geologic processes 
that intensify salinity in terminal lakes with freshwater tributaries). 
 119  See id.  
 120  Owens Valley Comm., Owens Lake Birds, http://www.ovcweb.org/owensvalley/owens 
lake.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 121  Id. 
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that the sky would become so black with birds during migration season that 
it was sometimes hard to see sky between them.122 
The Owens River thus provided Los Angeles the possibility of much-
needed water, but the Owens Valley is hundreds of miles from the city, and 
there are two mountain ranges in between. There was closer and easier 
water to be had, including untapped groundwater resources from aquifers 
and artesian springs.123 Exploiting these sources would have been faster, 
easier, and cheaper—at least in the short term. Why bother seeking water 
two hundred miles north to the Owens Valley when there was more 
accessible water closer to home? 
1. A Self-Powering Design 
City leaders considered seven potential sources for water imports, 
many of them closer and more easily accessible with a lower initial outlay.124 
However, regional planners were concerned that exploiting groundwater 
resources closer to the city would curtail desired development of the 
surrounding metropolitan areas.125 Yet there was another reason Los Angeles 
was especially drawn to the water in the Owens Valley—one that had to do 
with gravity. 
Over time, the other potential sources would have required the use of 
substantial energy to continuously pump water toward Los Angeles. Even 
artesian wells that produce without assistance in the present would 
eventually require expensive pumps, after withdrawals reduced pressure in 
the aquifer.126 Moreover, the city had already learned—the hard way—that 
groundwater resources are not infinite, and civic planners worried that these 
sources would ultimately tap out. 
By contrast, the Owens Valley would provide a renewable flow, and 
while it lies hundreds of miles away, it rests at an altitude of 4,000 feet above 
sea level.127 Those 4,000 feet of elevation gain would make all the difference 
to the engineering project: The elevation gain provided enough potential 
energy to pipe water downhill toward Los Angeles—even over the two 
intervening mountain ranges—without any additional power source, 
enabling a completely gravity-powered design.128 
 
 122  See, e.g., id. (quoting Joseph Grinnell, who visited the lake in 1917: “‘Great numbers of 
water birds are in sight along the lake shore—avocets, phalaropes, ducks. Large flocks of 
shorebirds in flight over the water in the distance, wheeling about show in mass, now silvery 
now dark, against the gray-blue of the water. There must be literally thousands of birds within 
sight of this one spot.’”). 
 123  Biographical Information: Joseph Barlow Lippincott, available at 
http://www.owensvalleyhistory.com/stories3/lippincott_biography.pdf (extracted from the 
“Memoir” on Lippincott prepared by Kenneth Q. Volk and Edgar Alan Rowe that appeared in the 
108 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS 1543–50 (1943)). 
 124  Id. 
 125  Id. 
 126  Id. 
 127  Sahagun, supra note 109.  
 128  Id. 
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2. Prospecting in the San Fernando Valley 
There was one further reason the Owens Valley plan was so attractive 
to city leadership, this one having less to do with civil engineering and more 
to do with conventional pocket-lining. As chronicled more fully in Cadillac 
Desert129 and the classic movie Chinatown,130 the additional value was in 
what lies between the Owens Valley and the City of Los Angeles: the San 
Fernando Valley. 
Today, the San Fernando Valley is pricey southern California real 
estate, with prime access to both Los Angeles and the Pacific coast.131 
However, when Eaton, Mulholland, and Lipincott were masterminding the 
plan—before the aqueduct was constructed and the lands surrounding Los 
Angeles were even drier than the city—the San Fernando Valley was open, 
empty, economically worthless land.132 There was nothing there, because 
there was no water. 
Some proponents of the new aqueduct realized that moving water from 
the Owens Valley down to Los Angeles meant that they would be piping 
water through this worthless, forsaken land—and that it would not be 
worthless for long.133 In fact, many city leaders privy to the plan quietly 
bought land in the San Fernando Valley on the cheap before plans went 
public, trading on their inside knowledge of what was to come, and became 
overnight real estate moguls when the water rolled through.134 
3. The Miracle of Modern Engineering 
When construction began on the aqueduct in 1905, the gravity-propelled 
design spanning hundreds of miles and two mountain ranges was considered 
a miracle of modern engineering, on par with the Panama Canal.135 The early 
project included more than fifty miles of open canals, close to one hundred 
miles of covered conduits, nearly another fifty miles of tunnels, and some 
twelve miles of steel tubes perilously escorting the flow across plunging 
mountain canyons.136 
 
 129  REISNER, supra note 97 at 73–74; CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS 
DISAPPEARING WATER AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATURE (Columbia TriStar Television 1997). 
 130  CHINATOWN (Paramount Pictures 1974). 
 131  JOEL KOTKIN & ERIKA OZUNA, THE CHANGING FACE OF THE SAN FERNANDO VALLEY 8 (2002), 
available at http://publicpolicy.pepperdine.edu/davenport-institute/content/reports/changing-
face.pdf.  
 132  REISNER, supra note 97, at 72. 
 133  Id. at 73–74.  
 134  Id. at 75 (describing the syndicate of investors that purchased an option on the Porter 
Land and Water Company, which owned the greater part of the San Fernando Valley). 
 135  Eric Malnic, The Aqueduct: DWP Smoothes Out Rough Edges on the 74-Year Old 
Engineering Marvel, LA TIMES, Oct. 18, 1987, http://articles.latimes.com/1987-10-18/local/me-
15046_1_los-angeles-river (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 136  BD. OF PUB. SERV. COMM’RS OF THE CITY OF L.A., CONSTRUCTION OF THE LOS ANGELES 
AQUEDUCT FINAL REPORT 271 (1916). 
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To begin the long journey to Los Angeles, engineers had to move the 
Owens River entirely out of its bed.137 This they accomplished by use of a 
full-length diversion dam constructed at Aberdeen, a tiny hamlet just north 
of the town of Independence in Inyo County, California.138 
In the mid-1990s, if you stood at the diversion point and looked 
upstream, you would see the Owens river flowing toward you—down its 
naturally arching alluvial channel, lined by point bars, willows, and other 
riparian vegetation that slows the water and creates cozy pockets of fish and 
wildlife habitat. Then the river would reach the diversion dam, where the 
entire flow was shunted to the side into a narrow concrete channel where it 
gathers speed along its journey to Los Angeles. And if you looked 
downstream from the diversion dam, you would look out over an empty 
riverbed, where water stopped flowing almost a hundred years earlier. By 
then, it was filled with tangled brush and overgrowth, but it was still a 
gaping, ancient riverbed—with no river in it. 
New efforts to restore dewatered portions of the Lower Owens have 
been underway since 2006,139 but the old Aberdeen diversion dam still marks 
the beginning of the original Los Angeles Aqueduct. For many miles below 
that point, the aqueduct snakes across the desert, crosses mountain and 
valley, and finally rolls down the California Coast Range into the Los Angeles 
Basin, by this point in a giant concrete tube.140 Symbolically completing its 
journey, some of that water finally flows into the reflecting pool in front of 
DWP headquarters, where Chief Mulholland was once king.141 
4. Acquiring the Owens Valley Water Rights 
The aqueduct may have been a miracle of modern engineering, but that 
wasn’t the only puzzle city leaders had to resolve—there was also the legal 
puzzle. Our earlier discussion of private water law alludes to the other 
hurdle Los Angeles had to overcome before the aqueduct could begin 
 
 137  See Henry H. Thomas, Construction—River Diversion, http://community.dur.ac.uk/ 
~des0www4/cal/dams/cons/conss2.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 138  See Malnic, supra note 135 (discussing the diversion dam 30 miles south of Bishop, 
California). 
 139  Inyo Cnty. Water Dep’t, Lower Owens River Project, http://www.inyowater.org/LORP 
/default.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (describing efforts to restore a dewatered 62-mile 
stretch of the Lower Owens River below the diversion dam). For more information on Owens 
Valley restoration projects, see the Memorandum of Understanding Between L.A. Dep’t of Water 
and Power, the Cnty. of Inyo, Cal. Dep’t of Fish and Wildlife, Cal. State Lands Cmm’n, the Sierra 
Club, and the Owens Valley Comm., available at http://www.inyowater.org/LORP/DOCUMENTS 
/1997MOU.pdf. 
 140  See Malnic, supra note 135. 
 141  See Andrea Ford, Recycling Water : Environment: Bicyclists Are Carrying L.A. Water to 
Mono Lake in a Symbolic Effort to 'Rehydrate' It. They Also Call Attention to DWP Vote that 
May Reward Conservationists, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 1, 1992, http://articles.latimes.com/1992-09-
01/local/me-6794_1_mono-lake (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (describing an event in which ninety 
cyclists carried bottles of water from DWP’s reflecting pool 350 miles north to symbolically 
repatriate it to Mono Lake).  
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delivering water from afar. And though it seemed more easily handled at 
first, it became the thornier problem over time. 
The problem was how to deal with the existing water users who were 
already putting Owens River water to beneficial use, mostly for local 
agricultural use.142 Under both riparian rights and prior appropriations 
doctrine, Los Angeles could not just shunt an entire river out of its bed, 
leaving downstream users in the lurch.143 Landowners along the river had 
riparian rights, and many more Owens Valley residents had rights to 
withdraw from the river that were protected under the doctrine of prior 
appropriations.144 Under California water law, Los Angeles couldn’t just start 
exporting water south, no matter how many thirsty residents were waiting 
for it; the city had to get in line.145 
Even more problematic, the agricultural use that Owens Valley farmers 
were making would return most of withdrawn water back into the river as 
irrigation return flows, or into the underlying aquifer from which 
groundwater would then be available. Owens River water was being 
recycled through multiple in-basin uses and instream flows within the 
watershed, and in relatively stable equilibrium with climatic conditions. But 
Los Angeles’s intended use would be very different. Exporting the water 
would yield return flows to neither the river nor the underlying aquifer, 
interrupting the entire web of uses and appropriations. Los Angeles’s change 
in use could also set the city to the back of the line, making it the junior 
appropriator within the overall system and further complicating its desired 
yield. How the city resolved these issues became one of the seamier aspects 
of the aqueduct’s history. 
The only solution was for Los Angeles to acquire the appropriative and 
riparian rights it needed from the existing Owens Valley farmers—and to 
iron out the problems of priority, the city would have to buy up most if not 
all of the rights. But imagine the complications of trying to buy an entire 
town’s worth of riparian land and water rights. Imagine the likely reaction of 
most local farmers—presumably fond of the local community, the neighbors, 
and their families—to such a proposal. Perhaps the farmer is even ready to 
retire from farming, and the land is already on the market. And suppose the 
City of Los Angeles approaches with a generous offer to buy the farm and all 
associated water rights, so that it can send that water south and extinguish 
the community forever. How many farmers in this position would have 
accepted that offer? 
 
 142  See REISNER, supra note 97 (discussing how water rights were necessary for the Owens 
Valley Project). 
 143  See supra notes 79–94 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrines of prior 
appropriations and riparian rights, and the current doctrine for California water law). 
 144  See Scott Harrison, Dynamite Attacks on the Los Angeles Aqueduct, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 
2013, http://framework.latimes.com/2013/02/06/los-angeles-aqueduct-2/#/0 (last visited Apr. 17, 
2015) (discussing how Los Angeles officials had to buy land and water rights in the Owens 
Valley). 
 145  See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text (discussing the law of prior 
appropriations). 
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Apparently, the city leaders charged with executing the plan believed 
that few of them would. They surmised that most Owens Valley farmers 
would be hesitant to extinguish their communities, no matter the payout.146 
Accordingly, they concluded that the best approach was simply to keep the 
details of their intentions quiet. Essentially, when Los Angeles 
representatives came looking to buy, they pretended to be farmers. 
Using agents and operating undercover, they posed as regular farmers 
acquiring land and water rights to continue farming Owens Valley lands just 
as the previous rights-holders had long done.147 They covered up or 
conveniently left out that they were buying on behalf of Los Angeles, as well 
as any mention of their true intentions for the water.148 At the same time, 
other champions of the aqueduct were quietly convincing the U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation to disband pending plans to build a new water project in the 
Owens Valley that would have benefited the regional agricultural economy.149 
By the time local residents figured out what was happening, it was too late 
to stop it.150 
In 1913, after acquiring the bulk of all water rights in the valley, the Los 
Angeles Aqueduct began operations.151 The Aberdeen diversion dam was 
completed and water began moving south. Just over a hundred years ago, as 
the first Owens River water reached the end of its journey in Los Angeles, 
DWP Chief Engineer William Mulholland famously told the assembled 
crowd: “There it is. Take it.”152 
5. The Local Consequences of Withdrawals 
As demand for water in Los Angeles continued to grow, so did exports 
from the Owens Valley. Eventually, the city took not only the surface water 
of the Owens River, but also the groundwater from the Owens Valley aquifer, 
extracted by pumps on the land that the city had purchased to acquire 
associated water rights.153 With the disappearance of the river, and the loss of 
agricultural uses that had once returned so much water to the ground 
through irrigation, the local aquifer was rapidly depleted.154 Unsurprisingly, 
the consequences of removing the entire water supply were severe. Once-
 
 146  Local rebellions following the onset of water exports from the valley suggest that this 
perception was accurate. See Malnic, supra note 135. 
 147  REISNER, supra note 97, at 91. 
 148  See Malnic, supra note 135 (discussing how city officials began to quietly buy up water 
rights). 
 149  REISNER, supra note 97, at 79 (discussing how the Bureau of Reclamation project in 
Owens Valley complicated the Los Angeles Aqueduct project); see also Malnic, supra note 135 
(“[O]thers successfully lobbied Congress and President Theodore Roosevelt to abandon plans 
for a federal reclamation and irrigation project there.”). 
 150  See, e.g., REISNER, supra note 97, at 90 (discussing how farmers who did not originally 
sell out were eventually forced to do so). 
 151  Sahagun, supra note 109. 
 152  REISNER, supra note 97, at 86. 
 153  See id. at 100–01 (discussing how DPW “sank wells and began depauperating the aquifer” 
and that Los Angeles refused to limit its groundwater pumping). 
 154  Id. at 100.  
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thriving farm communities were devastated, and the irrigated agricultural 
economy has never recovered.155 
Still, the Owens Valley farmers did not go down quietly. They did not 
appreciate the less-than-forthright approach the city had taken in acquiring 
land and water rights.156 They felt swindled, and not just out of a few dollars, 
acres of land, or gallons of water per day—they felt robbed of their 
community, their homes, and their very way of life.157 In several incidents of 
open rebellion, angry farmers dynamited the aqueduct and released water 
back into the valley.158 
Their protests drew attention from around the world, with newspaper 
coverage effectively depicting the Owens Valley farmers as tiny Davids 
pounding on the toe of the Goliath-like City of Los Angeles.159 Nobody really 
expected them to prevail, and they didn’t—but the aqueduct continues under 
constant patrol surveillance to this day.160 Especially after additional 
bombings in the mid-1970s,161 high fences and locked gates prevent public 
access or interference.162 It’s hard to get physically close. 
The end result was that water effectively disappeared from the lower 
Owens Valley, south of the diversion dam.163 The most obvious local casualty 
that disappeared with it was Owens Lake, the large but shallow salt lake at 
the bottom of the now-empty river.164 The great waterway simply evaporated 
without replenishment, until all that was left were the dusty, dried-up 
minerals that had been accumulating over thousands of years.165 As a result, 
where there had once been an enormous black-with-birds desert oasis, there 
was now just a giant, white, empty salt flat—ugly, foul-smelling, and with 
 
 155  Sahagun, supra note 109. 
 156  See id. (explaining that tensions were high between Los Angeles and the Owens Valley, 
and that the aquifer was dynamited over a dozen times in the 1920s in citizen rebellions).  
 157  See Harrison, supra note 144 (describing incidents at the Alabama Gates and No Name 
Canyon, among others). 
 158  Id.  
 159  Cf. REISNER, supra note 97, at 95 (discussing public sympathy for Owens Valley farmers). 
  160  Los Angeles Dep’t of Water and Power, A Legacy of Safe-Keeping, INTAKE, Nov. 2013, at 
53–54, available at http://www.laaqueduct100.com/wp-content/uploads/LAA100Issue.pdf. 
 161  Harrison, supra note 144; see also Louis Sahagun, Los Angeles Aqueduct Bomber Reveals 
His Story, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2013, available at http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-c1-
aqueduct-bomber-20131030-dto-htmlstory.html#axzz2jDMnv8W0 (describing the 1976 bombing 
of an aqueduct gate). 
 162  See Elson Trinidad, A Self-Guided Tour of the Los Angeles Aqueduct, KCET, Nov. 4, 
2013, http://www.kcet.org/news/redefine/revisit/commentary/concrete-and-chaparral/a-self-guid 
ed-tour-of-the-los-angeles-aqueduct.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (describing water pumps 
surrounded by high chain link fences).  
 163  See REISNER, supra note 97, at 100. 
 164  See Sahagun, supra note 109. 
 165  See Marith C. Reheis, Dust Deposition Downwind of Owens (Dry) Lake, 1991–1994—
Preliminary Findings, 102 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. (ATMOSPHERES) 25,999–26,008 (1997) (describing 
the post-aqueduct deposits of minerals accumulated in Owens Lake over thousands of years). 
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nothing to offer the people or the wildlife that once depended on it.166 We 
now call it “Owens Dry Lake.”167 
Since then, the Owens Dry Lake wasteland has become an urgent 
problem for the valley, and not just because it is ugly and barren. The Owens 
Valley happens to rest at the base of the tallest mountain in the lower forty-
eight states—the Sierra Nevada’s Mount Whitney, looming more than 10,000 
feet above the valley floor at 14,500 feet above sea level.168 Ferocious winds 
whip off the characteristically steep escarpment of the Eastern Sierra, 
picking up dust and salt from the bed of Owens Dry Lake and churning it 
into chronic regional dust storms.169 
Yet Owens Valley dust storms are more threatening than the average 
dust storm. To make matters even worse, this dust happens to be toxic.170 
The fine-particle alkali salts that compose the dust are so small that they 
pass through the membranes of the human respiratory system and are 
associated with asthma, other respiratory ailments, and even cancer.171 In 
fact, the Owens Valley has been regularly rated as the most polluted place in 
the country on the basis of particulates, continually violating Clean Air Act172 
standards for ambient air quality.173 
The results of the aqueduct in the lower Owens Valley were truly tragic. 
Not only did it destroy the original farming communities, it made people 
sick. With no water, limited economic potential, and now elevated health 
risks, the Owens Valley stagnated.174 Driving around these parts in the mid-
1990s (with car windows rolled up) yielded sad sights amidst otherwise 
stunning vistas. In the worst hit areas, there were many abandoned 
structures, and few children. You might have seen a couple of older people 
 
 166  REISNER, supra note 97, at 101; Kirk Siegler, Owens Valley Salty as Los Angeles Water 
Battle Flows into Court, NPR, Mar. 11, 2013, http://www.npr.org/2013/03/11/173463688/owens-
valley-salty-as-los-angeles-water-battle-flows-into-court (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 167  See, e.g., Reheis, supra note 165 (describing Owens Lake in a dust disposition study as 
the “Owens (dry) Lake”).  
 168  See Stewart Green, Mount Whitney: Highest Mountain in California, ABOUT.COM, http:// 
climbing.about.com/od/mountainclimbing/a/MtWhitneyFacts.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 169  MARITH REHEIS ET AL., POTENTIAL HEALTH HAZARDS OF OWENS LAKE DUST? (2003), 
available at http://esp.cr.usgs.gov/projects/sw/swdust/pdfs/toxic_dust_poster.pdf.  
 170  Id. (“Mineral dusts from the desiccated playa of Owens Lake . . . contain elevated 
concentrations of many metals known to have toxic effects . . . .”). 
 171  Sarah Kittle, Great Basin Unified Air Pollution Control District, Survey of Reported 
Health Effects of Owens Lake Particulate Matter, http://www.gbuapcd.org/Information/Owens 
LakeParticulateMatterHealthEffects.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (discussing studies that 
have found positive associations between particulate matter and lung cancer). 
 172  42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012). 
 173  U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Owens Valley, CA Particulate Matter Plan, http://www.epa.gov/ 
region9/air/owens/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (describing Owens Lake as “the nation’s worst 
particulate air pollution problem”). 
 174 Richard L. Forstall, U.S. Census, California: Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 
1900 to 1990 (Mar. 27, 1995) (showing population growth from 11,684 in 1960 to 18,281 in 1990), 
http://www.census.gov/population/cencounts/ca190090.txt; U.S. Census Bureau, State and 
County QuickFacts: Inyo County, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06027.html (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2015) (showing current population of 18,410). 
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unwilling to leave their abandoned towns, sitting vacantly on the porches of 
distressed homes that looked a lot like the empty ones next door. 
In the late 1990s, Los Angeles began flooding more than 100 square 
miles of dry lake bed with billions of gallons of water to keep the dust from 
becoming airborne, responding to deep public concern over adverse health 
impacts, environmental litigation, and state and federal laws requiring better 
management of the air quality hazard.175 In late 2014, the city reached an 
agreement with the Great Basin Unified Air Pollution Control District 
enabling it to manage the lakebed hazard with a new method that consumes 
far less water.176 Under this agreement, tractors will till the moist lakebed to 
create basketball-sized dirt clods that can contain the toxic dust for years 
before breaking down, at which point the process will be repeated.177 
6. The St. Francis Dam 
The devastation of the Owens Valley was not the only tragic chapter in 
the saga of the early days of the aqueduct. There was also the story of the St. 
Francis Dam. 
To enable the aqueduct to deliver a steady flow of water to Los Angeles 
year round, engineers constructed a series of reservoirs along the aqueduct 
to store additional supply during the wet season, for gradual release during 
the dry season or other emergency circumstances.178 When the aqueduct was 
first constructed, one such dam was built at San Francisquito Canyon,179 a 
promising narrows located near the bottom of the aqueduct system, about 
forty miles north of Los Angeles near present day Santa Clarita.180 A photo of 
the dam when it was completed in 1926 shows a sturdy, shining component 
of the overall miracle of modern engineering.181 
Yet a photo of the same dam two years later shows nothing more than a 
single spire of concrete between gaping voids on either side, like a single 
front tooth in a baby’s mouth.182 It took just a few hours for that transition to 
 
 175  See Louis Sahagun, New Dust-Busting Method Ends L.A.’s Longtime Feud with Owens 
Valley, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/science/la-me-1115-owens-20141115-
story.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (describing new and former methods of containing lake 
bed dust). 
 176  Id. 
 177  Id. (noting that the new method saves enough water to supply 150,000 Los Angeles 
residents per year). 
 178  See REISNER, supra note 97, at 61–62. 
 179  Id. at 98. The St. Francis Dam was constructed in part to ensure supply if seismic activity 
along the San Andreas fault disrupted the aqueduct. See Kevin Roderick, Dam Disaster Killed 
450, Broke Mulholland, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1999, http://articles.latimes.com/1999/oct/12/ 
local/me-21385. 
 180  See Michael E. Martinet, Section 6: Flooding Hazards in the City of Downey, in CITY  
OF DOWNEY NATURAL HAZARDS MITIGATION PLAN 11, Section VI (Emergency Planning  
Consultants ed. 2004), available at http://www.downeyca.org/_blobcache/0000/0002/2401.pdf 
(quoting a contemporaneous report of the disaster). 
 181  See Scott Harrison, St. Francis Dam Collapse, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2013, available at 
http://framework.latimes.com/2013/03/12/st-francis-dam-collapse/#/1. 
 182  Id.  
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take place, in the dead of night. As news reports described this awful 
moment in California history, the dam gave way shortly after midnight on 
March 12, 1928: 
[I]n an instant 38,000 acre feet, totaling 12,000,000,000 gallons, of stored 
water was rushing on its mad race to the sea. . . . What little warning there was 
of the wall of water that swept the floor of the valley was insufficient to give 
any of the inhabitants of the upper part of the canyon time to flee its fury. 
Caught in the swirl of the raging flood, the hundreds of ranch houses that once 
dotted the canyon were crushed like egg shells and their inhabitants in most 
instances swept to their doom.183 
Raging floodwaters swept through the Santa Clara Valley toward the 
Pacific for more than fifty miles, devastating some sixty-five miles of valley 
before reaching the ocean between Oxnard and Ventura.184 The peak surge 
was estimated to be nearly eighty feet high.185 When it reached Santa Paula, 
forty-two miles south of the dam, the water was estimated to be twenty-five 
feet deep.186 Almost everything in its path was destroyed: ten bridges, twelve 
hundred homes, railways, power lines, orchards, and livestock.187 The flood 
carried away entire towns, wreaking “unthinkable carnage” along the way.188 
By the time it was over, parts of Ventura County lay under seventy feet 
of mud and debris. Over 450 people were killed, including half the student 
body at a local elementary school, hundreds of Department of Water and 
Power workers sleeping in a nearby work camp, and many migrant 
farmworkers camping in the valley and swept out to sea.189 Damages topped 
$20 million at the time,190 valued at well over $250 million today.191 Even now, 
it is considered one of the worst civil engineering failures of American 
history.192 
The spectacular failure of the St. Francis Dam terrified Californians. 
Modern engineering suddenly seemed less miraculous, and more dangerous. 
Los Angelenos who had once celebrated William Mulholland turned against 
him, and he went from being a local celebrity to a pariah seemingly 
 
 183  Special to the New York Times, 274 Perish, 700 Missing in Torrent Loosed by Bursting 
California Dam; Flood Engulfs Victims as They Sleep, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1928, at 1. Note that 
this article appears to misstate the date of the incident as March 13, 1928, and most other 
sources report the date as March 12, 1928. See, e.g., Martinet, supra note 180; Harrison, supra 
note 181; Roderick, supra note 179.  
 184  See Roderick, supra note 179. 
 185  Id. (describing a wall of water ten stories high).  
 186  See Martinet, supra note 180 (quoting a contemporaneous report of the disaster).  
 187  See id; Harrison, supra note 181; Roderick, supra note 179 (describing the devastation). 
 188  See Roderick, supra note 179.  
 189  Id. 
 190  Jan Silver Maguire, Water Triumphs and Tragedies, 77 AQUEDUCT MAG. (2006), available 
at http://www.mwdh2o.com/Aqueduct/may_06/article_03_01.html. 
 191  The actual figure in 2015 U.S. dollars is $273,341,520. See Consumer Price Index Inflation 
Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 192  See Roderick, supra note 179. 
15_TOJCI.RYAN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2015 2:53 PM 
2015] THE MONO LAKE STORY 591 
overnight.193 The surrounding community rebuilt and eventually removed all 
evidence of the dam, as though hoping to erase the memory of the horror 
that had unfolded there.194 Today, if you try to seek out where the dam had 
been, you can’t really find it; there is only an ordinary canyon, rich with 
greenery, and not even a memorial.195 
But in the late 1920s, even as public sentiment turned against 
Mulholland, Los Angelenos still coveted the water he had brought them.196 In 
the 1930s, as the city’s thirst continued to grow, engineers continued to look 
to other remote sources. And there in the distance—just another hundred 
miles north of the Owens River headwaters and an additional 2,000 feet up—
was the Mono Lake Basin. 
C. The 1940s: The Mono Basin Extension 
Mono Lake lies in a high desert basin just east of the Sierra crest—the 
peaks of the mountains that divide Yosemite National Park on the west from 
the Mono Basin and the Inyo National Forest on the east.197 Mono Lake is the 
eastern watershed of the Yosemite highlands, draining the eastern flanks of 
mountains that rise up to 14,000 feet into the air and then plunge more than 
7,000 feet to their eastern base.198 Surrounded by mountains in three of four 
directions, it is a staggeringly beautiful and occasionally otherworldly 
place—pierced by volcanic islands and geothermal activity, and adorned 
with limestone towers of tufa that grow where calcium-rich underground 
springs meet the carbonate-rich waters of the lake.199 
At around seventy square miles in surface area, Mono Lake itself is 
almost twice the size of the County of San Francisco—more of an inland sea 
than a lake.200 It averages about fifty feet deep but runs as deep as 159 feet 
 
 193  See REISNER, supra note 97, at 99–100 (describing the decline of Mulholland’s 
reputation). 
 194  See Hadley Meares, The Flood: St. Francis Dam Disaster, William Mulholland, and the 
Causalities of L.A. Imperialism, KCET, July 26, 2013, http://www.kcet.org/socal/departures/ 
columns/lost-landmarks/the-flood-st-francis-dam-disaster-william-mulholland-and-the-
casualties-of-la-imperialism.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 195  A former student of mine who grew up near the former dam site told me that she was 
baffled by the lack of local lore and remembrances about the disaster, noting that there was a 
small plaque somewhere in town mentioning what had happened, but nothing at the actual site 
of the disaster. See also Meares, supra note 194 ( “We were passing the former site of the St. 
Francis Dam, but we couldn't tell where it had been, so effective had nature been in reclaiming 
its land.”). 
 196  See REISNER, supra note 97, at 100–01. 
 197  U.S. Forest Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Mono Basin National Forest Scenic Area, 
http://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/inyo/specialplaces/?cid=stelprdb5129903 (last visited Apr. 17, 
2015). 
 198  See JOHN HART, STORM OVER MONO: THE MONO LAKE BATTLE AND THE CALIFORNIA WATER 
FUTURE 5–7 (1996). 
 199  See generally Mono Lake Comm., Quick Facts, http://www.monolake.org/about/stats 
[hereinafter Mono Lake Facts] (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (listing attributes and statistics about 
Mono Lake); see HART, supra note 198, at 20–21 (describing the formation of tufa). 
 200  Compare Mono Lake Facts, supra note 199 (noting Mono Lake’s surface area is 45,133 
acres, or 70.5 square miles), with U.S. Census Bureau, San Francisco County, California, 
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where its western shores approach the Sierra.201 Like Owens Lake, Mono is a 
saltwater terminal lake, collecting snowmelt from the five freshwater creeks 
that flow into the basin, carrying trace elements that are left behind as water 
evaporates off the surface. Unlike Owens Lake, whose geological age could 
be counted in thousands of years, Mono Lake is estimated to be between one 
and three million years old, competing with Lake Tahoe as perhaps the 
oldest continuous lake in North America.202 
The accumulation of those chlorides, carbonates, and sulfates over 
millions of years have made Mono Lake almost three times saltier than the 
ocean, and nearly as saline as parts of the Great Salt Lake in Utah.203 The 
water is so alkaline that fish cannot survive there.204 Nevertheless, the lake is 
home to a thriving ecosystem based on a unique species of brine shrimp and 
the alkali fly that breeds at its shores, a dietary staple of the Kutzadika’a 
Paiute Indians that still live there.205 Mark Twain didn’t care much for the 
place, referring to it disparagingly as the Dead Sea of California.206 But most 
who live, work, or visit there consider Mono Lake a very special place, 
because of its rugged natural beauty, its unique ecosystem, the unusual 
scientific research conducted there, and the local cultures and communities 
that have lived beside it over history. 
1. The Mono Lake Ecosystem 
The basis of the simple Mono Lake ecosystem is the algae in the lake, 
which support both the alkali fly and the brine shrimp that, in turn, support 
the rest of the food chain.207 The species of brine shrimp in the lake are 
unique to Mono Lake, and they are rather small—no bigger than the size of a 
clipped fingernail.208 However, there are estimated to be as many as three to 
four trillion of them in the lake.209 If I were to scoop a coffee cup of water out 
 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06075.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (noting San 
Francisco County’s land area is 46.87 square miles). 
 201  Mono Lake Facts, supra note 199. 
 202  See HART, supra note 198, at 8–10 (describing Mono Lake’s geological history over 
millions of years); Tahoe Fund, Lake Tahoe Fast Facts, http://www.tahoefund.org/about-
tahoe/recreational-paradise/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (“Tahoe is considered an ancient lake 
and is counted among the 20 oldest lakes in the world.”). 
 203  See HART, supra note 198, at 14 (listing Mono Lake as three times saltier than the ocean); 
Univ. of Utah, Physical Characteristics of Great Salt Lake, http://learn.genetics.utah.edu/ 
content/gsl/physical_char/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (describing the Great Salt Lake as 3.5 
times saltier than the ocean). 
 204  See HART, supra note 19798, at 16. 
 205  Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 711 (Cal. 1983); Mono Lake Comm., Brine Shrimp: Mono Lake’s 
Unique Species, http://www.monolake.org/about/ecoshrimp [hereinafter Mono Lake Brine 
Shrimp] (last visited Apr. 17, 2015); Mono Lake Facts, supra note 199; Mono Lake Comm., 
Kutzadika’a People: Living in Harmony with the Mono Basin, http://www.monolake.org/about/ 
kutzadikaa (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 206  MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 243, 245 (Harriet Elinor Smith & Edgar Marquess Branch eds., 
3d ed. 2011). 
 207  Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 711; Mono Lake Facts, supra note 199. 
 208  Mono Lake Brine Shrimp, supra note 205. 
 209  Id.  
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of the lake—as I did every day on countless South Tufa tours as a Mono 
Lake ranger with the Forest Service—I could have ten or twenty in my cup. 
From the perspective of a hungry bird, Mono Lake is a big bowl of shrimp 
soup. 
For that reason, Mono Lake holds an even more important position 
along the Pacific Flyway than Owens Lake held. Birds arriving from as far 
north as the Arctic Circle en route to points as far south as the tip of 
Argentina use Mono Lake as a critical resting place to gorge their body 
weights back up to full strength before resuming their journeys over the vast 
desert.210 Hundreds of species of migratory birds visit the lake regularly, 
including flocks of grebes, phalaropes, plovers, and sandpipers that 
occasionally constitute substantial percentages of their world populations.211 
Mono Lake is also a primary world breeding ground for California gulls, 
providing a first home to more than eighty-five percent of the state’s 
population.212 Year after year, they return to breed on Negit Island, the small 
black cindercone in the middle of the lake, where they are safe from 
predation by coyotes and other local predators reluctant to swim in Mono’s 
punishingly alkaline waters.213 
In fact, Negit and Paoha, the white island beside it, are the newest 
members of the youngest volcanic range in North America, the Mono 
Craters.214 Reaching as high as 9,000 feet, the Mono Craters extend from the 
south shore of the lake, through the islands in the middle, all the way to 
Black Point, a long-exposed underwater volcano that bites into the lake’s 
northwest shore.215 Paoha heaved above the surface of the lake without 
exploding only three hundred years ago, and hot springs and fumaroles 
continue to mark its cracked, lakebed surface.216 Mono Lake has been a 
destination for scientific research into underwater volcanism because it is 
safer and easier to explore than some of the more active underwater 
volcanoes in Hawaii.217 
More recently, Mono Lake briefly made international scientific news in 
2010, when NASA scientists announced that they had discovered the first 
 
 210  Kevin Neal, TED Case Studies, The Los Angeles Aqueduct and the Owens and Mono 
Lakes (MONO Case), http://www1.american.edu/ted/mono.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) 
(explaining Mono Lake’s importance to migratory bird routes from the Arctic Circle to South 
America); Mono Lake Comm., Birds of the Basin: The Migratory Millions of Mono, 
http://www.monolake.org/about/ecobirds [hereinafter Mono Lake Bird Facts] (last visited Apr. 
17, 2015). 
 211  Mono Lake Facts, supra note 199; Mono Lake Bird Facts, supra note 210. 
 212  Mono Lake Facts, supra note 199. 
 213  Id.; Mono Lake Bird Facts, supra note 210; see also HART, supra note 198, at 16–17. 
 214  Renee Murdock, Mono Basin Volcanism, http://www.indiana.edu/~sierra/papers/2004 
/murdock.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 215  Mono Lake Comm., Volcanic History: Evidence of Recent Eruptions, http://www.mono 
lake.org/about/geovolcanic (last visited Apr. 17, 2015); see also HART, supra note 198, at 13–14. 
 216  Lucas Hatcher, The Geology and Biology of Mono Lake, http://www.indiana.edu/~ 
sierra/papers/2013/hatcher.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 217  See, e.g., Mono Basin Clearinghouse, Current Mono Lake Research, http://www.mono 
basinresearch.org/research/index.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (listing ongoing scientific 
studies in the Mono Basin). 
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species of life on earth that exchanged arsenic for phosphorous in its 
chemical profile.218 These scientists had been studying bacteria from the 
bottom of Mono Lake as part of a research effort to imagine how life might 
evolve on other planets.219 Their discovery of the Mono Lake GFAJ-1 arsenic 
bacteria was an initially exciting development, indicating that life in stressed 
environments might make creative use of a normally poisonous element as a 
basic chemical building block.220 However, later research failed to replicate 
these findings,221 and the scientific implications of Mono Lake’s unique 
chemistry remain unresolved. 
The five Mono Basin creeks are themselves an important part of the 
local ecology, providing rich regional fisheries, critical riparian habitat in an 
otherwise high desert environment, and irreplaceable cultural and 
sustenance values for the local people.222 
2. Cultural History and the Modern Economy 
Mono Lake’s fascinating natural history is coupled with its compelling 
cultural history. It is the ancestral homeland to a branch of the Paiute Native 
American tribe known as the Kutzadika’a.223 It had been a supply station for 
the nearby ghost town of Bodie, one of California’s largest boom towns 
during the mid-nineteenth century gold rush.224 And it remains an 
international tourist destination for nature enthusiasts visiting the lake itself, 
Yosemite National Park and the Sierra wilderness areas to the west, 
Mammoth Mountain and the Long Valley Caldera to the south, Lake Tahoe 
and Reno to the north, and the Great Basin desert to the east.225 
Today, most of the people who call the Mono Basin home live in the 
tiny town of Lee Vining, nestled at 6,781 feet alongside the western shore of 
the lake at the base of the Inyo—Sierra Crest.226 With the three mountain 
passes leading into the town from the north, west, and south closed more 
 
 218  Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin., Discovery of “Arsenic-Bug” Expands Definition of 
Life, NASA SCIENCE NEWS, Dec. 2, 2010, http://science.nasa.gov/science-news/science-at-
nasa/2010/02dec_monolake/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).  
 219  See id. 
 220  Id. 
 221  Richard A. Lovett, Arsenic-Life Discovery Debunked—But “Alien” Organism Still Odd, 
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, July 9, 2012, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2012/07/ 
120709-arsenic-space-nasa-science-felisa-wolfe-simon/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 222  Mono Basin Clearinghouse, Mono Basin Creeks: Rush, Parker, Walker, Lee Vining, Mill, 
http://www.monobasinresearch.org/timelines/streams.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 223  HART, supra note 198, at 22–24 (describing the traditional lifestyle and culture of the 
Kutzadika’a). 
 224  Id. at 24–25. 
 225  See, e.g., Robert Reid, Top 10 US Travel Destinations for 2013, LONELY PLANET, Dec. 25, 
2012, http://www.lonelyplanet.com/north-america/travel-tips-and-articles/77583 (last visited Apr. 
17, 2015) (describing points of interest in the Eastern Sierra region of California); see also 
Mammoth Facts: Town of Mammoth Lakes Fact Sheet, http://www.visitmammoth.com/groups-
meetings/mammoth-facts/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (noting the nearby town of Mammoth 
Lakes receives an average of 2.8 million visitors every year). 
 226  See Lee Vining, California, http://www.city-data.com/city/Lee-Vining-California.html (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
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than half the year, only 315 people made it their year-round home when I 
lived there in the mid-1990s. When the local 1950s-style burger stand in the 
center of town, the “Mono Cone,” opened for business at the start of the 
summer season, it was the equivalent of a local holiday. 
There are limited economic opportunities in the Mono Basin; the holy 
grail of Lee Vining residence is a year-round job with benefits (rather than, 
say, a seasonal job with the June and Mammoth Lake ski resorts in towns 
further south), and they were few and far between when I lived there. As in 
most towns, Lee Vining residents work for the public schools, the local 
electric utility, the state highway department, one or two small stores and 
restaurants, and a few gas stations and hotels. Other employment comes 
from the three primary sources of local industry, all drawing on the bounty 
of unique natural resources in the area. 
The first source of industry is the local volcanic range. The Mono 
Craters are a rich source of pumice—a commercially valuable lightweight 
volcanic rock used in landscaping, gardens, and foot stones—and there is a 
productive pumice mine to the south of Mono Lake.227 There is also a brine 
shrimp processing plant on the west side of the lake, which harvests Mono 
Lake brine shrimp as commercial fish food.228 In the days of the gold rush, 
the Jeffrey Pine forests southeast of the Mono Lake were harvested for 
timber to build Bodie, and the lake was used to transport building 
materials.229 There are still one or two sheep ranches in the area. 
Today, however, the largest regional industry is provided by the 
national and state public lands in the area, which draw hundreds of 
thousands of visitors from all around the world.230 Most of the area has been 
designated for protection within the Inyo National Forest as the Mono Basin 
National Forest Scenic Area, the first National Forest lands set aside by 
Congress with a conservation management directive.231 Since then, several 
others have been designated, including the Columbia River Gorge National 
Forest Scenic Area in Oregon.232 Parts of the basin have also been set aside 
as the Mono Lake Tufa Reserve, a California State Park.233 Mono County 
maintains a municipal park on the north shore of the lake, and other basin 
 
 227  See U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt. Map of Mono Basin, available at 
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/ca/pdf/bakersfield/geology.Par.25066.File.dat/ovm07_ge
ology_maps.pdf. 
 228  Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983); High Sierra Brine Shrimp Co., High Sierra 
Brine Shrimp, http://www.hsbrineshrimp.com/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (advertising as “the 
world’s only supplier of Mono Lake brine shrimp . . . products”). 
 229  HART, supra note 198, at 24–25 (describing the construction of Bodie). 
 230  See Peter Fimrite, Mono Lake Efforts May Be Undone by Park Closures, SF GATE, July 
24, 2011, http://www.sfgate.com/green/article/Mono-Lake-efforts-may-be-undone-by-park-closu 
res-2353453.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (describing Lee Vining as a “community that relies 
on the 271,000 annual visitors who come to the area solely because of [Mono Lake]”). 
 231  See 16 U.S.C. § 543 (2012). 
 232  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL FORESTS: SPECIAL RECREATION AREAS NOT 
MEETING ESTABLISHED OBJECTIVES 9 (1990), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/150/148579. 
pdf. 
 233  Cal. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, Mono Lake Tufa State Natural Reserve, http://www. 
parks.ca.gov/?page_id=514 (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
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lands are separately conserved by private parties.234 Visitors to the area hike, 
fish, camp, canoe, climb, ski, bird watch, photograph, and otherwise enjoy 
the ample natural amenities—and seasonally fill the local restaurants, hotels, 
and shops.235 
The Mono Basin is well-loved by naturalists, scientists, recreationalists, 
local tribes, other local residents, and visitors from around the world. For 
these reasons, the Mono Basin was once considered for designation within 
the National Park Service as a National Monument or an annex to Yosemite, 
but the idea could not survive local opposition because it would have 
required the discontinuation of all commercial extraction, including the local 
pumice mine and brine shrimp plant.236 Even so, I was unofficially told, 
Yosemite Park managers still itch to acquire Lee Vining Canyon—the 
beautiful passageway along Highway 120 that dives from the eastern tip of 
Yosemite over Tioga Pass at 10,000 feet, and then extends nail-bitingly along 
granite cliffs past alpine Saddlebag and Ellery lakes, unfolding into the 
rolling meadows and canyons of the upper Mono Basin glacial moraines.237 
3. Acquiring the Mono Basin Water Rights 
It was into this setting that Los Angeles arrived in the 1930s, looking to 
expand supply for the Aqueduct. The freshwater creeks of the Mono Basin 
would provide ample supply and, like the Owens Valley, all by gravity-
powered conveyance. Indeed, the Mono Basin lies at an even higher 
elevation than the Owens Valley, with corresponding advantages. As an 
added benefit, it was estimated that diverting the Mono creeks through the 
Owens River Gorge would enable the city to generate some 268 million 
kilowatt hours of power annually—more than offsetting the 186 million 
kilowatt hours it would ultimately take to bring water to the city from the 
Colorado River each year.238 With all this in mind, the city concluded that it 
should acquire rights to divert from Mono Lake’s feeder creeks, just as it had 
done to acquire the waters of Owens River—but this time, Los Angeles took 
a different approach. 
In many respects, this was an easier project. Most of the flow in the 
freshwater Mono Basin creeks had never been privately appropriated,239 so 
 
 234  HART, supra note 198, at 7; see also Press Release, Eastern Sierra Land Trust, Permanent 
Protection of Mono Lake Scenic Vista Draws Applause (July 26, 2008), available at 
http://www.eslt.org/Pages/Newsroom2008.htm (describing the donation of a 480-acre 
conservation easement in Mono Basin). 
 235  Mono Lake Comm., Things to Do: Spending Your Time in the Mono Basin, http://www. 
monolake.org/visit/activities (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 236  See HART, supra note 198, at 92 (discussing efforts to designate the Mono Basin as a 
National Monument); see also author communications with U.S. Forest Service supervisors 
(1996-1998). 
 237  Author communications with U.S. Forest Service supervisors (1996–1998). 
 238  GARY LIBECAP, OWENS VALLEY REVISITED: A REASSESSMENT OF THE WEST’S FIRST GREAT 
WATER TRANSFER 133 (2007). 
 239  See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 711 (Cal. 1983) (explaining that the five freshwater streams 
had historically been Mono Lake’s main source of water prior to being appropriated by the city’s 
Department of Water and Power). 
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from the perspective of California water allocation law, it was there for Los 
Angeles’s taking. The traditional approach assigned no protectable rights to 
instream flows, so the fact that this snowmelt had long been preserving the 
Mono Lake ecosystem had no legal force under the doctrine of prior 
appropriations.240 
In addition, the Mono Basin was never as developed as the Owens 
Valley had been, so there were fewer prior rights holders to contend with. 
Most pre-existing claims were riparian rights associated with adjacent real 
property, so the city simply sought to purchase the land.241 The aqueduct had 
now been operating for decades, so there was neither mystery nor chicanery 
about the process. When Los Angeles came looking for land and water rights 
in the Mono Basin, nobody pretended to be a farmer. Instead, the city simply 
offered to buy riparian land and water rights, underscored by an open threat 
of condemnation if offers were refused.242 In fact, most owners sold willingly, 
although a few holdouts had to concede or lower their asking prices after 
the city brought consolidated eminent domain proceedings against all Basin 
landowners.243 
Nevertheless, creating the Mono Basin Extension introduced one new 
challenge. California water law had developed over the intervening decades, 
so this time, Los Angeles had to do more to secure its rights before it could 
begin withdrawals. In 1913, California enacted the Water Commission Act, 
which required permits for all newly asserted rights to unappropriated 
waters and all transfers of previously acquired water rights.244 All rights 
acquired before 1914 were grandfathered into the system, and as Los 
Angeles had secured rights to Owens Valley water before the Los Angeles 
Aqueduct opened in 1913, it had avoided the formal permitting process.245 
However, the law now required Los Angeles to establish its rights to 
previously unappropriated Mono Basin waters by permit.246 It also needed 
permits to transfer the pre-existing rights it acquired for new, out-of-basin 
purposes.247 Under the appropriative system, a user can’t just take existing 
water rights and do something wholly different with them—creating new 
 
 240  See supra notes 79–86, 90–92 and accompanying text (discussing the law of prior 
appropriations). 
 241  See HART, supra note 198, at 39–40 (describing how Los Angeles acquired land and water 
rights); see also City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 52 P.2d 585 (1935) (litigating just compensation 
for the related condemnation of Mono Basin property). 
 242  HART, supra note 198, at 38–39; see also Andrew H. Sawyer, Changing Landscape and 
Evolving Law: Lessons from Mono Lake on Takings and the Public Trust, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 311, 
323–24 (1997) (describing methods of water rights acquisition by the Los Angeles Department of 
Water and Power). 
 243  Los Angeles v. Aitken, 52 P.2d at 585 (consolidated condemnation proceedings for Mono 
Basin property); see also LIBECAP, supra note 238, at 133–34 (describing the Aitken litigation). 
 244  See Brian E. Gray, The Modern Era in California Water Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 249, 273–75 
(1994). 
 245  Id. at 274–75. 
 246  See William R. Attwater & James Markle, Overview of California Water Rights and Water 
Quality Law, 19 PAC. L.J. 957, 972–73 (1988) (noting that the Water Commission Act required 
permits to establish new rights in previously unappropriated water). 
 247  See id. 
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patterns of return flow and other potentially negative impacts on 
downstream riparians and appropriators.248 The California Water Resources 
Control Board (Water Board) must first verify that the new purpose is an 
eligible beneficial use, and then it has to figure out where the appropriation 
will lie in the chain of temporal priority.249 
When Los Angeles had acquired all the necessary rights from previous 
owners and sought permission from the state to begin diverting water to the 
aqueduct, the Water Board was openly troubled about the decision.250 Agency 
personnel worried aloud about the impacts these exports would have on the 
local community and environment.251 They recalled what had happened to 
the Owens Valley. They knew what similar diversions would mean for the 
Mono Basin, and it clearly alarmed them. They had no desire to be 
responsible for turning Mono Lake into another Owen’s Dry Lake. Yet they 
determined that their hands were effectively tied by California water law.252 
California water policy made clear that the task of the agency was to 
ensure that water was put to beneficial use,253 and domestic and municipal 
uses by state residents are the highest of all beneficial uses.254 “[T]here is 
apparently nothing that this office can do to prevent it,” lamented agency 
staff.255 Los Angeles was among the state’s largest and most economically 
important cities,256 and it sought this water for the most beneficial possible 
uses. “This office therefore has no alternative but to dismiss all protests 
based upon the possible lowering of the water level in Mono Lake,” they 
reluctantly reasoned.257 In 1940, the permits were granted.258 
With that permission, the Los Angeles Aqueduct formally reached the 
Mono Basin.259 It intercepted four of Mono’s five feeder creeks and shunted 
their water south into the upper Owens River, where it could continue 
through the established pathway to Los Angeles.260 A new reservoir, Crowley 
 
 248  See supra notes 79–86, 90–92 and accompanying text (discussing the law of prior 
appropriations). 
 249  Id. 
 250  See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 713–14 (Cal. 1983) (discussing the 1940 Water Board 
decision, which found that “it had to grant the application notwithstanding the harm to public 
trust uses of Mono Lake”). 
 251  Id. at 714. 
 252  See id. at 713–14 (discussing the Water Board’s findings that it was required to prioritize 
domestic use above all others). 
 253  CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2. (“[T]he general welfare requires that the water resources of the 
State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable . . . .”). 
 254  See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 713–14. 
 255  Id. at 714. 
 256  See HART, supra note 198, at 31; see also Koehler, supra note 94, at 560–61 (describing 
Los Angeles’s potential for growth and success as a prime acquirer of land and water rights of 
the Mono Basin).  
 257  Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 714. 
 258  Id. at 711. 
 259  Id. (describing how Mono Lake receives water from its feeder streams, of which four out 
of five were appropriated by Los Angeles). 
 260  Id. at 711, 713. 
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Lake, was built just north of where the Owens River passes through the 
elongated canyon of the Owens River Gorge.261 
There were additional engineering complications to overcome—most 
notably, the Mono Crater volcanic range that extended south from Mono 
Lake along the path the water would take to reach Crowley. To complete the 
aqueduct, engineers had to tunnel through eleven miles of dormant 
volcanoes, and the local lore is that the project had lost a man per mile as 
workers encountered steam vents and toxic gases—just another indication 
of how valuable this water was considered to be.262 So valuable, in fact, that 
thirty years later, they built a second aqueduct. 
4. 1970: The Second Barrel 
As demand for water in Los Angeles continued to grow, the city realized 
that it could export even more water from the Mono Basin, if only the 
system could be modified to accommodate additional flow.263 To make that 
happen, DWP essentially built a second aqueduct.264 The second barrel 
increased the capacity of the original system by roughly fifty percent, laying 
an additional, parallel channel where needed to accommodate increased 
flow.265 Following the logic of the original 1940 permits, the Water Board 
affirmed permission for the additional exports in 1970.266 By this time, Los 
Angeles was importing about 100,000 acre-feet per year from the Mono 
Basin, or roughly twelve percent of its total water supply—supplemented by 
the California and Colorado River aqueducts that were now in place.267 
Mono Lake had already been slowly deteriorating during the first 
twenty-five years after the Los Angeles Aqueduct arrived.268 In 1962, ten years 
before the second barrel was put in, the lake had already lost nearly twenty-
five vertical feet.269 A famous set of limestone towers known as the 
“Benchmark Tufa” illustrated the decline: they had been fully submerged 
before diversions began in the 1940s, but they were several feet above the 
new water line in 1962, and they were standing fully exposed in 1968 at the 
edge of the lakeshore, some six feet high.270 
After the second barrel went in, almost no water reached the lake from 
its major tributaries, and Mono Lake’s decline accelerated dramatically. Ten 
years after the second barrel, the lake had lost nearly forty-five vertical 
 
 261  See HART, supra note 198, at 34, 42, 137 (discussing the creation of Crowley Lake, also 
known as the “Long Valley reservoir”). 
 262  Id. at 43 (discussing the tunnel); TIMOTHY TIERNEY, GEOLOGY OF THE MONO BASIN 51 (2d 
ed. 2000) (noting the eleven deaths). 
 263  HART, supra note 198, at 56. 
 264  Id. at 56–57. 
 265  Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 714 (Cal. 1983). 
 266  Decision 1631, supra note 8, at 86. 
 267  Id. (“Annual Mono Basin exports increased to an average of 102,000 acre-feet per year 
through 1981 . . . .”); Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 714; see also HART, supra note 198, at 76. 
 268  See HART, supra note 198, at 49. 
 269  See id at 49, 51. 
 270  Id. at 50–51. 
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feet,271 and half its pre-diversion volume.272 The drop in the lake level exposed 
about 18,000 acres of lake bed.273 By 1995, the Benchmark Tufa stood sun-
bleached and bone dry, more than a mile from the shore.274 
The falling water level devastated Mono Lake’s ecology. The lake was 
losing volume to unreplenished surface evaporation, but evaporation leaves 
the saline mineral content behind. As a result, when the volume of the lake 
was halved, its salinity doubled. When the salinity doubled, the simple Mono 
Lake ecosystem began to unravel. 
There were biological impacts to the shrimp, and their reproduction 
rates slowed.275 As the shrimp population declined, there were corresponding 
effects on the migratory bird populations that depended on the shrimp for 
survival along their thousand-mile journeys.276 In addition, as the water level 
fell, Negit island—the small black volcano where the California Gulls came 
to breed277—became bridged to the land.278 Gull populations were devastated 
as local coyotes gorged on the eggs and chicks that were no longer sheltered 
from predation—notwithstanding two failed attempts by the National Guard 
to breach the land bridge with dynamite.279 Meanwhile, the freshwater creeks 
below the diversion points were completely desiccated, destroying riparian 
habitat and devastating local fisheries.280 
Moreover, as the lake dramatically shrunk in size, the exposed lakebed 
contained the same toxic alkali dust that had poisoned the Owens Valley 
when the Owens Dry Lakebed was exposed.281 Satellite photos from 1968 
show a pronounced ring of white, exposed alkali flats encircling the lake like 
a ring of bathtub soap scum—a ring that appeared to double in size by 1983, 
after the second barrel had gone in.282 Like Owens Lake, Mono Lake sits at 
the base of a dramatic 10,000-foot escarpment along the Eastern Sierra, 
where high winds ricochet off the mountainsides and churn exposed salts 
into airborne, cancer-causing dust storms. Pollution hadn’t yet reached the 
critical levels recorded in the Owens Valley, but Mono is so much more 
saline than Owens that the potential public health implications were 
 
 271  Id. at 58; Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 714. 
 272  See Mono Lake Facts, supra note 199 (listing the volume of Mono Lake at its highest and 
lowest levels). 
 273  Decision 1631, supra note 8, at 5 (“The surface area of the lake declined from 54,924 
acres in 1941 to approximately 37,688 acres in 1982.”); see also Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 716. 
 274  See Andrew Ford, Mono Basin: Tufa, http://public.wsu.edu/~forda/tufa1.html (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2015) (showing a photograph of Professor Ford kneeling at the tufa in 1995, with the 
shores of Mono Lake visible in the background of the photograph).  
 275  See HART, supra note 198, at 69 (discussing shrimp reproductive issues). 
 276  Id. at 70. 
 277  Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 716. 
 278  Id. 
 279  See HART, supra note 198, at 72, 88 (describing attempts to breach the Negit land bridge 
in 1978 and 1979). 
 280  Id. at 54–56 (describing effects on the feeder streams). 
 281  See id. at 52–54 (describing the alkali band buildup and increase in toxic dust storms). 
 282  See Maggie’s Notebook, NASA’s Creature at Bottom of Mono Lake: Remnants of 
Previous Earth Inhabitants?, http://www.maggiesnotebook.com/2010/12/nasas-creature-at-
bottom-of-mono-lake-remnants-of-previous-earth-inhabitants/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
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concerning.283 As it was, the Mono Basin National Forest Scenic Area—
established by Congress for its extraordinary scenic, ecological, and 
recreational values—was periodically violating Clean Air Act particulate 
standards.284 
5. The Coalition of Resistance 
As environmental devastation in the Mono Basin gathered speed, local 
resistance gathered force. Residents feared both for their health and for 
their livelihoods, as water exports eroded the lake at the center of their 
public lands-based tourist economy. Students and scientists who studied the 
unique geologic and biological resources in the area raised the alarm of 
impending ecologic collapse.285 
In 1976, Stanford biologist David Gaines oversaw a student research 
project by David Winkler about the effects of Los Angeles’s diversions on 
Mono Lake,286 which galvanized the growing opposition.287 If Los Angeles 
continued to export 100,000 acre-feet per year from the Mono Basin creeks, 
the lake was predicted to lose another forty-three vertical feet and twenty 
square miles of surface area over the next eighty to one hundred years.288 
Forecasters predicted that it would eventually reach equilibrium as a lifeless, 
hypersaline sump at the center of the vast and toxic salt plains of the 
formerly submerged lakebed.289 
A coalition of local residents, nature lovers, environmental advocates, 
scientists, legal experts, and government agencies coalesced around the idea 
that something had to be done.290 In 1978, with help from the Santa Monica 
Bay Audubon Society, David Gaines organized the Mono Lake Committee, a 
local grassroots organization committed to saving Mono Lake.291 David and 
his wife, Sally Gaines, traveled the state raising awareness about the Mono 
 
 283  Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 704–05 (describing Mono Lake’s unique level of 
salinity). 
 284  HART, supra note 198, at 154–55. 
 285  Id. at 61–63 (describing how scientists of various fields demonstrated concern for Mono 
Lake). 
 286  MONO BASIN RESEARCH GRP., AN ECOLOGICAL STUDY OF MONO LAKE, CALIFORNIA (David W. 
Winkler ed., 1977), available at http://www.monobasinresearch.org/onlinereports/1976study/ 
ecologicalstudyofmonolake.pdf. 
 287  See Mono Lake Comm., History of the Mono Lake Committee, http://www.mono 
lake.org/mlc/history (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) [hereinafter MLC History] (“[The] report drew 
attention to the potentially catastrophic ecological impacts of Mono Lake’s falling level . . . .”). 
 288  Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 715 (Cal. 1983). 
 289  See id. (noting that forecasters predicted the lake would stabilize at 6,330 feet, with a 
surface area of approximately 38 square miles). 
 290  For the most thorough historical account of scientific, political, and legal advocacy at 
Mono Lake, see generally HART, supra note 198. For a discussion of the different advocates on 
the eve of litigation, see id. at 61–83. For a description of the legal research produced by 
Professor Harrison Dunning’s pivotal public trust doctrine conference in 1980 at U.C. Davis, see 
id. at 101.  
 291  See MLC History, supra note 287. 
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Lake situation with “schools, conservation groups, legislators, and anyone 
who would listen.”292  
An independent study by an Interagency Task Force of state and federal 
environmental agencies concluded that diversions would need to be reduced 
to 15,000 acre-feet per year to stabilize the lake,293 and state legislation 
requiring those reductions was introduced but never enacted.294 
Nevertheless, statewide public sentiment began shifting in sympathy with 
the lake advocates. Vehicles all over California began sporting “Save Mono 
Lake” bumper stickers.295 The National Audubon Society expressed interest 
in helping the fledgling Mono Lake Committee bring a lawsuit.296 
Meanwhile, in 1970, Professor Joseph Sax published the now classic 
law review article entitled The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource 
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention.297 In his article—one of those rare 
academic works that literally changes the world—he noted: 
Private citizens, no longer willing to accede to the efforts of administrative 
agencies to protect the public interest, have begun to take the initiative 
themselves. One dramatic result is a proliferation of lawsuits in which citizens, 
demanding judicial recognition of their rights as members of the public, sue the 
very governmental agencies which are supposed to be protecting the public 
interest.298 
Sax argued that because legislatures are susceptible to capture by industry 
that would monopolize and degrade commonly held natural resources, the 
doctrine enables judicial access to “promote equality of political power for a 
disorganized and diffuse majority.”299 He further argued that the public trust 
doctrine should not be limited in application to navigable waters, but should 
be extended to “a wide range of situations in which diffuse public interests 
need protection against tightly organized groups with clear and immediate 
goals.”300 
His inspiration was surely felt in the famous litigation that followed. 
 
 292  Id. 
 293  INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON MONO LAKE, REPORT OF INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON MONO 
LAKE 1–2 (1979); see also HART, supra note 198, at 88 (describing the report of the Task Force). 
 294  HART, supra note 198, at 84, 88–89. Earlier legislation inspired by the Owens Valley 
conflict imposed tighter controls on some out-of-basin water exports, but Los Angeles Aqueduct 
exports were not subject to these restrictions. See LIBECAP, supra note 238, at 16 (describing 
California’s 1943 Area of Origin Law). 
 295  Jane Kay, It’s Rising and Healthy: Three Decades Ago, a Bunch of College Students 
Reported on and Worried About the Fate of Mono Lake. This Month, They Celebrated Its 
Recovery., SF GATE, July 29, 2006, http://www.sfgate.com/green/article/it-s-rising-and-healthy-
three-decades-ago-a-2515840.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).  
 296  See MLC History, supra note 287 (discussing two lawsuits brought by the Mono Lake 
Committee and the National Audubon Society). 
 297  See generally Sax, supra note 12. 
 298  Id. at 473. 
 299  Id. at 560. 
 300  Id. at 556. 
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IV. THE MONO LAKE LITIGATION 
The emerging coalition marshalled its resources to forestall further 
environmental devastation in the Mono Basin, culminating in the California 
Supreme Court’s epic Mono Lake decision. This Part reviews the path to 
litigation, the arguments that reached the high court, the justices’ landmark 
ruling, and the aftermath of its decision—including the Water Board’s 
resulting plans for implementation of the court’s decision and Los Angeles’s 
embrace of a new strategy for compliance. After exploring the most 
important doctrinal features of the court’s decision, it touches on some 
important scholarly criticisms of the resulting doctrine, as well as potential 
future public trust developments, including the Atmospheric Trust Project. 
A. The Audubon Society (Mono Lake) Case 
In 1979, the National Audubon Society and Mono Lake Committee filed 
a lawsuit in Mono County court, arguing that Los Angeles’s diversions 
violated the public trust doctrine, constituted a common law nuisance, and 
violated portions of the California constitution protecting navigable 
waterways.301 Los Angeles defended the legality of the diversions under 
California water law and moved for an adjudication of all water rights in the 
Mono Basin—effectively joining all private, state, and federal landholders in 
a suit that would ultimately proceed all the way to the California Supreme 
Court.302 
1. The Parties 
The parties to the resulting litigation included local residents, state 
landowners, environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) at 
various levels of geographical scale, government agencies responsible for 
impacted land, water, wildlife, and air resources, and DWP. The Mono Lake 
Committee coordinated efforts on behalf of the plaintiffs from Lee Vining, 
where they remain a Mono Basin watchdog and advocacy group.303 In 
addition to local and national chapters of the Audubon Society, they were 
joined by several other environmental NGOs, including Friends of the Earth, 
the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, and CalTrout.304 
 
 301  See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 716 (Cal. 1983) (“[P]laintiffs filed suit for injunctive and 
declaratory relief in the Superior Court for Mono County on May 21, 1979.”). Mono Lake had 
been previously established as a navigable waterway in an earlier takings case, City of Los 
Angeles v. Aitken, 52 P.2d 585, 588 (Cal. 1935) (“There can be no doubt that Mono Lake is a 
navigable body of water.”). 
 302  Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 716, 727. 
 303  Decision 1631, supra note 8, at 7; see also MLC History, supra note 287 (describing the 
mission of the organization as “a non-profit citizens’ group dedicated to protecting and restoring 
the Mono Basin ecosystem, educating the public about Mono Lake and the impacts on the 
environment of excessive water use, and promoting cooperative solutions that protect Mono 
Lake and meet . . . real water needs without . . . transferring environmental problems to other 
areas”) (quotation marks omitted). 
 304  Decision 1631, supra note 8, at 7, 19. 
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A host of state and federal government agencies were also involved,305 
including the U.S. Forest Service (responsible for managing the Mono Basin 
National Forest Scenic Area), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (with 
interests in the Mono Basin creeks and fisheries), the California Department 
of Fish and Game (concerned with wildlife impacts), the California 
Department of Parks and Recreation (responsible for the Mono Lake Tufa 
State Reserve), the State Lands Commission (responsible for state land 
resources), and the California Great Basin Unified Air Pollution Control 
District (charged with managing compliance with the Clean Air Act and 
other air quality controls).306 And of course, DWP defended the city’s 
exports.307 
2. Settlement Negotiations 
Extensive negotiations preceded the California Supreme Court’s 
disposition of the case, in which lawmakers and others tried and failed to 
persuade the disputants to reach a compromise.308 Sizeable state and federal 
grants were offered to help Los Angeles adopt water conservation 
technologies that might reduce its need for water imports,309 but the city was 
loathe to give any ground on its claims for imported water. Los Angeles 
commanded one of the largest metropolitan areas in the country, but its 
continued existence hinged on access to imported water. City leaders likely 
worried that conceding any water in the Mono Basin might redound 
negatively to other claims.310 Moreover, under the “use it or lose it” principle 
of appropriative water law, any sustained failure by Los Angeles to exercise 
those water rights could result in their legal forfeiture forever.311 
Meanwhile, the Interagency Task Force had determined that 6,388 feet 
above sea level was the minimum water level required in Mono Lake to 
forestall ecological collapse and prevent further degradation of air 
resources.312 Although they did not insist that Mono Lake be returned to its 
 
 305  For the argument that the federal government might also have challenged diversions on 
the basis of the riparian rights associated with its ownership of Mono Basin public lands, see 
Richard P. Shanahan, The Application of California Riparian Water Rights Doctrine to Federal 
Lands in the Mono Lake Basin, 34 HASTING L.J. 1293, 1296 (1983). 
 306  Decision 1631, supra note 8, at 19–20. 
 307  See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 709 (“Plaintiffs filed suit . . . to enjoin DWP diversions . . . .”). 
 308  HART, supra note 198, at 85, 88. 
 309  Id. at 88 (“The state and federal governments would pay two-thirds of the cost of 
replacement water for the first two years . . . .”). 
 310  Author email communication with Geoff McQuilken, Executive Director of the Mono 
Lake Committee, Apr. 26, 2015 (on file with author); see also HART, supra note 198, at 88–89, 
168–70 (discussing the city’s reluctance to engage in any activity that might undermine its 
appropriative rights); id. at 83 (describing a failed settlement conference among the parties in 
which the DWP representative pledged the city’s resolve to protect its appropriative rights by 
warning the Mono Lake advocates that “The last lawsuit we had like this took forty-three years. 
. . . Fortunately, we're young.”). 
 311  See supra Part II.B (discussing the law of prior appropriations). 
 312  See HART, supra note 198, at 86, 88 (discussing the Mono Lake Committee’s and 
Interagency Task Force’s insistence on restoring the lake level to 6,388 feet, depending on how 
the lake level would be defined). 
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pre-diversion level of 6,417 feet, the Mono Lake advocates refused to 
consider any proposal that would not protect the lake at the 6,388-foot 
level.313 Indeed, Mono Lake Committee leaders once explained to me that 
they had been counseled by negotiation experts to open with a more 
extreme demand that would enable them bargaining room to concede 
downward during negotiations with the city. However, they rejected the 
conventional approach in favor of one they felt was grounded in the 
authority of scientific evidence.314 “Why play games?” they explained: “We 
weren’t going to bluff; we were just going to start with what the science said 
was necessary, and then stay there forever.”315 
3. The California Supreme Court Decision 
As negotiations failed to resolve the dispute, Mono Lake continued to 
decline, and the case proceeded through all levels of the judicial system to 
the California Supreme Court.316 In the case before the California high court, 
the plaintiffs made a simple claim that threatened to undermine a century’s 
worth of seemingly settled California water law. Channeling the insights of 
Professor Sax and the U.C. Davis conference scholars, the plaintiffs argued 
that allowing the destruction of Mono Lake through continued water 
diversions was impermissible, notwithstanding that these diversions were 
pursuant to state-approved appropriations, because it violated state 
obligations under the public trust doctrine.317 The importance of the public 
trust doctrine had been progressively recognized in several prior California 
Supreme Court cases,318 and the plaintiffs argued that the state’s obligations 
 
 313  See id. at 85 (discussing negotiations between the Mono Lake Committee, the 
Interagency Task Force, and the City of Los Angeles). 
 314  See Decision 1631, supra note 8, at 154–55 (describing the long-term goal of returning the 
lake to a level that would protect the various public trust resources at issue). 
 315  Personal communications with Geoffrey McQuilken, MLC Executive Director (July 1996 
& May 2001); see also MLC History, supra note 287 (noting that early Mono Lake Committee 
leaders “also decided to ask for exactly what they wanted, instead of asking for more and then 
compromising down to the true goal”). 
 316  Because the litigation included federal agencies, the case was removed to federal district 
court, which abstained on the novel issue of state law and remanded back to state court. See 
Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Dep’t of Water & Power of Los Angeles, 496 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Cal. 
1980); Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983) (describing the federal district court’s request 
“that the state courts determine the relationship between the public trust doctrine and the 
water rights system”); see also Mono Basin Clearinghouse, Political & Legal Chronology, 
http://www.monobasinresearch.org/timelines/polchr.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (describing 
history of the various lawsuits taking place at Mono Lake). 
 317  See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712 (describing plaintiffs’ theory that “the shores, bed and 
waters of Mono Lake are protected by a public trust” and that diversions that fail to consider 
the public trust “may result in needless destruction of [public trust] values”). 
 318  See, e.g., State of California v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 29 Cal. 3d 240, 247 (Cal. 1981) 
(applying the public trust doctrine to “all the navigable lakes and rivers in California”); State of 
California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 29 Cal. 3d 210, 227 (Cal. 1981) (same); City of Berkeley v. 
Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 364 (1980) (characterizing the public trust right as “illimitable and 
unrestrainable and incapable of individual exclusive appropriation”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Marks, 491 P.2d 374 (1971) (recognizing the public trust doctrine as a matter “of great 
public importance”). 
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as trustee must accordingly take precedence over its previous decisions to 
allow Los Angeles’s diversions. 
Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the state had failed its trust 
obligations back in 1940, when the Water Board had first granted Los 
Angeles permission to divert water from the Mono Basin creeks.319 The Water 
Board had granted these licenses in violation of the public trust doctrine, the 
plaintiffs explained, because its decision failed to account for the 
foreseeable harms to Mono Lake’s ecologic, scenic, and recreational 
values.320 At the time, the agency had openly worried about these very 
problems, reflecting on the earlier destruction of Owens Lake.321 The 
plaintiffs contended that the Water Board had violated the state’s trust 
obligations when it wrongly concluded that it had no alternative but to 
permit the exports, notwithstanding these anticipated harms.322 
In fact, the plaintiffs argued, the public trust doctrine both empowered 
and obligated the Water Board to prevent these exports. Mono Lake was 
held by the state in trust for the public, and no organ of the state could give 
away its water if that would result in the destruction of the resource.323 The 
argument, in essence, was that it was no more permissible for California to 
give away Mono Lake’s waters than it was for Illinois to give away Chicago 
Harbor in the famous Illinois Central case.324 The plaintiffs also argued that 
Los Angeles’s harmful diversions should be considered an unreasonable 
use.325 
DWP defended Los Angeles’s rights to export Mono Basin water on 
grounds that the licenses were fully consistent with the clearly articulated 
California water law principles of prior appropriations and beneficial use.326 
The California constitution affirms that water should be put to beneficial 
 
 319  See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728–29 (noting that the rights had been acquired “in 1940 
from a water board which believed it lacked both the power and the duty to protect the Mono 
Lake environment” and that DWP “continues to exercise those rights in apparent disregard for 
the resulting damage to . . . Mono Lake”). 
 320  Id. 
 321  Id. at 714 (citing the Water Board’s 1940 decision, which found: “It is indeed unfortunate 
that the City’s proposed development will result in decreasing the aesthetic advantages of Mono 
Basin but there is apparently nothing that this office can do to prevent it.”) (emphasis in 
opinion); see also Decision 1631, supra note 8, at 1 (noting the Water Board’s conclusion that 
the Water Code “required issuance of the permits despite anticipated damage to Mono Lake and 
other natural resources”). 
 322  See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712–14 (noting plaintiffs’ public trust violation cause of 
action and the DWP’s determination not to consider the public trust in its 1940 decision). 
 323  Id. at 712 (summarizing the state’s public trust duty and synthesizing the doctrine with 
the prior appropriations doctrine). 
 324  See id. at 721 (discussing Illinois Central and applying its rule of law); see also supra Part 
II.A.1 (discussing Illinois Central). 
 325  See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 718 (discussing defendant’s attempt to require plaintiffs to 
exhaust administrative remedies before the Water Board for claims “based on asserted 
unreasonable or nonbeneficial use of appropriated water”). 
 326  Id. at 727 (noting defendant’s argument that the public trust had been subsumed into the 
prior appropriation system, giving it “a vested right in perpetuity to take water without concern 
for the consequences to the trust”); see also supra Part II.B (reviewing principles of water law). 
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use,327 and much of this water was going to the highest recognized form of 
beneficial use—domestic use by the citizens of Los Angeles. (This, they 
would have argued, was hardly comparable to giving away the bed of 
Chicago Harbor.) 
DWP also pointed to the vast legal and physical infrastructure by which 
water is moved all over the state of California, from watersheds with more 
to watersheds with less.328 This elaborate network of water transfers is 
formalized by the system of licenses that confer the appropriative rights on 
which cities like Los Angeles have long relied.329  
Finally, DWP argued that the well-developed body of statutory water 
law in California had subsumed and displaced the common law public trust 
doctrine.330 After all, this is normally what happens when statutory law 
conflicts with the common law—as it has in vast areas of tort, contract, and 
criminal law.331 Legislative pronouncements to the contrary abrogate the 
precedents of judge-made common law.332 DWP also argued that the 
plaintiffs were not entitled to judicial relief because they had not exhausted 
administrative remedies.333 
The plaintiffs thus argued that the public trust doctrine trumps the prior 
appropriations doctrine, while the defendants maintained that the statutorily 
codified principles of prior appropriation trump the common law public 
trust doctrine.334 Indeed, reviewing the two doctrines in isolation reveals a 
set of legal principles that seem hard to reconcile; neither so much as 
acknowledges the other. The court openly acknowledged that “the two 
systems of legal thought have been on a collision course,” and that it was 
time to resolve the issue.335 This, then, was the critical question of first 
impression that the Mono Lake case presented to the justices of the 
California Supreme Court: What is the relationship between the public trust 
 
 327  CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2. (“[I]n this State the general welfare requires that the water 
resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable, 
and that the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of water be prevented, 
and that the conservation of such waters is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable and 
beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people and for the public welfare.”). 
 328  See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 727–28 (discussing California’s historical reliance on water 
diversions out of stream). 
 329  Id. at 727 (discussing the Water Board’s power to “grant usufructuary licenses that will 
permit an appropriator to take water from flowing streams and use that water in a distant part 
of the state”). 
 330  Id. 
 331  See, e.g., William Lindsley, Effects of Statutes on Common Law, in 58 CAL. JUR. 3D 
Statutes § 5 (“The legislature is at liberty to change any rule of the common law and thereby 
prevent it from being the rule of decision in this state.”); Modern Barber Colleges v. Cal. Emp’t 
State Comm’n, 192 P.2d 916, 920 (Cal. 1948) (noting that the legislature may “create new rights 
or provide that rights which have previously existed shall no longer arise, and it has full power 
to regulate and circumscribe the methods and means of enjoying those rights”). 
 332  See Lowman v. Stafford, 226 Cal. App. 2d 31, 38–39 (1964) (“[T]he law itself, as a rule of 
conduct, may be changed at will by the Legislature subject only to constitutional provision.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 333  Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 718. 
 334  Id. at 713–14, 718. 
 335  Id. at 712, 727. 
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doctrine and the law of appropriative water rights? When they point in 
opposite directions, which do we follow? Which trumps the other? 
In its ultimate decision, the high state court famously declined to 
choose. Instead, it affirmed that both doctrines remain bedrock principles 
within California law, and that neither displaces the other.336 It is the 
obligation of the state, said the court, to navigate the requirements of both.337 
The state must act to protect the interests in navigable waters that are 
protected by the trust, but it must also have the power to enable 
appropriative rights in water for other public purposes, even if diversions 
harm public trust values.338  
Critically, however, the court stated that “[a]pproval of such diversion 
without considering public trust values . . . may result in needless 
destruction of those values.”339 The court directed that “before state courts 
and agencies approve water diversions they should consider the effect of 
such diversions upon interests protected by the public trust, and attempt, so 
far as feasible, to avoid or minimize any harm to those interests.”340 
On the facts of this case, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that the 
public trust doctrine had not been given its due weight in the Water Board’s 
permitting calculus.341 The state could not allow the Mono Lake tributaries to 
be diverted to the extinguishment of its public trust values without even 
considering the possibilities for avoiding this harm.342 But the court also 
stressed that the state’s most populous areas have long depended on the 
appropriation of water from remote locations, often to the detriment of the 
basin of origin.343 Water allocation and permitting laws govern the 
established legal relationships in these circumstances in ways that cannot be 
casually disrupted. In a decision affirming that instream values are 
considered beneficial uses in California,344 the court nevertheless allowed 
that there may be times when the public interests in diversions outweigh the 
public values protected by the trust.345 
The court thus affirmed that Southern California’s legitimate water 
needs must remain protected by appropriations law, but also that these 
rights are nonvested, and subject to the state’s ongoing duty to supervise the 
impact of diversions on the navigational and environmental values 
associated with trust resources.346 It concluded that the Water Board had 
neglected these obligations in 1940 and 1970, when it issued Los Angeles 
permits without even considering its implicated trust responsibilities.347 
 
 336  Id. at 727. 
 337  Id. 
 338  Id. at 712. 
 339  Id. 
 340  Id. 
 341  Id. 
 342  Id. 
 343  Id. at 728–29. 
 344  Id. at 726. 
 345  Id. at 712, 727. 
 346  Id. at 727. 
 347  Id. at 728–29. 
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Accordingly, the court invalidated the licenses and remanded them to 
the Water Board for reconsideration in light of its decision.348 In the new 
decision-making process, the Water Board was directed to balance the 
legitimate water needs of Los Angeles with the state’s obligation to protect 
the scenic, ecological, and recreational values in the Mono Basin as much as 
feasible.349 Finally, the court upheld its concurrent jurisdiction with the 
Water Board in administering issues of the public trust and water rights, 
affirming the plaintiff’s ability to seek judicial relief without first exhausting 
administrative remedies.350 
4. Legal Innovations 
The central contribution of the Mono Lake case is its affirmation that—
at least in California351—the common law public trust doctrine exerts force 
independently from the statutory principles of private water allocation, and 
that water planners must accommodate the interests protected by each. As 
discussed above, the court pointedly rejected the argument that the trust 
had been subsumed or preempted by statutory and constitutional provisions 
establishing the prior appropriations doctrine.352 In addition to clarifying the 
relationship between the public trust and prior appropriation doctrines, 
however, the decision also yields several other important points of law, 
including its application to environmental values, non-navigable tributaries, 
and over time. 
a. Application to Environmental Values. 
Among lay audiences worldwide, the Mono Lake case is perhaps most 
famous for the proposition that the public trust doctrine protects values 
beyond the traditional boating, fishing, and swimming associated with 
navigable waters to also include ecological, recreational, and scenic 
considerations.353 Indeed, when I would give the South Tufa tour along the 
southwest shore as a Mono Lake ranger, we casually extolled the decision 
for its extension of public trust principles to include these more modern 
environmental values. Only in law school did I learn that this was a bit of a 
 
 348  Id. at 729. 
 349  Id. at 728–29. 
 350  Id. at 730–32.  
 351  Although the California Supreme Court’s interpretation is limited to California law, it is 
noteworthy that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in the Robinson 
Township decision. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 913 (Pa. 2013). For further 
discussion of the case, see supra Part II.A.2.  
 352  Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983) (conceiving of California water law as “an 
integration including both the public trust doctrine and the board-administered appropriative 
rights system”); see supra Part IV.A.3 (discussing this holding).  
 353  See, e.g., Blumm, supra note 15, at 591 (characterizing Mono Lake as among the best 
known of the new generation of public trust decisions); Frank, supra note 23, at 670 (referring 
to the case as “perhaps the nation’s most important public trust decision in nearly a century”); 
Conway, supra note 92, at 631. 
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local conceit; while the Mono Lake case made it famous, that expansion was 
really established by another case more than ten years earlier.354 
In 1971, in Marks v. Whitney (Marks),355 the California Supreme Court 
affirmed the flexibility of the public trust doctrine to encompass changing 
public needs in trust resources, including ecological, open space, habitat, 
scenery, and scientific values.356 However, Marks addressed a comparatively 
dry set of facts, adjudicating the conflicting rights of private parties over the 
construction of a wharf in trust-protected tidelands.357 By comparison, the 
compelling facts of the Mono Lake case, together with the force of the more 
photogenic environmental values at risk there, have made it the more 
popular standard-bearer for the expansion. The use of the public trust 
doctrine to protect the vulnerable water, air, wildlife, scenic, scientific, and 
recreational values of the Mono Basin remains the best known feature of the 
Mono Lake story.358 
b. Application to Non-Navigable Tributaries. 
An especially concrete legal innovation of the Mono Lake case is that it 
extended the protection of the public trust doctrine from the navigable 
waterway itself to the non-navigable tributaries on which it relies 
hydrologically.359 After all, Los Angeles wasn’t directly draining the lake 
(which would have yielded some awfully nonpotable water!). Instead, the 
city was diverting the mostly non-navigable creeks that channeled snowmelt 
from the Sierra into the lake, replenishing it against continuous 
evaporation.360 At the time, the public trust doctrine had not been applied to 
activity interfering with non-navigable creeks. Los Angeles could thus 
defend the Mono Lake lawsuit not only by arguing that the doctrine had been 
preempted by prior appropriations, but also that there was no interference 
with a waterway subject to the trust. 
 
 354  Marks, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (expanding public trust protections to ecological, 
habitat, open space, climatic, and scenic values). 
 355  Id. 
 356  Id. (expanding public trust protections to ecological, habitat, open space, climatic, and 
scenic values). 
 357  Id. at 377. 
 358  The public trust analysis in the Mono Lake case is complemented by several important 
but unpublished cases that helped lay political foundation for the role of the doctrine in 
California water law, involving the American River and Putah Creek. See, e.g., Stuart L. Somach, 
The American River Decision: Balancing Instream Protection with Other Competing Beneficial 
Uses, 1 RIVERS 251, 258–60 (1990) (discussing use of the doctrine in an unpublished Alameda 
County Court decision that led the state agency to relocate its exercise of rights from the 
Folsom South Canal upstream of Sacramento to Freeport downstream in order to preserve 
instream flow through the intervening channel); Joseph Sax, Bringing an Ecological Perspective 
to Natural Resources Law: Fulfilling the Promise of the Public Trust, in NATURAL RESOURCES 
POLICY AND LAW: TRENDS AND DIRECTIONS 152–60 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Sarah F. Bates, 
eds. 1993) (discussing the same Alameda County case). 
 359  Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 720–21 (Cal. 1983). 
 360  Id. at 711. 
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Nevertheless, the court accepted the hydrological relationship between 
the lake and its essential tributaries to construe them as one for the purpose 
of doctrinal protection.361 As the court reasoned, protection of the navigable 
waterway of Mono Lake had to include protection of its tributaries, without 
which the lake would ultimately disappear.362 This particular aspect of the 
court’s reasoning has particular resonance to a contemporary public trust 
case unfolding in Northern California, where litigants are currently arguing 
that doctrinal protection should be extended to the non-navigable 
groundwater tributaries of the navigable Scott River (the Scott River case).363 
c. Application over Time 
While these are all important new points of law in the Mono Lake 
decision, the potentially widest-reaching legal innovation was its recognition 
of the state’s trust responsibilities as an ongoing legal duty.364 The court 
clarified that the public trust doctrine not only requires the state to protect 
trust resources as much as feasible when allocating water, it held that the 
state also has a continuing duty of supervision under the doctrine.365 Indeed, 
it was this element of the decision—the Mono Lake doctrine of ongoing 
oversight—that empowered (and obligated) the state to revisit the 
permitting decision it had made approving Los Angeles’s exports nearly fifty 
years earlier. 
The consequences of this new understanding of the doctrine were 
potentially staggering. A state duty to revisit past allocation decisions that 
are compromising trust values in the present has ramifications far beyond 
the Mono Basin. Subjecting prior appropriations to potential revision for 
countervailing public trust values threatened havoc for water managers all 
over California, and potentially all over the western United States. 
Throughout the West, large volumes of water are transported long 
distances in just the way the Los Angeles aqueduct exports it from the Mono 
Basin.366 Just as it did in southern California, urban and agricultural 
development all over the arid west has depended on the ability to shift water 
from wetter to drier parts—and Americans have become quite good at it, at 
least from the engineering perspective.367 If the Mono Lake doctrine were 
widely applied, all of those water licenses would suddenly become very 
 
 361  Id. at 720–21. 
 362  This argument has particular resonance right now, as another public trust drama unfolds 
in northern California around the extension of public trust obligations to protect the 
groundwater tributaries of the Scott River (discussed further in Part IV.C). See Order After 
Hearing on Cross Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings at 3, Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water 
Res. Control Bd., Case No.: 34-2010-80000583 (Cal. Sacramento County Ct. 2014) [hereinafter 
Scott River Case]. 
 363  See id. at 3–4. For further discussion of the Scott River Case, see infra Part IV.C.2. 
 364  Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728. 
 365  Id.  
 366  See generally REISNER, supra note 97, at 12 (noting that water from Colorado River 
canyons is moved to meet demand in Phoenix and Palm Springs). 
 367  See id. 
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uncertain. If public trust values were being affected in ways that hadn’t been 
anticipated when those licenses were initially granted, then all the 
appropriative rights on which remote uses had developed in reliance would 
be up for renegotiation. For that reason, the doctrine of continuing oversight 
was an extremely controversial element of the decision.368 
Perhaps for the same reason, it is also a doctrinal element that has 
rarely been adopted outside of California. One exception is Hawaii, where 
the state Supreme Court has also held that private allocation decisions do 
not displace the trust.369 Indeed, Hawaii’s public trust doctrine is perhaps the 
most protective of all American states—but it is distinguishable from that in 
most western states because Hawaii’s doctrine is incorporated 
constitutionally, and the state does not follow the doctrine of prior 
appropriations.370 The closest a prior appropriations state has come to 
embracing the Mono Lake doctrine of ongoing oversight is in Nevada, where 
two concurring justices suggested an important role for the public trust 
doctrine in a water rights case—but this analysis was not part of the 
majority opinion.371 Beyond Hawaii, however, no western state has formally 
adopted the California requirement of continuing oversight. Several Idaho 
cases signaled approval of this feature of the California public trust doctrine 
in the years after the Mono Lake case was decided,372 but they were 
subsequently (and pointedly) overruled by the state legislature.373 
Even within California, where the doctrine remains good law, 
obligations of ongoing oversight have had a very limited impact on 
previously established water rights outside of the Mono Basin.374 In a 
quantitative study of freshwater public trust litigation in California since 
Mono Lake, Professor David Owen concludes that outside of the Mono 
Basin, the doctrine has exerted almost no force on existing patterns of water 
 
 368  See LIBECAP, supra note 238, at 151–53 (critiquing the Mono Lake decision’s impact on 
prior appropriations systems by creating uncertainty, undermining property rights, and 
compromising economic efficiency); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 
1449, 1533 (1990) (noting how Mono Lake “surprised many people and was certainly a deviation 
from most water lawyers’ expectations”). 
 369  Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Haw. 2000) (holding that the state water code “does not 
supplant the protections of the public trust doctrine”). 
 370  See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text (discussing Hawaiian water law). 
 371  Mineral Cnty. v. State Dep’t of Conservation & Natural Res., 20 P.3d 800, 807 (Nev. 2001) 
(Rose, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court should affirm the existence and role of Nevada’s 
public trust doctrine); see also Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 617 (Nev. 2011) (adopting 
the public trust doctrine expressly but in a case that did not address water rights).  
 372  See, e.g., Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085, 1094, 1096 
(Idaho 1983) (adopting the “California rule” but finding that the land grant at issue did not 
violate it). 
 373  IDAHO CODE tit. 58, ch. 12 § 58-1201 (1996). For further discussion, see generally Blumm 
et al., supra note 65 (discussing Idaho’s attempt to legislate away the public trust doctrine). 
 374  See generally David Owen, The Mono Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the 
Administrative State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099 (2012) (noting that, despite this potential, the 
doctrine has not upended many established water rights). Depending on the final outcome of 
the Scott River litigation, however, the doctrine may yet be extended to previously asserted 
groundwater rights. See generally Scott River Case, supra note 362. 
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use, even when serious interference with trust values are manifest.375 He 
concludes that effects of the doctrine are inextricably intertwined with the 
force of other environmental laws, which are often more responsible for 
substantive results, almost exclusively at the administrative level, and most 
often with regard to prospective uses of water, rather than existing rights.376 
B. The Aftermath of the Court’s Decision 
The California Supreme Court’s decision was the seminal step toward 
the protection of Mono Lake, but it was only the first step—and an uncertain 
one at best. It required the Water Board to consider the public trust values in 
the Mono Basin before adjudicating Los Angeles’s permits, but it did not 
specify how to balance the competing interests at stake. Additional litigation 
over the Mono Basin creeks further complicated the Water Board’s task. Los 
Angeles would make important choices in its response to the outcome of the 
legal process. And the scholarly community would pass judgment as well. 
1. The California Trout Litigation 
Before the Water Board could respond to the court’s relicensing 
directive, it was charged to consider a further set of statutory concerns after 
California Trout—joined by the National Audubon Society and the Mono 
Lake Committee—separately sued in California Trout v. State Water 
Resource Control Board (California Trout)377 to modify DWP’s diversion 
licenses on additional grounds. In the California Trout litigation, the 
plaintiffs argued that the DWP diversion dams were harming Mono Basin 
creeks in violation of state Fish and Game Code provisions.378  
After determining that the plaintiff’s claim had merit, the appeals court 
ordered the Water Board to additionally incorporate these concerns into its 
reconsideration of Los Angeles’s permits to export from the Mono Basin.379 
Indeed, the California Trout litigation was just as critical as the earlier Mono 
Lake case in determining the outcome at Mono Lake, and arguably more so 
in terms of its ultimate impact on stream restoration requirements. 
Consolidating both the Mono Lake and California Trout judicial 
commands into a single proceeding, the Water Board accordingly set to 
work determining how to assess the appropriate equipoise of so many 
conflicting interests. It struggled with the question over ten years of 
scientific inquiry, public hearings, and policy research, finally culminating in 
its 1994 release of the 200-page directive that would become known as 
Decision 1631.380 
 
 375  Owen, supra note 374, at 1122–23. 
 376  Id. at 1135–36. 
 377  207 Cal. App. 3d 585, 592 (1989). 
 378  Id. at 592 (commanding the Water Board to reconsider Mono Basin diversion licenses in 
light of the California Department of Fish and Game code requirements). 
 379  Id. at 632–33. 
 380  See generally Decision 1631, supra note 8. 
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2. Implementation by the Water Board: Decision 1631 
In the historic Decision 1631 that it released in 1994, the Water Board 
re-allocated water rights in the Mono Basin, modifying Los Angeles’s 
licenses to export in accordance with the judicial orders of the Mono Lake 
case and the California Trout case.381 
Following a full decade of research, evidentiary hearings, stakeholder 
consultation, and an exhaustive Environmental Impact Report,382 the Water 
Board arrived at a compromise not unlike the original proposal by the 
Interagency Task Force and Mono Lakeadvocates: that water exports should 
be curtailed to the extent needed to enable Mono Lake to rise to the level of 
6,392 feet above sea level over the next twenty years.383 Exports were 
eliminated until the lake reached an elevation of 6,377 feet (up from the 
current low near 6,372 feet) and water exports would then be permitted on a 
limited, graduated basis designed to achieve and maintain the ecologically 
sound lake management level.384 Once the lake reached the designated level, 
Los Angeles could increase diversions to a little more than thirty thousand 
acre-feet per year, so long as the lake level remained stable.385 Decision 1631 
also included requirements for restoration of the desiccated Mono Basin 
creeks and minimum instream flows going forward, and it designated Mono 
Lake as an Outstanding National Resource Water.386 
The Water Board designated 6,392 feet as the recovery target because 
the science confirmed that this level would resolve the most serious threats 
to the public trust values in the Mono Basin.387 This target would stabilize the 
salinity of Mono Lake at a level that would allow the ecosystem to recover.388 
The brine shrimp and alkali fly populations would reproduce successfully 
and maintain the base of the food web.389 The breeding grounds of California 
Gulls and nesting habitat of migratory birds would be protected.390 It would 
cover the most harmful salt flats that were causing air pollution problems.391 
It would protect the most scenic and recreational values associated with the 
lake, leaving some of the relicted lands’ tufa exposed.392 It would protect the 
fisheries and riparian habitat associated with the desiccated Mono Basin 
 
 381  Id. at 2. 
 382  California State Water Resources Board, Final Environmental Impact Report for the 
Review of Mono Basin Water Rights and the City of Los Angeles (1994), available at http://www. 
monobasinresearch.org/onlinereports/feir1.php. 
 383  Decision 1631, supra note 8, at 154–55, 158. 
 384  Id. 
 385  Id. at 3. 
 386  Id. at 2 (requiring Los Angeles to prepare stream restoration plans). See generally 
Koehler, supra note 94 (reviewing the historical buildup to Mono Lake and critiquing the 
positive and negative aspects of the Water Board’s resulting Decision 1631). 
 387  Decision 1631, supra note 8, at 155. 
 388  Id. at 77–78, 82. 
 389  Id. at 82. 
 390  Id. at 3. 
 391  Id. 
 392  Id. “Relicted lands” refers to the formerly submerged lakebed that has been exposed by 
water diversions. Id. 
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creeks, but some important waterfowl areas would be forsaken. And it 
would still allow Los Angeles to divert water—though diversions would be 
curtailed as needed to enable the lake to recover to the designated levels. 
It was, in every respect, a compromise plan. Indeed, almost poetically, 
the plan would raise the lake approximately twenty vertical feet from its 
post-diversion low of 6,372 feet, but it would leave it twenty-five feet below 
its pre-diversion level of 6,417 feet—roughly in the middle. 
When I left Mono Lake in the late 1990s for law school, the results of 
Decision 1631 were visible to the naked eye. The land bridge joining Mono 
Lake’s north shore to the gull rookery on Negit Island was receding under 
water. The rangers had to pull up many legs of the old boardwalk extending 
the public trails down to the water’s edge as the lake reclaimed formerly 
exposed bed. The toxic dust devils were less intense and less frequent. The 
lake level rose about ten feet to 6,382 feet in the first five years after the 
decision, raising high hopes all around—and then, sadly and suddenly, it 
stopped.393 
Climate patterns have shifted in California—as elsewhere—leading to 
reduced snowmelt in the creeks.394 The drought that hit California in the 
2000s has intensified to epic levels in the 2010s.395 Precipitation has not been 
following the modeled average conditions that Decision 1631 relied on, and 
so the lake did not reach 6,392 feet last year, as the Water Board had 
projected.396 Even though Los Angeles has remained on a curtailed schedule 
of diversions, the lake level has hovered around 6,382 feet since 1998, 
suspended at halfway to the compromise point—and this year, for the first 
time in decades, it has declined below 6,380.397  
3. Los Angeles Turns a New Page 
Whether Mono Lake will continue to recover will partly depend on 
climatic conditions beyond human control, but it will also depend on 
 
 393  See Mono Lake Comm., Mono Lake Level and Tributary Stream Flows, http://www. 
monolake.org/today/water [hereinafter Mono Lake Level] (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (listing 
historic lake levels from 1919 until present). 
 394  See, e.g., Mono Basin Clearinghouse, Monthly Weather Summaries for Lee Vining, CA, 
http://www.monobasinresearch.org/data/weather.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (noting 
average temperatures in Lee Vining and providing precipitation data). 
 395  Kyle Kim & Thomas Suh Lauder, 163 Drought Maps Reveal Just How Thirsty California 
Has Become, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/science/la-me-g-california-
drought-map-htmlstory.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (showing the severity of the California 
drought with map infographic). 
 396  See Mono Lake Level, supra note 393 (providing recent sub-6,392 foot water levels). In 
fact, with the lake level below 6,380 feet as of April 1, 2015, Los Angeles will be required to 
dramatically curtail exports again. Geoff McQuilken, Executive Director of the Mono Lake 
Committee, April 1 Lake Level Means Reduced Water Exports to LA, More Protection for Mono 
Lake, MONOLOGUE, April 1, 2015, http://www.monolake.org/today/2015/04/01/april-1-lake 
-level-means-reduced-water-exports-to-la-more-protection-for-mono-lake/ (last visited Apr. 17, 
2015) (noting that the lake has declined to a level at which water exports to Los Angeles are 
automatically reduced by 70% to 4,500 acre-feet of export annually). 
 397  See Mono Lake Level, supra note 393. 
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decision making in Los Angeles, at levels both political and personal. If the 
recent past is any indication, there is reason to be hopeful. 
Indeed, one of the favorite chapters of the Mono Lake tale is how the 
City of Los Angeles reacted to the various losses it encountered thus far in 
the story. While paling in comparison to what the Owens Valley lost—and 
what the Mono Basin is still trying to avoid—Los Angeles has also lost a 
good deal over this course of events. It lost in court, twice. It lost water 
rights it believed were settled decades earlier, and it lost any sense of 
security that its current rights are fully vested. It also lost access to a fair 
amount of water—twelve percent of its total supply. 
To avoid these painful losses, the city fought hard to prevail on the legal 
issues, fearful of weakening its access to critical water imports on which it 
had come to rely. It declined offers of state and federal funds to experiment 
with water recycling and other technology that might enable it to import less 
water, fearful of losing any portion of its hard-fought water rights to 
forfeiture or abandonment.398 But after investing so much energy in fighting 
an ultimately losing battle, the city finally turned a page after the Water 
Board’s decision. Just as the citizens of Illinois forced a change in the 
direction its legislature took over the conveyance of Chicago Harbor, the 
citizens of Los Angeles embraced a new approach to the city’s ongoing 
problem of water insecurity: conservation.399 
After Decision 1631, Los Angeles made two critical decisions. First, and 
perhaps most important, the city decided not to seek judicial review of the 
Water Board’s decision. Even though a significant portion of the city’s water 
supply was at stake, equally significant support for restoration of Mono Lake 
had developed among city residents. A city official would later explain that 
the mayor wanted to engage a more forward-thinking environmental policy, 
and the decision to accept the Water Board’s new allocation was consistent 
with this new ethic.400 In addition, the Mono Lake Committee had worked 
hard to generate ideas and funding to help Los Angeles gracefully absorb the 
loss of Mono Basin water, and not just replace it with harmful exports from 
other vulnerable watersheds.401 
Los Angeles’s second critical decision was to fully embrace the 
conservation alternative. The city sprung to a new phase of action, 
experimenting with infrastructural improvements, new methods of 
municipal and highway barrier management, and grassroots campaigning for 
household water saving devices.402 The city pushed forward with the use of 
recycled water for irrigation and industrial purposes.403 It sponsored 
 
 398  See HART, supra note 198, at 88–89 (discussing DWP’s refusal to adopt the Interagency 
Task Force plan that offered state and federal money to cover the majority of the cost of 
replacement water for the first two years after adoption). 
 399  See id. at 168–70. 
 400  David Cobb, National Director of Civic Affairs, HDR Inc., Address at the Berkeley Mono 
Lake Symposium (Nov. 17, 2014), available at http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/board_info/ 
media/nov2014/mono_lake_111714_1.shtml. 
 401  Id. 
 402 HART, supra note 198, at 148–49. 
 403  Id. at 182. 
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neighborhood drives to trade in old toilets for low-flush models.404 “Save 
Mono Lake” bumper stickers gave way to “I Save Water for Mono Lake” 
bumper stickers, which appeared throughout the city, and even the state. In 
the end, by effectively deploying these strategies, Los Angeles was able to 
recover all twelve percent of the water that it had lost as a result of the 
Mono Lake legal decisions—simply by reducing its demand.405 And this 
makes the Mono Lake story one of the very rare cases in environmental law 
with a happy ending for both sides on the dispute. 
Los Angeles remains at the forefront of water conservation efforts and 
has become a leader nationwide.406 Although the population has grown 
substantially in the past two decades, municipal water use has remained 
fairly flat.407 While the city may have earned scorn for its approach to water 
management at the beginning of the last century, and there is certainly still 
work to be done today, it nevertheless deserves credit for its approach at the 
beginning of the 21st century. 
4. Public Trust and Distrust: The Critiques 
After Mono Lake, the public trust doctrine achieved instant notoriety 
among environmental advocates, property rights advocates, and legal 
academics. Environmentalists hailed the doctrine as a means of preserving 
ecological treasures that might otherwise be lost.408 Some began looking for 
other opportunities to apply the public trust concept in other realms of 
 
 404  Id. at 149. 
 405  Compare id. at 76 (noting that Mono Lake provided 12% of Los Angeles’s water supply), 
with Mono Lake Comm., Mono Lake FAQ: Frequently Asked Questions About Mono Lake, 
http://www.monolake.org/about/faq (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (noting that Los Angeles 
conservation efforts have more than replaced water no longer diverted from Mono Lake). 
 406  See Jacques Leslie, Los Angeles, City of Water, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2014, http://nyti 
.ms/1u550yO (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (noting that Los Angeles has become “a leader in 
sustainable water management, a pioneer in big-city use of cost-effective, environmentally 
beneficial water conservation, collection and reuse technologies”). 
 407  See Mono Lake Comm., Replacement Water: Helping Los Angeles Find Better Solutions, 
http://www.monolake.org/mlc/altwater (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (“[D]espite growth of a 
million people between 1975 and 2005, LA’s water usage (of about 600,000 AF/yr) had not 
changed.”). 
 408  See, e.g., Blumm, supra note 15, at 579 (characterizing the public trust doctrine as 
“chameleon-like” in its ability to shape itself to different contexts); Stevens, supra note 64, at 
621 (concluding that the public trust and prior appropriations doctrines were intertwined long 
before Mono Lake and other cases, and arguing that the public trust is an inalienable attribute 
of sovereignty); Kevin M. Raymond, Protecting the People’s Waters: The California Supreme 
Court Recognizes Two Remedies to Safeguard Public Trust Interests in Water—National 
Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 
104 S. Ct. 413 (1983), 59 WASH. L. REV. 357, 357–58 (1984) (examining the administrative and 
judicial remedies available for public trust violations in California after the case); Gray, supra 
note 93, at 975, 979, 997 (describing the author’s work with the San Francisco City Attorney’s 
office on an amicus brief for the plaintiffs, and arguing that one especially significant aspect of 
the case is the court’s recognition of an environmental baseline in the management of public 
resources); see also Arnold, supra note 3, at 2 (celebrating Mono Lake as an environmental 
achievement); Enzler, supra note 3, at 456–501 (reviewing the significance of Mono Lake for 
public trust and environmental law at the systemic level). 
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natural resources management.409 Directly inspired by Mono Lake, India 
incorporated the public trust doctrine into its own constitutional order.410 Yet 
the ongoing development of the public trust doctrine has also spawned 
serious alarm among competing constituencies, and even some 
environmental advocates.411 While the doctrine remains generally popular 
among the public, this section briefly addresses the distrust that also 
emerged around the idea of the public trust, focusing on concerns about 
property rights, environmental protection, and legal process. 
a. The Property Rights Critique 
Perhaps the most immediate concerns were those raised by advocates 
for private property rights, alarmed that expansive use of the doctrine would 
result in the confiscation of private rights, in tension with public trust 
values.412 Conflicts between public and private rights have manifested over 
water rights,413 waterfront and wetland development,414 the regulation of 
private activity on submerged lands,415 and beach and lakefront access.416 For 
 
 409  See infra notes 445–451 and accompanying text (discussing attempts to extend public 
trust protection to other realms). 
 410  M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 S.C.C. 388 (1996) (India), in I UNITED NATIONS 
ENVIRONMENT PROJECT COMPENDIUM OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN MATTERS RELATED TO THE 
ENVIRONMENT, NATIONAL DECISIONS 259 (1998), available at http://www.asianjudges.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/Compendium_Judicial_Decisions_Nat_v1.pdf (discussing the role of 
the public trust doctrine in Indian law and quoting the California Supreme Court’s description 
of the doctrine in Mono Lake). 
 411  See infra notes 370–400 and accompanying text (discussing various critiques of the 
public trust doctrine). 
 412  See, e.g., James L. Huffman, A Fish out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a 
Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527, 533 (1989) (identifying the doctrine as a creature of 
property law that has been distorted by the courts beyond its proper boundaries); Barton H. 
Thompson, Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine: A Conservative Reconstruction and Defense, 15 
SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 47, 49 (2006) (suggesting reconstruction of the public trust doctrine in 
response to libertarian and property rights critiques); Cohen, supra note 41, at 274–76 
(criticizing the public trust doctrine’s effects on private property rights); see also Rose, supra 
note 16, at 711–13, 774, 777–81 (recognizing the inevitable conflict between the public trust and 
private property rights and considering what type of property can, under competing notions of 
public trust, be considered inherently public). But see Epstein, supra note 41, at 428–30 (1987) 
(analyzing the public trust from a similarly libertarian, property rights perspective, but 
supporting it as a natural limitation on government power, comparable to restrictions on 
eminent domain). 
 413  See, e.g., Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983) (discussing public and private rights 
over water). 
 414  See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 611 (2001) (resolving takings claim 
related to waterfront development, in part, on public trust grounds); see also Ryan, supra note 
42, at 123–25 (discussing South Carolina’s Marsh Island Bridge debate involving waterfront land 
and water development programs). 
 415  See, e.g., Marks, 491 P.2d 374, 383 (Cal. 1971) (discussing regulation of private activity on 
submerged lands). 
 416  See e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 355–56 (N.J. 1984) 
(discussing private and public activity on beachfront property); Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58 
(Mich. 2005) (discussing private and public rights on lakefront property). 
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example, in one of the most controversial extensions of the doctrine, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court held in Matthews v. Bay Head417 that the doctrine 
protected public passage over private beachfront property if needed for 
public access to the ocean.418 Like the California Supreme Court in Marks, 
the New Jersey Court in Matthews stressed that the doctrine must be 
construed flexibly, to respond to changing societal needs.419 
When courts administering the trust emphasize its flexibility to adapt to 
changing public needs,420 property rights advocates worry.421 Without a clear 
limit on how far the public trust doctrine may intrude on seemingly settled 
private rights, they worry about its potential as an unlimited tool of legal 
opportunism that, caricatured, eats everything in its path.422  
The property rights critique asks what, then, is the limiting principle?423 
Whenever the public decides it wants something new in a trust resource, 
does that mean private interests must yield, no matter how established?424 
Especially in California, where the Mono Lake case establishes an ongoing 
duty of supervision, the state can theoretically revisit water licenses at any 
time (although, as noted above, this hasn’t actually happened).425 For 
example, analyzing the doctrine from a law and economics perspective, 
Professor Lloyd Cohen criticized the doctrine as “a piece of disingenuous 
gimmickry” that would undermine property rights.426 
 
 417  Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n (Matthews), 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). 
 418  Matthews, 471 A.2d at 363 (“In order to exercise these rights guaranteed by the public 
trust doctrine, the public must have access to municipally-owned dry sand areas as well as the 
foreshore. The extension of the public trust doctrine to include municipally-owned dry sand 
areas was necessitated by our conclusion that enjoyment of rights in the foreshore is 
inseparable from use of dry sand beaches.”). 
 419  Id. at 365. 
 420  See, e.g., id.; Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983). 
 421  See Thompson, supra note 412, at 48–49 (discussing concerns among conservatives 
about judicial interpretations of the public trust doctrine); Thompson, supra note 368, at 1478 
(discussing concerns among property owners about possible takings under the public trust 
doctrine). 
 422  Thompson, supra note 368, at 1507–08, 1520, 1532–33. But see Michael C. Blumm, The 
Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property: The Accommodation Principle, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 649, 654 (2010) (arguing that there is no inherent conflict between private property and the 
public trust doctrine). See also Thompson, supra note 412, at 48–49; Thompson, supra note 368, 
at 1478. 
 423  See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 368, at 1478 (discussing the belief that property is 
determined politically with no objective principle); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 30, at 929–30 
(arguing for limited application, and worrying about unclear boundaries). But see Epstein, 
supra note 41, at 428–29 (arguing that the sweep of the doctrine, as he construes it, “should be 
broad indeed”). 
 424  Cf. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 62–63, 65 
(2010) (discussing how far the public trust doctrine will go and querying whether it might 
require the public to give up public use rights as an incident to public enjoyment of trust 
resources). 
 425  See supra notes 371–374 and accompanying text (discussing the limited impact of the 
duty of ongoing oversight).  
 426  Cohen, supra note 41, at 276. Professor Gary Libecap has critiqued the rule for impeding 
economically efficient interbasin transfers and frustrating the development of water markets. 
See LIBECAP, supra note 238, at 151–53. 
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b. The Environmental Critique 
In the immediate wake of the Mono Lake case, a separate critique of the 
public trust doctrine emerged from within the circle of environmental 
advocacy. Some environmental critics were skeptical that the doctrine, with 
its roots in property law, would provide the best legal tools to support the 
unfolding environmental law movement.427 The notion of the “public trust” 
relies on public ownership and oversight of natural resources to effectuate 
environmental protection, but owners can be fickle and shortsighted, and 
public participation requirements are content-neutral.428 The trust may 
prohibit private monopoly, but if public opinion swings away from 
environmental protection at a critical moment, competing concerns may 
prevail.429 After all, the same public owners advocating for environmental 
protection one day may find themselves longing for cheaper fuels the next. 
Recognizing that the doctrine isn’t invariably “green,” these “green 
dissenters”430 would have preferred that the legal protection of natural 
resources be established according to concepts of stewardship with a more 
explicit commitment to environmental protection. Indeed, just as the Mono 
Lake case was filed, executive agencies were being given new roles of 
responsibility for administering the major federal environmental statutes of 
the 1970s.431 Environmental critics of the public trust doctrine hoped that 
environmental protection norms would take root in administrative law 
responsibilities that were more aligned with the principles of stewardship 
than the dominion of ownership. 
For example, Professor Richard Lazarus worried that the doctrine 
might distract the progress of environmental law toward effectuating 
resource protection through more concrete state and federal mandates, 
arguing that it was a “romantic step backward toward a bygone era at a time 
when we face modern problems that demand candid and honest debate on 
the merits.”432 Professor William Araiza argued that a substantive 
 
 427  See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in 
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 715–16 (1986); 
William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-Based Constitutional 
Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45 
UCLA L. REV. 385, 387–88 (1997). 
 428  See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 427, at 715–16 (discussing public trust and shifts in notions 
of private property). 
 429  See, e.g., Araiza, supra note 427, at 432 (criticizing the doctrine’s reliance on process over 
a substantive commitment to environmental protection). But see Arnold, supra note 3, at 39, 41 
(using Mono Lake to suggest that politics and public participation are as critical to 
environmental protection as formal environmental law). 
 430  See Ryan, supra note 1, at 493 (discussing the “green dissent” by environmentalists 
objecting to use of the doctrine for environmental protection in lieu of conventional 
environmental statutory and administrative law.). 
 431  See Lazarus, supra note 427, at 681 n.308, 684. 
 432  Id. at 715–16. But see Albert C. Lin, Public Trust and Public Nuisance: Common Law Peas 
in a Pod?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1075, 1097 (2012) (distinguishing the public trust doctrine and 
common law nuisance as elements of property and tort law respectively, and answering 
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commitment to environmental values would be preferable to the untethered 
political process implied by public trust adjudication.433 After all, even the 
Mono Lake case did not require the absolute protection of Mono Lake; it 
simply required that the Water Board think carefully about it.434 
c. The Legal Process Critique 
Other critiques took aim at the way that the doctrine empowers judicial 
decision making at the expense of political decision making.435 The doctrine 
expressly enables the judiciary to countermand legislative and executive 
decisions, even though the political branches of government are 
conventionally considered to be more democratic.  
Public trust supporters argue that the role of judicial review is among 
the greatest strengths of the doctrine, enforcing necessary checks and 
balances among the three branches of government.436 However, legal process 
critics worry that the doctrine provides insufficient guidance to decision 
makers,437 and that the judiciary—prone to abstraction and elitism—will not 
be as responsive to the public in the same way as regularly elected 
legislators.438 For example, Professor James Huffman has argued that the 
doctrine had been distorted by the courts beyond its appropriate boundaries, 
threatening both liberty and democracy.439 
Finally, some worry about the implications of the public trust doctrine 
for upending the role of law in protecting settled expectations more 
generally.440 Professor Barton (“Buzz”) Thompson summarized generalized 
distrust of the public trust doctrine evocatively: 
To environmentalists and public-access supporters, the public trust 
doctrine appears to provide a relatively malleable legal tool to address a variety 
of issues involving the use and protection of waterways, beaches, and perhaps 
other important lands and resources. . . . These environmental advantages, 
 
Lazarus’s arguments that the public trust should be superseded by nuisance law with his 
conclusion that the two fill distinct roles). 
 433  Araiza, supra note 427, at 452; see also William D. Araiza, The Public Trust Doctrine as an 
Interpretive Canon, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 693, 697 (2012) (suggesting the public trust doctrine be 
interpreted as a canon of construction, establishing a background principle against which 
legislation and administrative actions are construed, rather than as an independent legal 
principle). 
 434  Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 712, 727 (Cal. 1983). 
 435  See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 412, at 48–49. 
 436  See, e.g., Blumm, supra note 353, at 580 (arguing that the public trust doctrine 
compensates for defects in the democratic process). 
 437  See, e.g., Araiza, supra note 427, at 432 (criticizing the process-justified public trust 
doctrine as a violation of the democratic political process); Thompson, supra note 368, at 1507–
08, 1532–33. 
 438  See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 412, at 533; see also Cohen, supra note 41, at 271–72. 
 439  See Huffman, supra note 412, at 533. 
 440  See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 42, at 130–31 (2006) (discussing concerns by coastal 
landowners that the administration of public trust principles would frustrate their 
expectations). 
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however, are conservative anathema. To many conservatives, the public trust 
doctrine is an anchorless doctrine that is anti-democratic and an easy way to 
evade critically important property protections.441 
Concerns about the malleability of the doctrine tap into age-old 
anxieties about the evolving nature of the common law—pitting the need for 
flexibility to meet changing public interests against the need for certainty to 
establish order and expectations.442 For example, the Mono Lake doctrine of 
ongoing oversight stands squarely on the side of flexibility at the cost of 
certainty443—but popular resistance to that idea may also explain why it has 
been seldom used.444 
C. Future Doctrinal Developments 
The Mono Lake case was followed by a surge of interest in use of the 
public trust doctrine for environmental advocacy.445 Following Professor 
Sax’s broad vision, litigants and scholars sought to expand its application to 
other water resource issues446 and to other critical public commons that are 
 
 441  See Thompson, supra note 412, at 48–49. 
 442  See generally Smith, supra note 90 (defending Mono Lake against critiques during its 
immediate aftermath). 
 443  See, e.g., Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal. 1983) (emphasizing that appropriative rights 
are nonvested, and subject to the state’s continuing oversight). 
 444  THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 87, at 685–87 (noting that the Mono Lake duty of ongoing 
oversight generated concern among water planners but never amounted to many changes in 
allocations). 
 445  See, e.g., Rose, supra note 16, at 711 (recognizing the inevitable conflict between the 
public trust and private property rights and considering what type of property can be 
considered inherently public); Blumm, supra note 353, at 579 (characterizing the public trust 
doctrine as “chameleon-like” in its ability to shape itself to different contexts); Frank, supra 
note 23, at 671–73 (analyzing the past and future of the public trust and the various resources 
subject to the trust); Allison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An 
Emerging Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393 (1991) (discussing the 
significance of the Mono Lake case in recognizing the preservation of ecological function as a 
trust value and proposing additional theoretical support for the move). 
 446  See, e.g., Ralph W. Johnson, Water Pollution and the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 
485, 486–88 (1989) (suggesting innovative application of the trust to nonpoint pollution sources 
left largely unregulated by the Clean Water Act); Danielle Spiegel, Can the Public Trust Doctrine 
Save Western Groundwater?, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 412, 414 (2010) (analyzing the public trust’s 
extension to groundwater and concluding that western states where depletion is most 
problematic are least likely to do so); Carol Necole Brown, Drinking from a Deep Well: The 
Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (advocating for 
expansion of public trust doctrine to preempt prior appropriations in western states where 
water scarcity issues loom); Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of 
Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 257–59 (1990) (discussing the future of water law and the 
takings law ramifications of government-mandated restoration of instream flows from 
appropriations right-holders); Sam Brandao, Louisiana’s Mono Lake: The Public Trust Doctrine 
and Oil Company Liability for Louisiana’s Vanishing Wetlands, 86 TUL. L. REV. 759, 761–62 (2012) 
(comparing Louisiana’s public trust doctrine to that of California following Mono Lake, and 
arguing for its expansion to better protect Louisiana’s coastal wetlands). 
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also subject to private appropriation.447 Some states, like Pennsylvania, have 
constitutionalized broader versions of the trust that extend to additional 
resources.448 Some scholars have emphasized the important role of executive 
agencies in administering the trust.449 Others have pointed to the doctrine as 
a means of resisting takings claims against regulations protecting trust 
resources,450 and some courts have agreed.451 
 
 447  See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. 
REV. 1437, 1440–41 (2013) (arguing that the public trust should be integrated into state wildlife 
protection law); Alexandra B. Klass, Renewable Energy and the Public Trust Doctrine, 45 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1026 (2012) (considering use of the doctrine within the field of renewable 
energy law); Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State 
Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 781 (2010) (arguing that the doctrine 
could provide “legal support for adaptive management-based climate change adaptation 
regimes”); David D. Caron, Time and the Public Trust Doctrine: Law’s Knowledge of Climate 
Change, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 441, 442–43 (2013) (advocating that the doctrine be used to prevent 
sea level rise in the context of climate change); see also Irma S. Russell, A Common Tragedy: 
The Breach of Promises to Benefit the Public Commons and the Enforceability Problem, 11 
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 557, 558, 560–61 (2005) (suggesting contract law as a solution to the 
difficulty of enforcing legislation designed to protect public commons). 
 448  See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (discussing the Pennsylvania 
Environmental Rights Amendment); John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a 
Constitutional Public Trust, 45 ENVTL. L. 257, 469–73 (2015); See also CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE 
REFORM, supra note 50 (listing state-by-state public trust surveys by Craig, Klass, and Blumm); 
Araiza, supra note 427, at 394–95 (noting that many state constitutions have developed a 
conception of the public trust that is based on a more substantive commitment to preservation 
than most common law analogues); Silvyn, supra note 62, 356–57, 373 (comparing California’s 
common law and constitutional public trust rights and concluding that the latter is more 
expansive). 
 449  See, e.g., Ronald B. Robie, Effective Implementation of the Public Trust Doctrine in 
California Water Resources Decision-Making: A View from the Bench, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1155, 1157 (2012) (reflecting on the impact of the case 30 years later and concluding that 
protection of the public trust should primarily rest with administrative actors); Dave Owen, The 
Mono Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Administrative State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1099, 1104–05 (2012) (considering the administrative ramifications of the case and its impacts 
on the California water board); Gregory S. Weber, Articulating the Public Trust: Text, Near-Text 
and Context, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1155, 1159 (1995) (examining the judicial, legislative, and 
administrative development of the public trust doctrine in California after the case). 
 450  See Ryan, supra note 42, at 123 (analyzing how the public trust doctrine operates as a 
background principle of law that can constrain the reasonable expectations of a property owner 
alleging a taking); J. Peter Byrne, The Public Trust Doctrine, Legislation, and Green Property: A 
Future Convergence?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 915, 916 (2012) (suggesting that the doctrine be 
used as a defense to innovative regulatory takings claims and to “sustain environmental 
legislation against judicial hostility”); John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a 
Background Principles Defense in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931, 931–34 (2012) 
(analyzing use of the doctrine as a takings defense in light of two California cases that did not 
allow it). But see Thompson, supra note 368, at 1532–33 (criticizing use of the doctrine to avoid 
just compensation for what otherwise looks like a taking). 
 451  See, e.g., Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *7 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 
5, 2005) (relying on the public trust doctrine in part to conclude in an unpublished opinion that 
there had been no taking of privately owned wetlands by a state wetlands regulation); see also 
Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072–73 (Wash. 1987) (determining that the public trust 
doctrine foreclosed a regulatory takings claim because the public trust doctrine already applied 
to private property owner’s tidelands prior to the adoption of a regulation prohibiting dredging 
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Additional noteworthy developments include the public trust doctrine’s 
application to oil and gas extraction activities impacting trust resources, its 
potential extension to groundwater resources, and its potential role in 
managing climate change. 
1. Application to Oil and Gas Extraction 
As discussed in Part II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently 
invoked its constitutional version of the public trust doctrine to protect local 
authority to regulate fracking andperhaps other extraction activities that 
pose a threat to local water resources.452 The Robinson Township decision 
marked a dramatic debut for Pennsylvania’s constitutional doctrine, which 
had not previously been understood as self-executing and had never before 
been used to invalidate state law.453 
Other municipalities have also attempted to assert local control over 
fracking, but they have been less successful—especially in states without 
similar public trust protections. For example, when two Colorado 
municipalities banned fracking within local limits, two separate state courts 
held their ordinances were preempted by contrary state law.454 Notably, 
Colorado’s public trust doctrine is far more limited than Pennsylvania’s 
expansive trust.455 Because Pennsylvania’s law is so encompassing, its model 
may not be easily replicated elsewhere. Nevertheless, Robinson Township 
has galvanized interest in applying the doctrine to the regulation of oil and 
gas extraction with impacts on water resources in states with a strong public 
trust.456 
 
and filling; remanded on factual question of whether private property owner uses land for any 
uses consistent with public trust doctrine, which could present a takings claim). 
 452  See Robinson Township, 83 A.3d 901, 913, 980 (Pa. 2013) (holding unconstitutional parts 
of Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas Act prohibiting local government water and air quality 
protections, on the basis of article I section 27 of Pennsylvania’s Constitution, which provides 
for the public trust doctrine). 
 453  Dernbach, supra note 48; see also supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (discussing 
the Pennsylvania Environmental Rights Amendment). 
 454  See Colorado Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Longmont, No. 2013CV63, at 17 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 
July 24, 2014) (order granting summary judgment); see also Colorado Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of 
Fort Collins, No. 2013CV031385, at 7, 9 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Aug. 7, 2014) (order granting summary 
judgment). 
 455  Compare Ling-Yee Huang, Restoring the Trust: An Index of State Constitutional and 
Statutory Provisions on Water Resources and the Public Trust Doctrine 2, 7 nn.37–41 (Ctr. for 
Progressive Reform White Paper No. 908-B, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1478512 (noting that Colorado’s public trust doctrine is limited to 
issues pertaining to “waters of every natural stream”), with Robinson Township, 83 A.3d at 913 
(recognizing that Pennsylvania’s public trust doctrine applies more broadly to natural resources 
affected by oil and gas). 
 456  See Ellen M. Gilmer, Enviros Push ‘Public Trust’ as Trump Card over Oil and Gas 
Influence, E&E ENERGYWIRE, August 15, 2014, http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060004530 (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2015) (noting that in Michigan, environmental attorneys assert that “even if the 
doctrine is limited to navigable water issues . . . it places a duty on government to consider how 
fracking and horizontal drilling could affect the water”). 
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2. Potential Extension to Groundwater Resources 
One important innovation from the Mono Lake decision may provide 
the basis for a historic extension of the doctrine to groundwater resources 
that supply surface waters subject to the trust. Just as the Mono Lake 
plaintiffs had argued that the doctrine be extended to Mono’s non-navigable 
tributaries to protect the trust values of the navigable lake,457 plaintiffs in the 
unfolding Scott River case are arguing that it must be extended to protect 
the non-navigable tributaries of a river that is demonstrably dependent on 
groundwater recharge.458 
Located in the Klamath River Basin, the Scott River is famous for 
hosting regionally important runs of salmon and steelhead trout. The lower 
reach of the river derives the majority of its flow from groundwater, and 
along hydrologic pathways that are perhaps unusually well established.459 
However, as locally permitted groundwater withdrawals increase, long 
portions of the river often run dry in the summer.460 In the Scott River case, 
the plaintiffs argued that the state must curtail groundwater pumping to 
satisfy its public trust obligations to protect the Scott River—even though 
groundwater has never before been considered within reach of the public 
trust doctrine.461 However, the lower court followed the Mono Lake 
precedent to conclude that diverting essential hydrologically connected 
groundwater tributaries is analogous to diverting essential non-navigable 
tributaries, opening the possibility that groundwater resources may also be 
subject to public trust protection.462 
3. The Atmospheric Trust Project 
After Mono Lake, litigants attempted to extend the doctrine to other 
resources, with little success. A few cases have borrowed the concept of the 
public trust as a basis for protecting fugitive wildlife.463 However, most U.S. 
 
 457  See supra notes 359–363 and accompanying text (describing Mono Lake’s extension of 
the public trust doctrine to non-navigable tributaries). 
 458  Scott River Case, supra note 362, at 2. 
 459  Marcus Griswold, Scott River Decision Gives Californians One More Tool to Keep Water 
in Streams, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Aug. 25, 2014), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/ 
mgriswold/scott_river_decision_gives_cal.html. 
 460  Scott River Case, supra note 362, at 3. 
 461  See id. at 2 (characterizing application of public trust doctrine to groundwater as an 
“issue of first impression”); see also Frank, supra note 23, at 675–76 (discussing application of 
public trust doctrine to groundwater in Hawaii, Vermont, and California). 
 462  See Scott River Case, supra note 362, at 10. 
 463  See, e.g., Betchart v. Dep’t of Fish & Game, 158 Cal.App.3d 1104, 1106 (1984) (holding 
that “California wildlife is publicly owned and is not held by owners of private land where 
wildlife is present”); Owsichek v. State Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 495 (Alaska 
1988) (“[C]ommon law principles incorporated in the common use clause impose upon the state 
a trust duty to manage the fish, wildlife and water resources of the state for the benefit of all the 
people. We have twice recognized this duty in our prior decisions.” (footnote omitted)); see also 
Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 447, at 1440 (discussing application of the public trust to protect 
wildlife). 
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efforts to expand the common law trust beyond water resources have not 
been successful.464 
Nevertheless, the principles underlying the doctrine raise legitimate 
questions about why the same premise of a public trust should not also 
apply to other critical commons resources that are also susceptible to 
harmful appropriation or monopoly. By the same rationale that applies 
public oversight to waterways, why not other natural resource commons like 
coral reefs, forests, or biodiversity, which also confer critical ecosystem 
services and represent inherent value? Perhaps these resources do not share 
the same common pool features of water, or draw less support from 
common law precedent. But if those are the relevant metrics, then what 
about the atmosphere? 
If the premise of the public trust is that some resources are so critical 
that they cannot belong to anyone in particular, and must instead belong to 
everyone,465 then why should it not also apply to the great air commons on 
which we all depend for life as surely as we depend on water? After all, the 
original Roman common law statement of the public trust included not only 
the sea and the shores of the sea as the common property of all the people, 
but also the air.466 In the United States, we have already expanded the trust 
from the sea to the great navigable lakes and rivers that span our country. 
Should the atmosphere be next? Has the public trust doctrine anything to 
say about the natural resource crisis that would appear to eclipse all 
others—the harms associated with impending climate change? 
Several scholars have argued that the doctrine could provide legal 
support for regulatory responses to climate change. Professor Robin Craig 
has argued that it could support adaptive management-based adaptation 
regimes.467 Professor David Caron has argued that it could support climate 
governance to forestall sea level rise.468 Professor Jeff Thaler and Patrick 
Lyons suggest it could be used to promote offshore renewable energy as a 
means of combating climate change.469 
Most ambitiously, however, Professor Mary Wood has sought to apply 
the trust directly to atmospheric resources, reviving the Justinian concept of 
the public trust as encompassing not just the running waters and the sea, but 
also the air.470 In urging use of the doctrine to protect endangered air 
 
 464  Ryan, supra note 1, at 490 (listing failed efforts to expand the doctrine).  
 465  See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text (discussing the philosophical 
underpinnings of the doctrine). 
 466  See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 467  See Craig, supra note 447, at 781. 
 468  See David D. Caron, supra note 447, at 455–56. 
 469  See Jeff Thaler & Patrick William Lyons, The Seas Are Changing: It’s Time to Use Ocean-
Based Renewable Energy, the Public Trust Doctrine and a Green Thumb to Protect Seas from 
Our Changing Climate, 19 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 241, 276 (2014). 
 470  See NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 65; Mary Christina Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation, 
in CLIMATE CHANGE: A READER 1018, 1021 (W.H. Rodgers, Jr. et al., eds.) (2011); Wood, Part I, 
supra note 65, at 80–81 (2013) (criticizing the failure of modern environmental law to protect 
natural resources and proposing broader state responsibilities as trustee, especially to combat 
greenhouse gas pollution); Wood, Part II, supra note 65, at 91, 93–98, 139 (discussing the 
pragmatic duties of governmental trustees, the interaction between the public trust and 
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resources, she argues that the state must curtail private appropriation of the 
atmosphere as a dumping ground for carbon pollution and other greenhouse 
gases.471 She argues that the government’s failure to prevent this 
unprecedented private appropriation is enabling short-sighted destruction of 
the most important public commons of all, leading to the global threats 
associated with rapid climate change.472 As she might describe it, it’s like 
giving away Chicago Harbor to self-interested private actors—only worse, 
because in this case, countless lives, communities, cultures, places, and 
species will be lost if we don’t take it back soon. 
As this Article goes to press, grassroots advocates are attempting to 
leverage Professor Wood’s theory in a nationwide campaign of 
environmental litigation. Individual atmospheric trust lawsuits and 
administrative petitions have been filed all around the country in separate 
states and the D.C. Circuit, each seeking to establish that the atmosphere is 
subject to the public trust, and that the relevant regulators must therefore 
act to protect it from private appropriation by air polluters as a carbon 
sink.473  
When government allows unfettered greenhouse gas emissions, the 
advocates argue, it is allowing private parties to despoil the air commons 
that belongs to all of us, in derogation of the public trust.474 Arrestingly, the 
actual plaintiffs in each of these lawsuits are children.475 Their argument is 
that it is their future, and the well being of the children that come after them, 
that will be squandered by our failure to protect the air commons today.476 
Public trust lawsuits by children on behalf of future generations may be 
haunting, but their legal argument faces a number of uphill battles. While the 
claim has roots in the original Justinian Code—applying the trust to the air, 
the running waters, and the sea and its shores477—the air commons has never 
before been recognized as a public trust resource in the United States. 
Recognizing one now would mark a substantial extension of the American 
doctrine, and an ambitious reach in a legal arena already marked by 
 
statutory law, and the ramifications of the trust for property rights in an effort to “reframe what 
is currently government’s discretion to destroy our atmosphere and other resources into an 
obligation to defend those resources”) (emphases in original); Mary Christina Wood, Tribal 
Trustees in Climate Crisis, 2 AM. INDIAN L.J. 518, 518–19 (2014) (considering the federal trust 
obligation as the legal cornerstone of Indian law and suggesting how tribes can use their status 
as co-trustees with the federal government to combat climate change). 
 471  Wood, Part II, supra note 65, at 93–98; see also Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 63. 
 472  Wood, Part II, supra note 65, at 97–98. 
 473  See James Conca, Atmospheric Trust Litigation—Can We Sue Ourselves over Climate 
Change? FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2014/11/23/atmospheric-trust-litigati 
on-can-we-sue-ourselves-over-climate-change/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 474  Id. 
 475  Sam Bliss, These Teens Are Taking Their Climate Lawsuit All the Way to the Supreme 
Court, GRIST, http://grist.org/climate-energy/these-teens-are-taking-their-climate-lawsuit-all-the-
way-to-the-supreme-court/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 476  Id. 
 477  See supra notes 12–22 and accompanying text (discussing the jus publicum). 
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suspicion among critics about the potentially limitless malleability of the 
doctrine.478 
Even if a court does newly recognize the atmosphere as a trust 
resource, fashioning a meaningful judicial remedy would prove a difficult 
challenge. It seems unlikely that any court would order the political 
branches to affirmatively regulate greenhouse gases beyond existing 
statutory obligations, and existing obligations are weak to nascent at the 
moment. Professor Wood argues that courts should impose natural resource 
damages for trust violations, and perhaps the threat of substantial enough 
damages could motivate changes in the law.479 However, courts imposing 
substantial fines on the political branches under a contentious doctrine of 
judge-made common law could raise separation-of-powers concerns that 
extend beyond the more ordinary judicial invalidation of political decision 
making.480 
As the California Supreme Court did at Mono Lake, a court reviewing an 
atmospheric trust claim could order the defendant agencies to use existing 
statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, or else explain 
why doing so was beyond their statutory authority or outweighed by 
competing public policy concerns.481 This could help facilitate a process of 
good climate governance that more meaningfully engages with the question 
of sovereign responsibility to protect trust resources in the atmosphere. That 
said, it also indicates an additional hurdle for the atmospheric trust 
litigation, because the state agencies currently recognized as responsible for 
administering the trust arguably lack the authority necessary to manage 
atmospheric pollution. 
The only government entity with true capacity to effectively regulate 
greenhouse gases is Congress, because greenhouse gas emissions are a 
collective action problem of the most national scope.482 Although many 
states are experimenting laudably with local climate regulation to valuable 
ends,483 most concede that it is a second-best solution to the ideal of a 
national program that could better control leakage and incentivize 
appropriately scaled responses.484 However, the public trust has not yet been 
recognized as applying to the federal government. As discussed in Part II, 
 
 478  See supra notes 408–444 and accompanying text (discussing critiques of the public trust 
doctrine). 
 479  Wood, Part II, supra note 65, at 97–98. 
 480  See Jeremy Waldron, Representative Lawmaking, 89 B. U. L. REV. 335, 335–37 (2009). 
 481  See Professor Amicus Brief, supra note 27. 
 482  Opponents would doubtlessly argue that even Congress lacks the needed capacity, 
because greenhouse gases mix evenly in the atmosphere at the international level—but unlike 
the states, at least the federal government can participate in treaty-making and other 
international efforts to resolve the problem.  
 483  See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, Whither Subnational Climate Change Initiatives in the Wake of 
Federal Climate Legislation?, 39 PUBLIUS 432, 437–39 (2009) (providing an overview of multiple 
climate change initiatives advanced by the states; see also ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG 
OF WAR WITHIN 145, 169–73 (2011). 
 484  See, e.g., RYAN, supra note 42, 169–73 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of 
state climate regulation and noting that state climate regulators still long for a national 
solution). 
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there is a compelling argument that the trust is an attribute of sovereignty 
that should apply to any sovereign with jurisdiction over a trust resource.485 
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court made that argument even more 
difficult in its recent PPL Montana486 decision, in dicta suggesting that the 
doctrine is a creature of state law alone.487 The D.C. Circuit recently rejected 
one of the atmospheric trust cases on these grounds (and the Supreme Court 
declined review).488 
For all of these reasons and potentially others, most of these lawsuits 
will likely fail. Indeed, several have already lost, including those filed in the 
state of Kansas,489 and in the D.C. Circuit, which the Supreme Court declined 
to review.490 Notably, the case proceeding in Oregon has succeeded, at least 
as far as the appellate court level.491 The New Mexico Court of Appeals 
recently affirmed the plaintiff’s contention that the state’s public trust 
doctrine applies to the atmosphere: “We agree that Article XX, Section 21 of 
our state constitution recognizes that a public trust duty exists for the 
protection of New Mexico’s natural resources, including the atmosphere, for 
the benefit of the people of this state.”492 Nevertheless, it declined the 
requested injunctive relief on grounds that the state’s air quality regulatory 
process provided sufficient remedy.493 There has also been mixed success in 
Arizona.494 
The atmospheric trust plaintiffs must further contend with the strategic 
criticism that the lawsuits themselves could be harmful, because the losses 
may produce unfavorable precedent that could set their ultimate cause back. 
 
 485  See supra notes 68–78 and accompanying text (discussing arguments that the public 
trust doctrine should also limit federal authority in appropriate cases). 
 486  PPL Montana, L.L.C. v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012). 
 487  Id. at 1235 (2012) (“Unlike the equal-footing doctrine, however, which is the 
constitutional foundation for the navigability rule of riverbed title, the public trust doctrine 
remains a matter of state law . . . .”). 
 488  Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, No. 14-405, 
2014 WL 6860603 (U.S. Dec. 8, 2014). 
 489  See Press Release, Our Children’s Trust, Kansas Teenager Pledges to Petition 
Department of Health and Environment for Climate Change Regulations After Court Tells Her 
to Go to Agency (June 13, 2013), available at http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/ 
2013.06.13-KansasPR.pdf; Petition for Declaratory Judgment, for Writ of Mandamus and 
Application for Injunctive Relief, Farb v. Kansas, (No. 12-C-1133), 2012 WL 5974335 (D. Kan. 
Oct. 18, 2012). 
 490  Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, No. 14-405, 
2014 WL 6860603 (U.S. Dec. 8, 2014). 
 491  Chernaik v. Kitzhaber, 263 Or. App. 463, 481 (2014) (“[P]laintiffs are entitled to a judicial 
declaration of whether, as they allege, the atmosphere ‘is a trust resource’ that ‘the State of 
Oregon, as a trustee, has a fiduciary obligation to protect . . . from the impacts of climate 
change . . . .’”) (citing the Plaintiffs–Appellant’s Opening Brief at 13, 29, Chernaik v. Kitzhaber, 
263 Or. App. 463 (2014) (No. A151856)). 
 492  Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, No. 33,110, 2015 WL 1120403 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 2015). 
 493  Id. 
 494  Butler v. Brewer, No. 1 CA–CV 12–0347, 2013 WL 1091209, at *1, *5–7 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
March 14, 2013) (rejecting the argument that determinations of what resources are included in 
the public trust doctrine and whether the state has violated the doctrine are non-justiciable, but 
ultimately dismissing the case for lack of standing). 
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Usually, the plaintiffs in strategic impact litigation make carefully tailored 
decisions about when and where to file, professionally counseled to aim for 
legal moments at which the chosen jurisdiction appears ready for the new 
interpretation the litigants are promoting.495 The scattershot approach of the 
atmospheric trust litigation defies this approach, and could create 
unwelcome precedent. Bringing cases in every jurisdiction all over the 
country all at one time is poetic, but it runs the risk that at least some (and 
possibly many) could result in negative judgments that could make it even 
more difficult to bring more narrowly tailored public trust claims in the 
future. 
Nevertheless, the atmospheric trust suits represent an important 
doctrinal development, even if most are unsuccessful. These litigants are 
relying on one of the most important and powerful features of the doctrine. 
For them, it is a legal device for starting a conversation among the three 
branches of government, about the sovereign obligations of government. In 
this time-honored way, the doctrine enables ordinary citizens to put pressure 
on the political branches through the judiciary, when the political branches 
seem not to be listening otherwise. Used appropriately, the doctrine protects 
the public against legislative or executive abdication, strengthening the 
legitimacy of the democratic process with additional checks and balances.496 
Even if the public trust lawsuit fails, it provides citizens the political 
leverage they may need to start a wider societal conversation about the 
management of trust resources—in this case, resources threatened by 
climate change. Public trust litigation thus provides an additional fulcrum 
into the political process, and into public dialogue. Even if no atmospheric 
trust case ever succeeds on the merits, these children will have initiated an 
open conversation about climate change in terms that ordinary people can 
immediately understand, and to which many have responded with support.497 
The strategic critique elides the expressive power of the doctrine to spark 
meaningful grassroots change, translating losses in court to political 
momentum. After all, most successful legal movements are preceded by 
countless failures, before bad precedent eventually gives way to change. 
Some brave somebody always has to begin somewhere. 
My own view is that while the legal argument may be too ambitious to 
succeed in the near term, the central premise is sound. Protecting a public 
commons from short-sighted private appropriation—as Professor Sax first 
urged in 1970—is the same premise that motivated the Mono Lake decision, 
the Illinois Central decision before it, and the Supreme Court of India 
thereafter. It makes sense to understand the public trust doctrine as an 
attribute of sovereignty at all levels. The air commons was recognized as a 
 
 495  James E. Pfander, Forum Shopping and the Infrastructure of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & 
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 355, 355 (2007) (discussing the use of forum shopping in deciding whether to 
bring impact litigation claims). 
 496  Gerald Torres, Joe Sax and the Public Trust, 45 ENVTL. L. 257, 393–97 (2015). 
 497  Bill Moyers, The Children’s Climate Crusade (Public Affairs Television, Inc. Jan. 1, 2015), 
transcript available at http://billmoyers.com/episode/full-show-climate-crusade/ (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2015). 
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public trust resource as early as ancient Rome, it is an equally essential 
public commons, and it is equally vulnerable to harmful private 
appropriation. Even if the American public trust only protects water 
resources, government would still be obligated to manage greenhouse gas 
emissions, given the implications for navigable waters of the national mega-
drought that has been forecast over the next century as a result of climate 
change.498 Scientists project that extreme drought will threaten the public 
trust resources of virtually all the nation’s navigable waterways—just as 
diversions to Los Angeles have threatened Mono Lake. 
These are the same arguments that once motivated me to leave the 
idyllic life of a Mono Basin forest ranger to pursue the calling of law as a 
means of solving critical societal problems. Recognizing this, I became a 
signatory on the law professor amicus briefs in the atmospheric trust cases, 
notwithstanding concerns about the risky strategy. To be sure, these 
lawsuits are not without their own strategic craft; the device of children as 
plaintiffs is certainly a strategic move. Yet the connection between these 
children and the future generations they represent is not opportunistic—it is 
literal. Concerns about precedent aside, there is something that goes beyond 
strategy, perhaps even beyond poetry, about children all around the country 
making this powerful public trust argument with a single voice, at this 
pivotal moment in time, because time appears to be running out. They may 
not win, but something about their argument is what the public trust 
doctrine was made for. 
V. CONCLUSION 
One hundred years after the opening of the Los Angeles Aqueduct, 
thirty years after the California Supreme Court’s decision, and twenty years 
after the Water Board’s Decision 1631 implementing it, this is an especially 
good time to revisit the Mono Lake story. 
After our great loss of Joe Sax last year, it is also a good time to think 
more about the public trust doctrine—and with newly unfolding doctrinal 
developments, there is much to consider. The Scott River litigation in 
Northern California may extend the Mono Lake doctrine to groundwater 
tributaries of navigable waters.499 The Robinson Township decision by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied that state’s constitutionalized trust to 
affirm local authority to regulate fracking, and possibly other extractive 
activities that threaten trust resources.500 The Atmospheric Trust Litigation, 
whether or not it is successful in court, is opening a conversation among the 
 
 498  Darryl Fears, A “Megadrought” Will Grip U.S. in the Coming Decades, NASA Researchers 
Say, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/todays-
drought-in-the-west-is-nothing-compared-to-what-may-be-coming/2015/02/12/0041646a-b2d9-
11e4-854b-a38d13486ba1_story.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (discussing scientific forecasting 
that over the next 100 years, soil moisture levels will reach desert levels throughout the western 
and midwestern states, with devastating consequences for waterways).  
 499  See supra notes 458–462 and accompanying text. 
 500  See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. 
15_TOJCI.RYAN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2015 2:53 PM 
632 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 45:561 
public and its three branches of government about how to respond to the 
challenges of climate change.501 
The Mono Lake story and these progeny provide a rich reservoir of 
context for considering the questions raised in Part I: 1) Who is the public 
trust doctrine’s relevant “public”?; 2) What interests does it protect?; 3) Does 
the doctrine impose substantive or procedural obligations?; and 4) How does 
the doctrine intersect with the separation of powers? Concluding the piece, I 
now return to each of these questions, considering the public trust doctrine 
as the California Supreme Court articulated it in the Mono Lake decision. I 
raise them mostly to provoke further reflection, offering only preliminary 
thoughts in response, and recognizing that the trust continues to evolve 
independently throughout the United States—and indeed, the world. 
A. Who Is the Public Trust Doctrine’s “Public”? 
First, as we recount this famous moment of public trust development, 
consider what we really mean by “public.” Whose interests count when we 
talk about the “public interest” at issue here? On what scale? And what’s the 
real difference between public and private interest? Is economic 
development a private or public interest? What about environmental 
protection? Who, then, was the relevant “public” in the Mono Lake case? 
Was it Lee Vining? California? The Audubon Society? The Forest Service? 
The scientific community? The international community? 
In the Mono Lake case alone, many different publics were operating, 
and they appeared to have different interests. Indeed, we often gloss over 
this question in the United States, where we seem to have some fragile 
working consensus about what the public interests means. But especially in 
other countries where I have offered this lecture—for example, in China—
my audiences are often very unsettled by this question. Isn’t all law in the 
public interest? What is the difference between public and private interest? 
Is the public interest just an aggregation of private interests, or is it 
something more? 
At least in the United States, most public trust cases suggest that the 
relevant public is the population of the relevant sovereign, usually the state. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court reached this conclusion most explicitly in 
the Matthews beach access case, in which it determined that the interests of 
state citizens who lived far away from the beach must be protected, even at 
the expense of the contrary interests among the more local beachfront 
communities.502 In Mono Lake, the court invoked the interests of the entire 
state of California in preserving Mono Lake—even though millions of Los 
Angelenos are missing their former access to water that will now remain in a 
basin where only a few hundred live. 
With that anti-utilitarian calculus in mind, the public interest has to be 
more than just the aggregation of private interests—unless we indulge an 
 
 501  See supra note 496 and accompanying text. 
 502  471 A.2d 355, 363–64 (N.J. 1984). 
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extravagantly hypothesized cost–benefit analysis of social preferences 
favoring environmental intangibles that we may never be able to prove. Even 
though the trust sounds in the concept of ownership, it has taken on 
undertones of stewardship, at least in California. This makes sense, given 
that an important difference between a state’s public trust obligations and its 
authority to protect public welfare under the police power more generally is 
that the public trust doctrine puts more focus on the welfare of future 
generations. In that way, the “public” of the public trust doctrine requires 
consideration of intergenerational equity, necessarily infusing the doctrine 
with undertones of sustainability.503 Nevertheless, the California high court 
also invoked utilitarian reasoning in affirming the need to move water great 
distances to the south, even when doing so causes harm to the basin of 
origin. Public trust resources may be damaged, but the public interest 
requires it. 
To that end, it may be that the California Supreme Court hasn’t quite 
worked out what the public interest means either—and more to the point, 
doesn’t have to. By assigning the task to the Water Board to figure out, the 
decision suggests that the public interest is whatever the political process 
determines it to be, through conventional measures of consultation and 
consensus building. That means that the Audubon Society, the Forest 
Service, the scientific community, and perhaps even the international 
community are all able to voice their interests as public participants.  
So perhaps the public trust “public” isn’t really a discrete collection of 
people; perhaps it is defined more as a process of public expression. (Public 
choice theorists, cue your violins!) Cynically, one could conclude that the 
role of the public in public trust controversies is therefore to be played by 
whoever turns out to be most successful at mobilizing the political process. 
Less cynically, how else is democracy intended to work? 
B. What Interests Does the Public Trust Doctrine Protect? 
A key question that continues to bedevil the discourse is the issue of 
which resources should receive protection by the doctrine. Why is it that 
some resources seem to merit public trust consideration, while others do 
not? If the trust protects more than just water resources—for example, if it 
protects the atmosphere—then what else does it protect? All resources 
subject to private appropriation and monopoly? Only those that reach some 
critical threshold of utilitarian or biocentric concern? Should it protect 
pollinators, soil microbes, and other natural resources that provide critical 
ecosystem services? At what point, if any, is the critics’ fear of doctrinal 
limitlessness made manifest?  
In the uncontroversial context of navigable waterways, Mono Lake and 
Marks assigned novel trust protection to ecological, recreational, and scenic 
 
 503  This important distinction also differentiates the public trust doctrine from the police 
power that is the sole province of state law, an important distinction for those urging a federal 
trust obligation. See supra notes 62–78 (discussing the interpretive possibility of a federal public 
trust). 
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values, but neither decision provided a definitive theoretical account that 
would resolve these issues in other resource contexts. But even when we 
agree that a resource warrants public trust protection, what interests should 
be taken into account when balancing environmental values against the 
competing economic development and private property values that collide in 
public trust conflicts? If you were the Water Board tasked with managing the 
conflict between prior appropriations and the public trust at Mono Lake, 
what would you consider? Gross domestic product? Birds? Human Health? 
Wilderness? Jobs? The Water Board had to consider each of these in the 
Mono Lake aftermath, but which should have more or less gravity?  
In reaching the balance established by Decision 1631, the Water Board 
was faithful to the compromise position that the court struck with regard to 
the integration of public trust and private appropriation principles in water 
allocation. The Board appeared to thoughtfully weigh the interests of birds, 
human health, the ecosystem, and the Mono Basin regional economy in 
establishing a target lake level that would mitigate the most severe harms to 
each of these interests. It also accounted for the municipal interests of Los 
Angeles, in allowing the city to divert at a reduced but steady stream once 
the most immediate danger to the Mono Basin ecosystem had passed—even 
while the system was still under stress. Still, the diversions were so 
reduced—by nearly 45,000 acre-feet per year504—that one could reasonably 
conclude that birds, human health, and wilderness in the basin had trumped 
competing interests in Los Angeles. 
Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the court’s decision, sentiment 
toward protecting Mono Lake ran high, even among Los Angelenos. Twenty 
years later, however, the lake has missed the designated 2014 lake level 
target.505 In fact, it has never moved above the halfway point of designated 
recovery.506 And notwithstanding the court’s recognition of an ongoing duty 
of supervision, there has been no move to revisit the allocation—although 
the dropping lake level will automatically trigger reduced exports in the near 
future.507 With worsening reservoir conditions,508 Los Angeles’s legitimate 
needs for water have also taken on new urgency. If the public interest is the 
political consensus of the moment, then perhaps the public interest has 
shifted, and 50% progress may be the new normal. Whether 50% progress 
should been seen as half empty or half full remains to be seen. 
That the public interest may be the political consensus of the moment 
lends credence to the concerns of the green dissent that environmental 
 
 504  Paul S. Kibel, The Public Trust Navigates California’s Bay Delta, 51 NAT. RESOURCES J. 35, 
51 (2011). 
 505  See Mono Lake Level, supra note 393 (showing that Mono Lake has not reached the 
target level since Decision 1631). 
 506  See Mono Basin Clearinghouse, Mono Lake Levels 1850—Present, http://www.mono 
basinresearch.org/data/levelyearly.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 507  See McQuilken, supra note 396 (explaining that exports will be reduced by 70% as the 
lake reaches a threshold of concern). 
 508  Cal. Dep’t of Water Res., Water Storage in Selected California Reservoirs, http://cdec. 
water.ca.gov/cgi-progs/rpts1/STORAGEM (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (showing declines in 
storage for several of California’s major reservoirs). 
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protection would do better with firmer commitments than mere public 
process.509 On the other hand, what if Los Angeles runs out of water? Some 
Central Valley agricultural communities without access to the municipal 
water grid have already done so this year,510 and it is excruciating to watch. 
(Come to think of it, though with joyless irony, it looks a lot like what 
happened to the agricultural communities of the Owens Valley.) Is the 
indeterminacy of the doctrine its Achilles’ heel, then—impeding certainty for 
both property rights and environmental protection? Or is it the genius of the 
doctrine—facilitating the ongoing conversation between citizens and 
sovereign that balances and rebalances competing interests as 
circumstances evolve? 
C. Does the Public Trust Doctrine Create Substantive or Procedural 
Obligations? 
Following this line of thinking, what exactly does the doctrine require 
of its administrators? At least as the California Supreme Court interpreted it, 
is there genuinely substantive content to the doctrine, in a meaningful 
command to protect trust values? Or is there merely a procedural 
requirement—similar to the procedural requirement under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)511—to have considered them before 
destroying them? The Mono Lake decision orders the Water Board to protect 
trust resources as much as is feasible, but how do we know how much that 
is? If we’ve thought it over and decided it’s not feasible, is that enough to 
satisfy judicial scrutiny? 
The language of the decision is sparse and vague on this point, so it’s 
hard to say definitively what substantive force there is to the command. The 
Mono Lake doctrine of ongoing oversight makes clear that the state may not 
rely on past decisions as determinative without seriously assessing their 
current and future consequences. And the Water Board must protect trust 
values as much as is feasible, perhaps appropriately punting the 
determination to agency experts, who can engage in whatever research and 
public participation is necessary to evaluate what is feasible under the 
circumstances. The decision doesn’t provide very much guidance about 
what “feasible” actually means. 
Still, the command does include a cognizable, if modest, substantive 
component. The court affirmatively requires that the resource be 
protected—at least as much as is feasible—and not just studied. In this 
respect, the California public trust doctrine is not equivalent to the 
information-forcing, substantively agnostic perspective that has come to be 
associated with NEPA. Although it may be weak in comparison to the 
 
 509  See supra notes 427–444 (discussing the environmental critique of the public trust 
doctrine). 
 510  See, e.g., Veronica Rocha, Central California Residents Rely on Bottled Water As Wells 
Run Dry, L.A.. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-central-
california-residents-wells-go-dry-20140826-story.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 511  National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370(h) (2012).  
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statutory commands of other environmental protection laws, there is an 
identifiable, substantive commitment in the California trust to achieving as 
much environmental protection as possible. 
Would the Water Board have satisfied the court’s command, then, had it 
considered the issues and simply decided to renew Los Angeles’s rights to 
divert as before? So long as it produced a solid enough record of the 
evidence to withstand the arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial 
review, a sympathetic court might have affirmed the agency against a 
challenge in court. On the other hand, we now know that this absolutely 
should not have satisfied the command to protect as much as is feasible, 
because more really was feasible. At least with the benefit of hindsight, we 
have seen that much more protection was possible, once Los Angeles 
undertook serious water conservation measures. So it will all come down to 
what kind of record the agency and plaintiffs produce, how hard a look the 
overseeing court takes, and perhaps how good everyone is at predicting the 
future at the moment of decision. 
The requirement to protect at some level thus deviates from NEPA’s 
purely procedural requirement, but it still remains unclear exactly what kind 
of substantive obligation is left. In keeping with California legal tradition, 
perhaps the trust obligation comes closer to the California Environmental 
Quality Act’s (CEQA)512 command—which disallows approval of an 
unmitigated environmentally harmful project only if the agency formally 
explains the overriding public considerations that outweigh the project’s 
significant impacts.513 Either way, much hinges on judicial and administrative 
discretion—but this is a doctrine that stakes its entire methodology on 
judicial discretion to oversee legislative and executive decision making. If 
we can’t trust the court to do that, then what’s the point of the doctrine? 
Yet if the doctrine really does create substantive obligations, why has it 
performed so little since the Mono Lake case?514 I suppose it is possible that 
everything is already perfect in California, but having lived there for a 
number of years, I suspect that it is not. Nevertheless, consider how much 
more the doctrine has done since then abroad, where its substantive 
component has shown undeniable force in various countries in Asia, Africa, 
and the Americas.515 In these international contexts, the trust sweeps with 
even greater aspiration, to the delight of its proponents, and the concern of 
its critics. 
 
 512  CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081 (West 2007). 
 513  Id. 
 514  See Owen, supra note 374, at 1122–23 (demonstrating how little actual change this 
doctrine has wrought in California since Mono Lake). 
 515  See generally Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public Trust 
Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion 
Vision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 741 (2012) (discussing various countries’ approaches to the public 
trust doctrine). 
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D. How Does the Public Trust Doctrine Intersect with the Separation of 
Powers? 
Following naturally from these concerns, the public trust doctrine asks 
us to consider the rightful roles of all the different legal actors in 
accomplishing this complex decision making. What is the appropriate role of 
the legislature? The courts? Administrative agencies? The citizens? Who 
should get to make the tough calls? Is the court an appropriate check on 
legislative action, or is it a feckless tyrant who will undo democratic 
processes? How much judicial discretion are we willing to accept? And how 
much power should the court have over the other branches? Should it only 
be able to undo bad decisions, or should it be able to affirmatively assess 
natural resource damages, as Professor Wood proposes? 
It’s old legal hat by now that most policy making is appropriately 
legislative, because the legislature is the designated apparatus of 
government for hammering out public consensus among competing 
considerations. That said, it is new legal hat that administrative agencies are 
increasingly involved in the process, often by legislative invitation in broadly 
framed requests for implementation, and often for good reason.516 Legislators 
can’t be experts about all the thorny details in every narrow subject of legal 
concern, but agency bureaucrats are subject matter experts by design. The 
court helps adjudicate civil, criminal, and constitutional disputes by 
interpreting the laws and the past judicial precedent making sense of them. 
The citizens oversee the entire mechanism by participating in the political 
process as voters, jurors, letter-writers, public commenters, NGO lobbyists, 
and occasionally as plaintiffs. 
The public trust doctrine engages everyone in their usual role. The 
legislative and executive branches coordinate in policy making and 
implementation until a citizen objects, filing a public trust claim. The court 
considers the claim in light of the available doctrine to decide whether the 
sovereign has abdicated a trust responsibility. If it concludes that the trust 
has been violated, the court simply informs the parties that the challenged 
government activity was ultra vires—beyond its authorized powers—and the 
sovereign actor revisits the decision. As a matter of public trust theory, the 
court doesn’t invalidate political action; the court simply interprets whether 
the applicable doctrine allowed or prevented the challenged action from 
having legal force. Which makes the judicial role seem less tyrannical—
although critics may legitimately worry about the expansion of judicial 
power under the doctrine through unchecked judicial interpretation. Then 
again, isn’t that the normal operating process of the common law? 
The separation of powers concern is certainly more muted when the 
doctrine is based on a constitutional or statutory source, because then the 
court is simply interpreting a legislative command. There is less room for 
judicial improvisation, and less room for criticism of judicial self-
aggrandizement. But even when the court is interpreting the common law 
 
 516  See, e.g., Owen, supra note 374 (discussing the preeminent role of administrative 
agencies in implementing trust-sensitive governance). 
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public trust doctrine, itself articulated by other judges, separation of powers 
concerns should not derail the doctrine.  
Just as Marbury v. Madison517 had to invent judicial review of 
congressional acts to protect the constitutional order,518 so the public trust 
doctrine was necessary to protect sovereign regulation of critical public 
commons from capture by private interests. And as noted above, what we 
casually refer to as the “common law” public trust doctrine may itself be a 
quasi-constitutional doctrine—or at least an inherent limit on sovereignty 
that should be recognized constitutionally, even if it is not expressly created 
by the constitution.519 (After all, the Constitution nowhere mentions the 
words “equal footing,” and yet we uncontroversially consider that a 
constitutional doctrine.)520 The Supreme Court does not presently favor this 
view,521 but as does the common law, constitutional interpretation 
sometimes changes with time. 
If the premise of the doctrine is that some commons resources must 
remain in public ownership, then the public has to be able to check political 
activity that falls prey to political patronage or other shortsighted impulses 
to expropriate trust values. Throwing the bums out is an insufficient 
corrective if the bums have already conveyed away an irreplaceable public 
trust resource—like Chicago Harbor, Mono Lake, or atmospheric integrity. 
But within the constitutional order, the only other avenue available to 
aggrieved citizens is to invoke judicial review, and have their day in court. 
For this reason, the judicial role in public trust cases is not antidemocratic—
it is a democratic corrective. It is the citizen’s last stand, the last opportunity 
to be heard within the political process. 
That the doctrine should evolve through the usual processes of the 
common law is necessary for the same reason the common law has always 
evolved.522 As always, times change—and with them, the circumstances. The 
public interest, that fleeting moment of consensus within the political 
process, changes with new circumstances. It is the same philosophical 
insight that underlies hallowed legal doctrines like the Rule Against 
Perpetuities and others hostile to dead-hand control. The judge evaluating 
the public interest in a given trust resource must have the flexibility to 
adjust. Notwithstanding, judges should be careful to exercise the restraint 
customary to their offices, because there is one aspect of the public trust 
doctrine that makes it special among the common law. 
Questions about the judicial and legislative roles with regard to the 
doctrine intersect with the ultimate question that faced the California 
Supreme Court in the Mono Lake case about which doctrine should trump—
 
 517  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  
 518  Id. at 177.  
 519  See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the trust as a constitutional doctrine). 
 520  See Blumm et al., supra note 65, at 494–96 (critiquing Idaho’s legislative restriction of the 
doctrine on grounds that it is an implied constitutional doctrine, like the equal footing doctrine, 
that should be immune from legislative abolition). 
 521  PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012). 
 522  See generally Matthews, 471 A.2d 355, 361–63 (N.J. 1984) (discussing the evolution of the 
public trust doctrine). 
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the common law public trust doctrine or the statutory doctrine of prior 
appropriations. It was a tricky question, because when statutes conflict with 
the common law, we normally conclude that the common law has been 
abrogated by the statute. The judge-made precedents of the common law are 
what the legal system uses to answer questions on which the legislature 
hasn’t spoken—and they are usually preempted uncontroversially when the 
legislature finally gets around to saying otherwise. So when the court 
determined that the public trust doctrine had not been displaced by 
statutory water law, that was a significant moment—revealing what sets the 
public trust doctrine apart. 
The decision affirms that the public trust doctrine is special among the 
common law, because it doesn’t just state a principle—it acts as a constraint 
on government action, limiting what the government may or may not do. It 
establishes a line beyond which the government cannot go. It acts, as 
discussed previously, as a limit on sovereign power.523 With that in mind, 
should the sovereign be able to free itself from that limit by destroying it 
with a statute? A few states may have come to that conclusion, by abolishing 
or limiting the common law public trust doctrine, as Idaho famously did by 
legislative enactment.524 But most have not done so, and like California, have 
honored the principle that the public trust can’t be easily abrogated. To 
change the public trust in these states would require public consent, as 
through constitutional amendment by referendum.525 
In states with strong common law doctrines, then, judges bear a 
heightened responsibility to act carefully, because what they decide cannot 
easily be undone by casual legislative response. In this respect, as even the 
famously libertarian Professor Richard Epstein has noted, the public trust 
doctrine has a constitutional dimension.526 When the Supreme Court renders 
a statutory interpretation that Congress doesn’t like, it can always amend the 
statute. But when the Court determines that a congressional act violates the 
Constitution, the legislature has no recourse but to accept the court’s 
judgment. Judicial public trust determinations have similar force, and must 
be taken equally seriously. 
And yet, so they are—and the sky has not fallen. Constitutional 
interpretation, while important, is not exotic; this is what we regularly ask of 
our courts. By and large, they are good at it. Everyone can point to a judicial 
decision she doesn’t like, but that hardly invalidates the system. Indeed, we 
hold out our constitutional system of judicial review as a model for the 
world. In which case, perhaps we should have more faith in the judicial 
administration of the public trust doctrine. 
 
*** 
 
 523  See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 524  Idaho Code Ann. § 58-1203 (West 2012). 
 525  See BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 47, at 4–5 (discussing the origins and nature of the public 
trust doctrine and noting the open question of “whether the public trust has constitutional force 
in those instances where it has not been incorporated explicitly into a constitution”). 
 526  Epstein, supra note 41, at 426–28. 
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Returning finally to the Mono Lake story: the epic tale continues. Water 
continues to flow back into the lake, and also south to Los Angeles. Decision 
1631 had directed that the lake reach its target level in 2014, and of course, 
that did not happen.527 As this Article goes to press, news is breaking that Los 
Angeles will have to begin curtailing exports to 4,500 acre-feet per year—an 
old restriction that few had expected to see again—because the lake level on 
April 1, 2015 had receded to 6,380 feet.528 But there has been less rain in 
California these past ten years, and it is projected that there will be even less 
in the future. 
Perhaps the state’s duty of ongoing supervision will eventually require 
that even the current plans for diversions must be revisited because of the 
drought that has prevented the Lake’s recovery. On the other hand, the lake 
has recovered substantially from the time of the litigation, and the drought is 
also causing hardship for Los Angelenos that may factor in to any 
reconsiderations. This is the state’s delicate balancing act—its ongoing task 
to negotiate between Los Angeles’s legitimate needs for imported water and 
the competing environmental, cultural, and economic reasons to keep it in 
the Mono Basin. The requirement of this balancing act, displacing the force 
of an erroneous decision of the past, is itself a substantial achievement. 
Nothing in the California Supreme Court opinion tells us exactly what 
the balance should look like, but it does tell us to think things through 
carefully. Bearing in mind the rich history behind the Mono Lake litigation 
and all the questions it continues to raise for us, let us be certain that we do. 
 
 
 527  See Mono Lake Level, supra note 393 (listing historical lake levels from 1919 to as 
recently as February 1, 2015). 
 528  McQuilken, supra note 396 (“The lake has declined to a level at which water exports to 
Los Angeles are, by the terms of the State Water Board’s rules, automatically reduced by 70%. 
DWP will be limited to 4,500 acre-feet of water export, a lake-protecting restriction that no one, 
until recently, thought would ever be activated again. It was a solemn, though not unexpected 
outcome, given that California’s drought is entering its fourth year and the Mono Lake 
watershed is officially classified as being under ‘exceptional’ drought.”) 
